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ABSTRACT
This study was a pre--phase A study initiated under NASA contract by JPL
to investigate the safety implications of Space Shuttle launched spacecraft
that use liquid fluorine as the oxidizer for spacecraft propulsion.
The referenre spacecraft, for study purposes, was similar to a MJS 77*
Mariner in configuration,
's
Fluorine based retropropulsion will be needed in the future to effectively
conduct a number of planetary orbiter missions particularly those to outer
planets. Technically, the concern for Space Shuttle launched spacecraft
consists of safely loading, transporting and carrying into space a tank contain-
ing typically I000 pounds of liquid fluorine which is a cryogenic, toxic, and
potentially corrosive fluid.
Feasibility of safe operation was investigated and the equipment and
procedures necessary to maximize the chance of success determined. hazards to
the Shuttle were found to be similar in [rind if not degree to those encountered
in use of nitrogen tetroxide (also a toxic oxidizer). It was concluded that
residual risks from spacecraft using fluorine and nitrogen tetroxide oxidizers
during ground and flight handling may be reduced by isolation of the oxidizer
to only its tank. Operation of planetary spacecraft propulsion in the vicinity
of the Shuttle in earth orbit is not required. Proper recognition of the
characteristics of both of-these oxidizers must be given in spacecraft design
and in ground and flight operations. Safety precautions appropriate to payloads
carried in manned vehicles were developed in the study.
The primary . hazard to personnel was identified as propellant loading
operations which are very similar in nature to routine transfers from the truck
trailers used during delivery of fluorine to industrial users...These operations
should be accomplished in an area reasonably remote from personnel and facilities
concentrations.
Transportation and installation of the loaded propulsion system involve
hazards second only to loading propellant where great care m!)st be.exercised.
Clearing the pad during spacecraft mating with. the Shuttle OrbiterA s recommended.
i
*Mariner Jupiter Saturn designated for launch in 1977
i
The considerations relating to transport: of the spacecraft b1propellant
propulsion systems considered here have much in common with carrying of other
propulsive payloads such as monopropellant hydrazine systems, and the OMS kits
which utilize N 204JMM€{. The selection of solid propellant for the IUS would
appear to eliminate the hazard of propellant leakage from the IUS.
a
Residual hazards during flight in the Shuttle cargo bay from a propulsion
system which has been subjected to propellant loading, storage, transportation
and installation in the Orbiter appear low. It is important, however, that
	 a
hazards to the propulsion system from the failure of other systems also in the
cargo bay are minimized.
To maximize the probability of success, basic work should be continued and
expanded with goals delineated to be matched against specific criteria.
511
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FOREWORD
The principal purpose of this study was to ascertain the more im-
portant effects on the Space Transportation System (STS) when liquid
fluorine (LF2 ) is transported on the STS as part of a Shuttle- launched
spacecraft. The study might best be categorized as a pre- ,Phase A study.
Planetary orbiters. will probably require bipropellant systems, so it
was clearly desirable to study the effects attendant with a space-
storable propellant such as LF2 as compared to an earth-storable propel-
lant. The oxidizer selected for comparison with fluorine was nitrogen.
tetroxide (N 204 ), because it is an acceptable oxidizer for transport on
the Shuttle.
The second purpose was to evaluate, on the basis of these effects,
the feasibility of carrying fluorine as part of a Shuttle payload. There
is always a risk to Shuttle from carrying any oxidizer or high pressure
gas. The basis for judgment was whether or not the risks associated with
a propulsion system containing fluorine could be reduced to the level of
one containing N204 . The comparison method (LF 2 versus N204 ) was used
throughout the study to give it the proper perspective since some type
of oxidizer is normally required for the propulsion system of a planetary
orbiter spacecraft.
The study begins with the loading of the spacecraft propulsion
system at ETR and concludes with deploywent of the IUS/Tug, avid it also
considers Shuttle abort modes.
9
The scope of the present study tended to broaden as it progressed;
,o
and the initially budgeted effort was not large enough to examine a 	 j
number of interesting areas. The question of whether or not to dump
propellant in case of abort, for example, could not be resolved within
the resources- avai l.abl e, so an arbitrary choice to assume dump :would. be
required was made for purposes of conservatism_ in continuing the study.
.Iii:
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The uncertainty surrounding the selection of the Interim Upper Stage
„nail .g ust before the studv ended orecluded an evaluation of some.
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1.1 SCOPE AND PURPOSE
The Space Shuttle or Space Transportation System (STS) will introduce
a new era in transportation, the era of routine flights and operations on
orbit. much creative energy, imagination and -Financial support have gone
into the design of the Shuttle system, beginning with conceptual design
and sizing, through the more detailed design . work now in progress. Now
that the capabilities of the STS are known, potential users such as the
spacecraft community are investigating how best to utilize these cap-
abi l i'ti es .
There are a number of missions of great interest which involve the
orbiting of Mariner class Spacecraft around the outer planets. Representa-
tive spacecraft for these missions are shown in Figures 1-1 through 1-3.
in order to accomplish these missions, consistent with anticipated Shuttle
Upper Stages (SUS) and with reasonable flight times, it has been found
cost effective in many cases to utilize the high level of spacecraft
planetary retro-propulsion performance that can only be obtained with
fluorine containing oxidizers such as liquid fluorine or fluorine-oxygen
mixtures.*	 j
i
One aspect of the use of such spacecraft propulsion was its effect,
If any, on Shuttle safety interfaces. This study was instituted to explore
saf ,:y 'opli.cations for Space Shuttle launched spacecraft using the space
'	 storable propellant combination of liquid fluorine as oxidizer and hydra-
zine as fuel ( LF2/N 2N4 ). Mission constraints arising from the Space
Shottic par-Formance and configuration were reasonably well known but the
constraints on spacecraft propulsion which result from Shuttle safety con-
siderations were not.
r
The basic objective of the study was to consider ground and flight
operations and to assess the unique crew and Shuttle hardware safety
*By dPL and TRW
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f Two variations of space storah1.e and a typical earth storable pro-
pu1sion system are shown in Figures 1-4 through 1•-6
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The twelve tasks discussed in Section 4 are:.
Tasks 1 and 2 - Spacecraft Propulsion Launch processing options
for ground handling.
Task 3 - LF2 temperature control options on the ground and in
the Shuttle
Tusk 4 - Oxidizer leak detection and control
Task 5 - N204 vs LF2 propulsion systems comparison
Task 5 - Oxidizer in-flight dump system,
	 analysis rC the possible
need For
Task 7 - Fluorine Feasibility assessment'
Task S Orbiter cockpit warning displays
Task . 9 - Prelaunch procedures
`Cask 10 - Shuttle and spacecraf c
 hardware impact of fluorine
propulsion
Task
w
11 - Comparison of results with a previous , study.
Task 12 -	 Flight h Wizard analysis
i
:
I
l --1 O
2.	 SUMMARY
2.1 OBJECTIVES, APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS
It was the purpose of this study to compare crew and Shuttle hardware.
safety interfaces which would result from the use of candidate earth stor-
able and space storable (such as F2/N2H4) propulsion systems including
those of the spacecraft, launch vehicle, ground support and on-ground and
flight operations.
From a technical standpoint two propellant systems were compared.
One is the fluorine/hydrazine combination. The other is the well known
nitrogen tetroxide/monomethyl-hydrazine combination used on the Shuttle
Orbit maneuvering system. In either case the oxidizer weight did not
exceed 3000 pounds.* Both blowdown and externally regulated pressuriza-
tion systems were considered.
It was to be assumed that launches will be from KSC using the Space
Shuttle (STS) as the carrier with its payload a Mariner spacecraft and IUS/
TUG. ** The NASA designated SUS is assumed to be used to accelerate the
Mariner spacecraft towards the vicinity of the target planet.
The overall approach for the study was to accomplish the twelve tasks
delineated in the Statement of Work in compliance with the stated study
objectives of;
• Comparing the safety interfaces between the Shuttle (con-
sidering both crew and hardware) and the spacecraft propulsion
system when using LF2 as an oxidizer versus N204.
• Identi.fy ng any new and/or unique propulsion system requirement
that would result from the use of liquid fluorine (LF2) as an
oxidizer in the propulsion system of a planetary spacecraft
launched from the . Space.Transportation System (STS).
*This corresponds to 5000 lbs of total propellant weight which is as much
Emphasis was placed on both hazard identification and design solu-
tions to minimize or eliminate credible Hazards.*
In performing this study, TRW drew on the results of a number of
previous and concurrent studies that involve the use o'r F21 2H4 in
advanced space propulsion systems and other experience in the use of F2
as oxidizer at TRW's test facility. Safety aspects of handling liquid
fluorine in preflight and flight operations or in a ground-based test
-facility are closely related. Since there is not as yet any experience
with Space Shuttle launched spacecraft propulsion, it was necessary
first.to identify procedures for earth storable 6204/MMH propellants.
After completion of each of the safety tasks considering earth
storable propellants, the study program tasks were completed for space
storable propellant to clearly specify how and why the use of the space
storable propellants might change the safety study results.
The study utilized system safety engineering methodology to investi-
gate potential hazards and system design engineering to define how exist-
ing technology could be used to provide safe operations.
Due to the value of the Shuttle and its facilities and the manned
aspects of Shuttle Orbiter operations, which may have their only precedent
in the Apollo program, significant safety precautions are required. In
response to this need, compromises of the spacecraft propulsion to achieve
increased safety have been considered which appear to be acceptable in
terms of performance and cost..
i.e., one which might reasonably exist or occur. See definition,
Appendix A, page A-20
2-2
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This study was accomplished in two phases. !luring the first phase
	
^l
the twelve tasks of the work statement were addressed. Participation and 	
I
review of this study by NASA Headquarters, JSC, MSFC, KSC and LRC was
	 j
accomplished by several trips and numerous telephone tails and by mail
communications. As the program progressed in the second phase the alter-
native design concepts and trade-offs involved in safe transport of a
loaded spacecraft in the Space Shuttle emerged.
Concepts for transport of earth storable N 204/MMH tended to follow
the approaches being evolved for 1) use of earth storable (Transtage or
Agana derivative) IUS concepts, 2) the QMS kits and 3) hydrazine ROCS
systems on proposed earth orbital spacecraft. Concepts for transport of
the space storable (cryogenic) 
LF2/N2H4 sti►rtem evolved from 1) the earth
storable concepts, 2) previous studies for expendable booster launched,
LF2 based, upper stage propul::I on and 3) concepts for cryogenic L02/LF2
IUS or Tug designs.* As the study progressed there was an on-going
evolution of the Shuttle payl.oad accommodations, requirements and criteria.
The IUS and Tug concepts also continued to evolve. The structure of the
study as it was accomplished can be summarized by nine elements;
1. Accumulation of design concepts, requirements and criteria.
2. Establishment of study format based on system safety engineering
techniques.
3. Comparison of safety parameters.
4. Conduct hazard analysis.
5. Postulate design concepts, processing sequences and procedures
to eliminate or mitigate hazards.
6. Evaluate alternate concepts and select most promising.
7. Document results.
S. Review with sponsoring agenices.
9. Refine the results and determine recommended follow-on work.
The results of this process are summarized in the rest of Section 2.
*The decision to use solid propellant for the IUS came at the end of the
study.
-	 E
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This study has been limited to some degree by the unavailability of
detailed information about the Shuttle Orbiter as no description of pro-
pellant dump accommodations or their design criteria for the Orbiter was
available. Also, only limited data on the Payload Changeout Facility was
available.
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2.2.1 Comparison of Safety aspects between propellants involves a
number of considerations related to physical and chemical properties of
the propellants and physiological effects on humans. Some of these
aspects are compared in Table 2-1.
Table 2.1.
COMPARISON OF SAFETY ASPECTS
ASPECT N^04 LF2
1. STATE OF LIQUID AT.USE ti 50 PSIG EARTH STORABLE 0 PSIG GRYOGENIC
2. EMERGENCY EXPOSURE LIMIT, 30 (10 MIN. NO2 ) 15	 (10 MIN.)
PAM
3. OSHA LIMIT, PPM** (5.0 No2 )* 0.1	 (QUESTIONABLE)
4. THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE*** (5.0 NO 2 )* 1.0 (REVISED FROM 0.1)
5. BREATHING INDIVIDUAL WILL DAMAGE WILL NOT ,BREATHE OVER
HIMSELF UNKNOWINGLY 25 PPM (5 MIN. EEL)	 g
6. OLFACTORY DETECTION NOT UNTIL EEL IMMEDIATE AT TLV
7. PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS DELAYED PULMONARY EDEMA MINOR OR NODE
AT SELF-DETECTION
8. TOXICITY OF REACTION BETTER: NO., NO, N 21 H 2{) WORSE THAN FOR N 204 ; HF
PRODUCTS 9
9. VULNERABILITY IN USE UNINSULATED INSULATED
10. FIRE CONTROL DIFFICULT DIFFICULT
11. EXPLOSION 0.05 TNT/LB ti 0. 0
.
2 TNT/LB.ROM
12. SPILL DISPERSAL. WORSE BETTER
* N204 DISSOCIATES . TO NO2 .IN THE ATMOSPHERE
** 8 HCUR WORK DAY
*** REFERENCE l - THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE FOR REPEATED 8 HOUR WORK DAY

tends to produce head in the. cloud which encourages vertical dispersion
Spill tests wi th LF2 were conducted at AF'RPL: in quantities of a pproxi-
mately 100.0 lbs . ,	 Data from these tests can be used as a rough guide in
formulating distances for personnel concentrations during .propellant
flowing arid-handling i n this application. 	-
Both propellants are hypergolic with amine (hydrazine based) fuel's.
Fluorine, however, is also hypergolic with many other "fuels, and eyen	 -
reacts vigorously with t-rater producing hydrofluoric acid, 'oxygen, and
steam.	 Fire control is thus di ffi cul, as it is with other strong
oxidizers.
Explosive hazard estimation involves certain assumptions and depends
on the -Fuel available, but because. of the somewhat greater reactivity of
fluori ne, its explosive po tenti al is considered less than N20	 because it
is more difficult to achieve a concentrated mixture of reactants.
-t 2,2	 Results
In the rest of 'this section, the overall 	 results of this study are
summarized by main topics of interest including;
Effect of fluorine as compared to N 0^ on KSC}operations
Eff=ect of fluorine as compared to N204 on 'ETR operations
-	 Effect of fluorine as compared to N a	 on Shuttle Post Launch
operations
Effect of fluorine.as compared to N 0 4 on the Shuttle Orbiter and
the Shuttle Upper Stage
Effect of fluorine as compared to N 29 on Spacecraft Propulsion
System; Qesign
Spacecraft Propulsion System des ign recommendations	
-a
In Sections 3 and 4 of thi s report; the technical background for
the use of fl uorine and the detailed exposition .of the originaltwel `ve
tasks of the study are described.	 The appendices include. important data
as to 	 thy` +7pL design gn concept, glossary o.f terms and l winch s7 to and
f11'ght 'hazard analyses.
r
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Effect of Fluorine as Compared to N 204 on KSC Operations
x.2.2.1	 S acecraft Processin g Options
Many processing options were considered to determine how the empty'
w spacecraft propulsion system should be loaded with oxidizer and how the
installation into the Space Shuttle should be accomplished.
The two loading alternatives considered were:
1.	 Loading of the spacecraft tanks remotely from the pad.
2.	 Loading of the spacecraft tanks at the pad.
r Remote loading was clearly indicated.
The other main consideration was whether the spacecraft should be
installed into the Shuttle Orbiter in the normal payload processing loca-
tion at the Orbiter Processing Facility, or via the Payload Changeout.
9
Room at the pad.
.} Other variations of integration sequence with the IUS or Space Tug.
were also considered. 	 As for comparisO.ns between the two oxidizers, there
is no basic-difference in the recommended processing sequences for LF2
and N 04 except as noted later.
The recommended sequence was based on the following criteria:
1.	 For safety of KSC personnel and the Shuttle, spacecraft propel-
lant should be loaded remotely from the pad.
2.	 rating of the spacecraft with the IUS/Tug should be done either
in the Shuttle Orbiter Bay or in the Payload Changeout Room to
avoid transporting spacecraft propellant through she OPF and VAB.
3.	 I•n order to Verify form, fit, and 'Function of the interfaces
between the Spacecraft and the IUD,/Tug and the Spacecraft and.
the Orbiter, a preliminary "dry" mating may be required with the
_	 HS/Tug and Shuttle or Shuttle simulators.	 This would be done
early in : the schedule of prelaunch' QperatiGns:
4	 The resulting steps are shown in Figure 2-1.
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SELECTED PROCESSING SEQUENCES
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PROPULSION	 LOAD	 **
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	 ORBITER
	 BAY DOORS 
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" A SPARE PROPULSION SYSTEM MAY BE INCLUDED
LF 2 REQUIRES LN 2 COOLING IN ALL. SUBSEQUENT STEPS UP TO LAUNCH
Figure 2-1
{
i
k	 The only difference between sequences recommended for LF2 and that for
N204 is that liquid fluorine requires cool i ng from the time of propellant
loading until .1 aunch.
i
In this sequence, the spacecraft is received at the launch site and
	 l
checked, out to verify . that..no damage occurred in transportation.	 Next
n it is dry* mated with the IUS or Tug in a location such as the Spacecraft
Assembly and Encapsulation Facility to verify compatibility of form, fit
and function of the mechanical and electrical interfaces, 	 verification
of compati bi l i ty with the Shuttle by means of 'a Shuttle Simulator is also
anticipated.	 These checks would minimize the chance of a loaded spacecraft
	 #
meeting the IU.S/Tug or Shuttle for the. first time at the pad in an incom-
patible condition which could impact the prelaunch schedule and hence
threaten. a slip. in the Iaunch-readinest date.
Y Next the spacecraft propulsion is isolated and taken to a remotely
located Oxidizer Dedi catcd Facility, for : example ESA-60 suitably mod i i ed.
Propellant loading always, of course, takes place with minimumpersonnel
exposure.
After an appropri'a-te stabilization period it is recommended that the
loaded propulsion be taken to a "propulsion garage." 	 The propulsion
garage is a remotely located building of simple. construction which is 	 ?
suitable for storage of the propulsion system. 	 The propulsion system is
monitored for:leakage or other changes of status..
I
As the launch readiness date approaches, the loaded propulsion system
and spacecraft are integrated. and transported to the Payload Changeout
Facility.
	
Depending on the design of the spacecraft and IUS/Tug, i nte-
..gration.of the spacecraft and IUS or Tug occurs either inside the Shuttle
Cargo Bay or in the Payload' Changeo`ut Roam, (opii on 3 or option 4).
fi.e. empty of propellants
i
Figure 2-2. Launch Pad Operations
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0	 2.2.2.2 S p acecraft Timeline For Pre- launch Operations
Spacecraft timel'nes for LF 2 and N 204 are virtually identical except
for a few hours required to disconnect and reconnect N 2 cooling lines when
the propulsion system is moved after loading. A period of thirty days in
the loaded condition is considered appropriate to gain assurance that the
tank is sound.
2.2.2.3 Shuttle Timeline for Pre-launch Operations
Shuttle timelines for LF2 and N 204 are expected to be the same except
for an additional period for LF 2 spacecraft not exceeding three hours.
This time period is considered necessary to 1) clear the pad for arrival
of the loaded spacecraft (one_ hour), 2) clear the pad for reconnection of
LN 2 coolant at the Payload Changeout Room (one hour), and 3) clear the
pad for reconnection of the LN 2 coolant after installation in the Orbiter
(one hour). All of the effects of propellant safety considerations includ-
ing pad clearance times total a maximum of six hours for N 204 and nine
w)	 hours for LF2 as shown in Figure 2-2.
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I 2 2+1
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TOTALS ^— 9
DURING
TRANSPORT
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2.2.2.4 Effects of Fluorine as Compared to 
N204 
on KSC Facilities -
Pa load Changeout Facilit
Effects of fluorine as compared to N204 in the design of and acti.-
vities in the Payload Changeout Facility are similar to those at the
spacecraft propellant loading site (ESA). The Key items are:
1. Automatic fluorine-specific vapor detection equipment is recommended.
2. Some additional care in evacuating and minimizing personnel during
arrival of the fluorine system and its installation into the Payload
Changeout Room, (e.g. personnel may be evacuated prior to arrival of
the spacecraft). This is due to the somewhat greater toxicity of F
3. A time allowance for connection of LN 2 cooling to the system after
installation in the p ayload Changeout Room.
4. Availability of cryogenic LF2 dewar tank or truck for propellant
drain in case of inability to either continue pre-launch operations
in accordance with the timeline or "back-out" the propulsion system,
1	 whether it is in the PCR or Arbiter Bay.
-'	 2.2.3 Effect of Fluorine as Compared to N20µ on ETR Facilities
2.2.3.1 Spacecraft Explosive Safe Facility
ESA-50 has been successfuly used for loading of Mariner spacecraft
with N 02 4/MMH and could presumably be modified to accommodate fluorine.
A modified ESA-60 or other oxidizer facility designed to handle fluorine
on an intermittent. basis will require, as does the N 20 4 facility, a
reactivation prior to and deactivation after each launch. All lines and
yalves and any tanks should preferably be maintained in a purged, dry and
inert condition to prevent possible corrosion by fluorine in combination
f
with moisture.
z
_z
For use with LF2, the following capabilities would be needed for a
modified ESA-60 or other site:
Y
	
1.	 Remotely operated fluorine transfer lines for trans,"er from trailer
truck to spacecraft propellant tanks
{ .1
	
2.	 LN 2 cooling equipment and LN2 dewar

2.2.5 Effect of Fluorine as Compared to N 204 on the Shuttle. Orbiter
and the Shuttle Upper Stage
2.2.5.1 Flight Operations and Modes
In normal flight operations, the LF2/N2U4 propulsion system will be
disconnected from ground cooling at T-O. It will have on -board cooling
for 24-36 hours provided by LN2 Uewars. The tanks will be unpressurized
(I bar, or 0 psig) from liftoff to deployment of the spacecraft from the
Shuttle Orbiter. Prior to use of the spacecraft a back -off maneuver of
approximately one mile separation between the Shuttle and spacecraft/SUS
will be accomplished. Only after the back -off maneuver will the space-
craft be pressurized. No operation of the spacecraft propulsion will
occur until 7-21 days after departure of the spacecraft from earth orbit.
Abort modes considered include:
o Return to launch site
o Abort to orbit
o Abort once around
o Abort; from orbit
o Landings at landing sites of opportunity
Flight hazards -from exi ui zers , either N204 or LF2 would result from:
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AFO could involve a longer time for cryogenic propellant to heat up,
however, there is also a longer time to perform propellant dump or payload
jettison procedures.
Landings at siLas of opportunity could involve additional risks if
equipment to handle residual F2
 is not available, however this is a secon-
dary hazard since all oxidizer is assumed normally dumved. Where is need
for an additional study of this landing mode.
In order to accommodate the spacecraft propulsion, a number of
effects on the Shuttle Orbiter will be incurred. Most of these are
needed for both N 204 and LF'2 except for the LN 2 coolant supply.
Affected systems in the Shuttle bay are:
1. Common requirements for N 204 and Li='2:
- Dump line (LF2
 requires an F2 passivated line)
-- Spacecraft relief val ye effluent line
- Exclusion of combustibles to the extent possible
I
I
2. Specific LF2
 requirement:
LN2
 coolant supply
For liquid fluorine a special fluorine dump line may be required,
and fluorine oxidizer tank relief lines will be required. A dump line
for the fluorine tank will have to be passivated. It is suggested that
during flight, helium pressure be maintained in the line to insure its
cleanliness.
The effects of possible leakage on the Shuttle Orbiter, if not
sufficiently well inhibited by double wall tanks or by vapor tight shroud
techniques, would be a need to eliminate all materials from the cargo bay
susceptible to ignition by fluorine. This does not appear, however, to
be a:practical measure. If the fluorine tank is provided with a double
wall, the possibility of fluorine Vapors in the Shuttle bay may be con-
sidered to be reduced to such a low value that vapor containment by the
}
^4<l
the N204 as the oxidizer, a
It was beyond the scope of
as to leakage containment
are probably the same as the
i will probably be routed
{	 i.
I'
spacecraft shroud is not necessary. For
vapor tight shroud should be considered.
this study to make final recommendations
techniques. SUS CIUS or Tug) interfaces
Shuttle bay interfaces as these function
through the SUS.
The Shuttle Upper Stage (SUS for this study was designated IUS/Tug)
meaning the Interim Upper Stage or Space Tug, and covers both desig-
nationz as appropriate.
Effects on the SUS or IUS/Tug may include:
1. A dump line and disconnect between the spacecraft and the SUS,
and an umbilical fitting at a SUS to Orbiter interface together
with an overboard dump line would be necessary if a spacecraft
dump requirement is imposed.
2. An oxidizer tank relief line appears to be required. It would
be routed from the spacecraft through the SUS and Orbiter inter-
faces as described in (1) above. Figure 2-3 illustrates this
routing.
DUMP LINE CONCEPT
c.ullLHlx k aurri-T	 I e.11YG
Figure 2-3.
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{Dumping always occurs at less than 0.1 psi (.007 bar) and can be
into the wake of the Orbiter and it is expected that oxidizers will
either be quickly diluted by the low pressure atmosphere, or will
expand to very low pressures if at orbital altitudes. The Shuttle
vents will be closed at this time but are expected to leak. For this
reason, some very low vap or pressure of oxidizer could theoretically
recirculate into the cargo bay. Although further analysis is suggested
it appears highly unlikely that a significant concentration of fluorine
could enter the cargo bay via such recirculation.
Cockpit functions will include for either oxidizer tank, status
monitors for;
tank pressure
tank temperature (for LF2)
vapor detection
Modifications needed an the exterior of the Shuttle will include dump
ports for the liquids if dump is required and (vapor) reiief ports.
2.2.6 Effects of Fluorine as Compared to N 204 on Spacecraft Propulsion
System Design
2.2.6.1 Spacecraft Propulsion Requirements and Technical Base
Substitution of higher energy LF 2/N2H4 for the N 204/M.MH propellants
used i`n Mariner class spacecraft primarily introduces the considerations
related to a cryogenic propellant.
The Shuttle considerations are primarily those of transportation,
since the Shuttle is used to transport this propulsion system in an
inert state.
The spacecraft propulsion system has;
No operation in the Shuttle
No operation near the Shuttle
t
	
	 Only after deployment and after SUS operation does this system per-
fora trajectory corrections and orbit insertions. These events do not
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begin until 7 to 21 days after departure from earth orbit. Thus, no
pressurization of the spacecraft propellant tanks is ' needed until it
: PROPULSION SYSTEM
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Table 2--3.
Mariner and LF2
 Fluorine in Hardware Assumptions of the Hazard Analyses
STUDY DASI'LINE 51IUTILE PREFERRED
SHUTTLE LAUNCH L1111FIG!RATIOR (niniriEO) sYsTEM
U204 LF2 N204 LF2ITEM
Oxidizer Tank o 6d14Y Titanium a Can take vacuum u Same as baseline o sane
0 109 psi typical o 6AL-4! o Double wall desirable
o Can take vacuum o Thoroughly cleaned
o designed for leak and passivated
before burst n Designed for leak
before burst
Detectors (press, o Temperature and o Temperature and o Same as baseline o Same as for the
temp, vapor) pressure pressure trans- o Vapor detector in baseline drsign
o Cockpit and ground duLer, alarm and shroud desirable 0 Also detectors required
analog alarm readout in the cargo bay.	 (if
o Vapor detector ever IVA. e.g.,
(di+litaf	 type) emergency)
o N., detectors in
cargo bay.
G COCLPit and ground,
analog and alarm
Dump/Vent system o Ournp capability pro- o Sara as 11204 o Can use other o Make dump sys compatible
Vided through the (assumed for hypergDl dump with LF2
tine [USITUG UMBIL. enqu:asis)
via kit.	 Processed
through oribter
dump piping
Vent or pressure o Gas pressure relief o llo vent system o Same as h"seline o Specially dcsigord vent
relief system system provided- system for vcniirg aver-
burst di V. and iso- board when shuttle bay
lation valve in doors are o,r.r= only.
series with burst Contains double rciundant
disk.	 One. for each burst distj nozzle, valve
tank piping etc.
o Passivation and cleanness
req.
shroud o Partial shroud a Partial shroud o Full leak tight n Nil shroads.	 The shroud
(protret (purtpct shroud, vented to shoald be d ,,signr,i to be
eiectroni rs) electrunies) space a4 re,istant against Lf2
0 Not designed to corrosion as pn%%ihle and
resist F2 corrosion vent F2 vapor overboard.
Tho shroud shall be designed
to prevent lrolA ng of F2 vapor
outside the shroud
Pressure supply o Separate pressure o Separate pressure o Same as baseline o Regulated ur equisalent pies-.
(blow-down is supply .	 suirilly sure systcri provided
pressure regu- o Regulated system o Regulatp.ii ur a snme a, baseline
lated) used equivalent pressure
G Pressurized during system required
launch o Not pressurized
during launch
Insulation o Not insulated o Insulated 0 Not insulated o Insulated, same as for baseline
sys
Stresses a Designed for axial o Some as for N2041 o same as baseline n Sane as for N,04 /Shut tle baseline
(vertical and horizontal Shuttle except that tia, liquid in the
horizontal) stresses container shv,uld lrr cuntained
o Designed for safely in a crash landing
tank to stay in
place during crash
landing
Oxidizer tank o Ho shell a Leak shell provided o No shell (may use o Leak shell provided
shell
	
(contains shroud)
leaking vapors or
liquids)
Off-load o Provided for a Provider! LF2 com- u Hypergolic oxidizer o Off-load calohility possible
capability before launch patible dump before dump system vie the vpn!-sys and the LF2
launch only o Freryaney deploy- compatfble ou.ip system
rent
Catch pan o No eaten pan a shrill only and.no o Dike systaa o Catch pan and shell
Sys Len system catch pan d"trablu if not
under pressure
New propulsion technology available for fluorine propulsion includes
compatibility testing, electron beam welding, fracture mechanics tech-
niques, the AFRPL developed bobbin seal, and a better understanding of
compatibility and passivation.
Materials selections will be based on experience being acquired at
JPL and in the industry on fluorine rocket and corollary high energy com-
bustion devices. dPL has successfully demonstrated a complete self-
contained (but not flight weight) F2/N2N4 propulsion system.
2.2.6.2 Hazard Analysis
A hazard analysis was conducted, ar,d the results derived from it are
largely reflected in the propulsion system design recommendations, dis-
cussed later. The details of the hazard analysis are included in the
basic document, but the assumptions upon which the analysis was based is
presented in Table 2-3 on the last half of the page. The changes in
these assumptions, as a result of the hazard analysis, are shown on the
right half of the Table.
2.2.6.3 Spacecraft Propulsion System Design Recommendations
The primary effects of fluorine on spacecraft propulsion system
design are to require tank insulation, ground cooling and relief line
provisions, and fluorine compatible materials. Propulsion system design
criteria which may be considered as recommended criteria for fluorine
and good practice for N 204 include:
1. System design shouldrep elude significant pressure in the tankage
during transportation from the loading site to the pad and during
transportation in the Shuttle. The fluorine tank should be pres-
surized only after the SIPS is deployed from the Shuttle Orbiter,
2. Fluorine (and probably N 204) should be isolated in its tank by
closed isolation valve mounted as close to the Lank as practical.
TMS state would be maintained until after Tug deployment from the
Shuttle Orbiter.
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3. Plumbing systems upstream and downstream from the isolation valves
to the next valve should be passivated to provide a fail-safe re-
dundant propellant containment.
4. Double wall tankage should be considered for LF2.
5. All associated equipment and procedures of the LF2 system should
be fail-fail-safe, or at least fail-safe.
6. Fail--safe.operations are needed during propellant loading.
7. A leakage detector sensor is desirable between the walls if a double
wall tank is used.
8. Caution and warning instrumentation should be provided and monitored
during propellant loading, storage, transport to the pad, instal-
lation in the orbiter, in flight and during SUS deployment in orbit.
Temperature, pressure and leakage information is required. Pressure
transducers should have double redundant propellant containment.
9. In the spacecraft both types of oxidizer tanks would be relatively
well protected from inadvertent mechanical damage. The LF 2 tank
Mould have external insulation to the extent of approximately two
to three inches of closed cell P5I foam. In addition, the LF 2 tank
could incorporate a double wall. N 204
 tanks would be covered with
multi layer insulation.
10. Command signals to the spacecraft propulsion should be inhibited
Until the deployment in orbit away from the Shuttle.
11. It is desirable to have a vapor tight shroud [shroud concepts are
shown in Figure 2-6.
12. It is desirable for cargo bay components to be metal, dense ceramics,
and fully fluorinated elastomers.
13. Crew air intake (if any) should be effectively separated from propel-
lant vent ports.
14. Combustible vapors and projectiles from other systems in cargo bay
should be prevented.
Mimi
Figure 2-4 showed schematically a system which incorporates the
desired features including propellant isolation. Figure 2-5 illustrated
features of the double wall tank concept that could be used consistent
with this system schematic.
2.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2.3.1 Conclusions
As a result of this.study, a number of conclusions can be drawn.
about design criteria and requirements, and ground and flight procedures
necessary to maximize the chance of safe and successful transport of a
spacecraft fluorine propulsion system in the Space Shuttle. These con-
clusions.re:
The chance of an incident (hazard) occurring is reduced by isolat-
ing the. LF2 in the tank and not allowing any fluorine in valves or
piping during handling of the loaded system on the ground or during
the Shuttle phase of the flight.
Current techniques for handling fluorine in commercial applications
and at rocket test sites appear applicable, with refinements, to
loading fluorine in payloads for Shuttle.
Propellant should be loaded into the spacecraft at a remote location.
The propulsion system should be monitored and allowed to stabilize
prior to transporting and installing the spacecraft into the Shuttle.
Use of an oxidizer dump system for LF2 during flight appears tech-
nically feasible, but the entire dump question requires further
inyesti gation.
disk to personnel is best reduced by excluding people from proximity
to toxic materials during the processing, and by providing effective
protective clothing and by instituting careful "back-out" procedures.
0
	
	
In order to achieve the required level of safety with fluorine some
additional Shuttle pre-launch operations time, in the order of a few
hours, may be needed.
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W^	 The safety effort required to control hazards to protect equipment,
facilities and personnel is significant and may be justifiably
higher than for previous, unmanned spacecraft. It is expected,
however, that safely related costs will be a Fraction of propulsion
costs,
The safety program for fluorine should be started and implemented
during the hardware development phase, should be oriented towards
specific goals and should incorporate the System Safety Engine.hring
approach throughout the program.
A safety assurance function in cooperation with the quality control
function must be provided to assure that all safety requirements
are met when the payload is installed into the Orbiter.
^►	 The effects of residual hazards during flight in the Space Shuttle
Orbiter Cargo bay from properly isolated propellants in a propulsion
system which has been loaded and stored prior to transportation on
the Shuttle appear low and the number of residual hazards appear few
provided that hazards to the propulsion system from other systems
are minimized.
• Transportation of the system should be in the unpressurized (or
nearly unpressurized) state to minimize the effects of any leafs
(ICC regulations limit transportation; on highways to 300 psi).
The concept of a "propulsion garage" at the launch complex for safe
storage of the loaded propulsion system during the verification
period after loading and prior to launch is suggested.
The use of double (redundant) wall pressure vessels for oxidizer
containment is suggested
Propellant vapor detection in the void between shells is suggested.
v	 Use of inert gas In fluorine dump lines to protect the passivation
and to provide verification of dump line integrity (if dump pro-
visions are required) is suggested.
3 ^\
2.3.2 Recommendations
Additional system safety engineering and propulsion system design
engineering efforts are recommended as indicated below. Close coordination
with the Shuttle Orbiter and Tug designers will be required as it was
during the execution of this study.
1.	 A more complete definition of the implications of and need for a
propellant dump system for fluorine considering the actual tedhnology
available for such a system and more complete definition of the
impacts to the Shuttle Orbiter design. This should include a) dump
valve and line design, b) reliability considerations and c) a safety
comparison (dump versus no dump).
?=	 Propellant tank design and demonstration activity to demonstrate the
feasibility of flightweight, long tern fluorine containment in a
redundant wall -tank.
3. Advanced development of long-life, leak-tight propellant isol ati on
valves in the 1 to 2 inch line size which will allow propellant to
be dumped within the allowable time constraint (if dump is required).
4. Continued definition of the propulsion system, including the shroud
and line routings especially for the coolant (and dump Iines, if required).
5. Technology work on the propulsion system which will allow fully realistic
design layouts to be made.
6. Advanced development of LF 2 and N 204 vapor detection equipment.
7. A study of the requirements for equipment to accomplish safe landings
and aborts to Landing sites of opportunity.
5
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3. BACKGROUND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED
TO THE USE OF FLUORINE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
While fluorinated oxidizers are among the most vigorous of oxidizing
substances, experience in the handling of large quantities of these fluids
has shown that with suitable designs and attention to detail, reliable
and safe utilization of these oxidizers is being obtained on a day-to-day
basis. As an example, liquid fluorine transportation in 5000 lb capacity
truck trailers is carried out with a high level of safety and reliability.
The utilization of the fluorinated oxidizers will require some
changes to be made in procedures for the development of propulsion system
stages from the initial design through the post-launch operations. One
of the purposes of this study has been to examine where specific changes
are required and how these compare to standard procedures developed for
currently used liquid propellant propulsion systems. In accomplishing
this study, the technology base developed far fluorine handling related to
 rocket engine testing, and other fluorine combustion devices. In the sec-
tions that follow the various aspects of work that has been accomplished
and how it may apply to the subject study will be discussed. Although pro-
pulsion system design and development are not the main subject of the
work accomplished, designs and development of the system will be affected
by launch safety considerations. Some of these elements and the methods
of approach to finding solutions are discussed briefly below.
3.2 SAFETY ASPECTS, CHARACTERISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT
In its use, the spacecraft propulsion system will be surrounded by
propulsion systems having similar characteristics. The OMS and OMSKITS
will use N204/MMH propulsion, and eventually the TUG may use two cryogenic
propellants, liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen..
Both fluorine and nitrogen tetroxide are vigorous oxidizers which
are toxic and potentially corrosive (in the presence of water). Safety
aspects are similar for the two, however they differ in degree and in
addition,LF2 is a cryogenic liquid with a normal boiling point of -1880C
i (-3070 F). The safety aspects were summarized in Section 2.2.1.
3-.1
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Fluorine is readily detectable by its pungent; odor at very low
concentrations. The threshold of detection by odor is generally accepted
to be 0.3 ppm and may be as low as 0.1 ppm. The Emergency Exposure Limit
for exposure to concentrations of 30 ppm is 15 to 10 minutes (Reference 1).
Since small leaks can be detected by odor well before lethal limits are
attained, personnel can usually be evacuated from the area before oxidity
becomes a problem. It should also be noted that, in general, the toxic
effects are not residual or cumulative as with some chemical compounds.
Additional safety precautions and monitors are needed to monitor leak-
age, as substantial fluorine leaks coming into contact with fuels can
cause ignition which can propagate even into metallic materials.
A study was made of the design of the spacecraft assemb13 bay and
Shuttle cargo bay to determine the best means of dealing with leakage of
LF2 from the propellant supply system. Such leakage will probably occur
upstream of the main propellant shutoff valves. Unless the leakage results
from failure of th q
 tank wall it will most probably occur in that part of
`r
the feed system upstream of the main propellant valve which contains the
greatest number of components. This is usually the section containing the
pressurization and vent valve assemblies, and for that reason a tank inlet
isolation valve is suggested.
The tradeoff must be made between 4 system designed for maximum relia-
bility and minimum leakage and the desirability of being able to remove
and replace a leaky component. The use of an all welded system for maximum
reliability and minimum possibility of leakage, will require offloading of
the fluorine, purging of the system, possible disassembly of portions of
the spacecraft and cutting out and rewelding of the faulty component.
This penalty which has to be paid for maximum reliability systems must be
weighed against the higher risk of leakage when flanged or threaded com-
ponents are utilized which could permit replacement of the component in
situ. It is our judgement that an all-welded system, or one with a mini-
mum number of bobbin seal joints is appropriate.
To provide a drain capability the system must be designed with a
means for accomodating the connection of a drain line and pressurization
WW1
line. Both of these are penetrations of the basic feed line system and
3-2
iJ
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
are themselves subject to leakage and hence reduce reliability. Transfer
of the propellant: will most probably be made in the liquid form.
3.3 DESIGN
Differences between the designs for current liquid bipropellant
rocket propulsion systems and those using cryogenic fluorine or fluorine
compounds will be the materials selections to assure compatibility with
fluorine, provision for passivation of components exposed to fluorine,
and the methods of construction selected for the fluorine system to
insure maximum safety and reliability. Some have stated that there are
no great differences in the requirements for system cleanliness, or other
aspects of Quality assurance, between current storable liquid propulsion
systems and those using fluorine compounds. The present specifications
which are imposed on spacecraft propulsion systems in order to insure
maximum reliability are in general, sufficiently stringent for both sys-
tems. This should be qualified to state that using present knowledge,
procedures for cleanliness and passivation can be developed which are
generally similar to those for currently used propellants. The passivation! 3	
layer requires protection from mechanical damage which might remove it.
The most notable tradeoff which might be made in comparing the
designs for the two systems is in the methods which are used in joining
the feed system subassemblies and components. The greatest number of 	
i
problems which occur with fluorine systems are usually associated with
joints in lines and fittings, or between lines and components. It has
been found that the most reliable means of joining the fluorine flow
system components is to arc-weld all joints in an inert atmosphere in such
a manner as to present a smooth interior, free of crevices, bubbles or
slag inclusions. Good practice calls for x-ray inspection of all welds
to assure their quality (Reference 2).
The use of welded joints can preclude the possibility of seams which
can serve as packets for contamination by grease, dirt, etc., which might
not be removed in the cleaning processes prior to operation of the system.
Passivation of the fluorine system alone is not a guarantee that problems
*Including FLOX, a liquid mixture of fluorine and oxygen.
g
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will not be encountered in joint areas since passivation process may not
disturb the surface of an included grease film or particulate contaminant.
Use of an all-welded assembly, while desirable in fluorine oxidized
systems, poses some assembly problems and higher cost implications during
the development, qualification and acceptance testing of the propulsion
system. In an all-welded assembly replacement of defective or damaged
components becomes much more difficult and, unless the propulsion sub-
system is designed as a totally self-contained, preassembled module,'the
integration of the propulsion subsystem into the spacecraft can be dif-
ficult, if not impossible. Use of Bobbin Seals, an AFRPL development
proved successful on JPL's Feasibility Module Demonstration test program,
for a judicious number of the mechanical joints could eliminate change-
out difficulties and can be recommended.
While many studies have been made of the suitability of materials
and components for use with liquid fluorine (See the list of References),
consideration must be given to problem areas which are characteristic of
the fluorine systems, aside from the normal selection of materials and
passivation. Problems may arise where motion is required between metal
parts immersed in fluorine.
3.4 FABRICATION AND ASSEMBLY
It appears that the fabrication of components for a fluorine oxi-
dized propulsion system may impose somewhat greater stringency on fabrica-
tion procedures than is presently requires for conventional spacecraft
propulsion system components. It may be that in some areas, such as the
specification for allowable inclusions in nonstress bearing welds, tighter
tolerances will be required because of the possibility of ignition of the
included material if exposed to fluorine. Similarly voids or seams at
joints which might be tolerated in a nonfluorine containing system would
not be tolerable because of the possibility of retention of contaminants.
A study will be required to determine whether or not it is desirable,
at the component level of fabrication, to perform preliminary passivation
of the components prior to storage. This would imply an additional cost
above that of Similar components used in nnnfli,nrinA rnntain'ina systems.
I
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The procedure which is somewhat different for the fluorine containing
propulsion systems as compared to currently used bjpropellant systems is
the requirement for passivation of all surfaces which will be exposed to
fluorine (References 2, 9 and 10). Passivation procedure takes advantage
of the fact that most metals used in construction are resistant to further
attack if an initial fluoride coating has been formed through a passiva-
tion procedure. The suitability of a material for use with fluorine in
a specific application will depend to a considerable extent on the nature
of the fluoride film which is formed. As an example, the nickel fluoride
film is relatively tough, tenacious to the nickel surface and impervious,
thus permitting this metal to be used under dynamic conditions with flow-
ing liquid fluorine. Other materials such as iron form a relatively soft
porous fluoride film which while preventing ignition of the iron causes
clogging of flow passages from an accumulation of solids. For this
reason the use of iron in industrial fluorine processes is generally
restricted to low cost systems utilizing gaseous fluorine at relatively
low flow rates (Reference 9). Stainless steel has been used with good
success.
The passivation procedure for fluorine systems varies somewhat.from
user to user but in general consists of initial cleaning procedures to
remove all obvious dirt, foreign particles, coatings, etc., followed by
thorough flushing with a drying agent such as acetone and an inert gas
purge (hot or cold) to remove any traces of water and solvent. In an
assembly of components it is customary at this stage of the passivation
procedure to conduct leak checks utilizing helium leak detection or
pressurization of the assembly with a dry, inert gas and monitoring the
lockup pressure.
The final step in the passivation is the admission of low pressure
fluorine gas, or fluorine gas mixed with inert gas in order to permit
slow fluorine reaction with any trace contaminants left after the cleaning
steps and to build up the protective fluoride film. Upon the completion
of passivation, the component or assembly must be sealed to prevent any
possible subsequent contamination. If for any reason, the component or
assembly has to be broken into, the passivation process must.be
 done again.
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3.5 FACILITY CONSIDERATIONS/RELATED ROCKET TEST EXPERIENCE
One difference between the programs for the currently used earth
storable propulsion systems and the proposed fluorine systems. which
causes non-recurring costs to be incurred is the necessity to provide a
facility oxidizer supply system. This supply system is normally based on
the use of LN2* jacketed tanks on the supply truck to contain the liquid
fluorine oxidizer. This requires a periodic supply of liquid nitrogen at
the facility to make up for the nitrogen boiloff losses from these storage
vessels. More important is the need to provide facilities which meet the
stringent OSHA regulations on permissible atmospheric contamination by
fluorine and hydrogen fluoride gases.
Requirements for protection against leakage and spills in the
test facility are probably somewhat less stringent than the requirements
for protection against accidents at the prelaunch and launch facilities.
The fluorine disposal requirements may be met using essentially the same
techniques at the launch facilities as would be used at the test facilities;
however, the installations may have somewhat more relaxed requirements
at the test facility. These installations are discussed below.
3.6 PRELAUNCH
Following a successful acceptance test of the spacecraft propulsion
system, a number of prelaunch activities will be influenced by the use of
fluorine oxidizers which will distinguish them from those of the current
earth--storable propellant systems. These can be divided in two phases,
the first are the test facility preparations for shipment and the second
is the integration of the propulsion system into the spacecraft.
The completion of a successful acceptance test** of a spacecraft
propulsion system utilzing fluorine provides strong assurance that there
are no contaminants or leaks which will cause problems in the spacecraft.
The program plan for the handling of the propulsion system after acceptance
test poses the dilemma as to whether the post-test decontamination and 	 3
clean-up procedures normally utilized can add to the spacecraft reliability
*liquid nitrogen
*k assuming a hot firing of the subsystem at a remote site.
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or will in themself provide possible problem areas. Post- and pre-shipment
procedures must be examined very carefully to insure that these do not
compromise or degrade the established subsystem reliability.
A primary consideration is the removal of residual fluorine from the
feed system without the reintroduction of contaminants or the removal of
the desired protective fluoride film by the clean-up procedures. A
means of decontaminating the propulsion system of residual fluorine
oxidizer would be to use a dry, well-filtered, oil-free inert gas purge
with a monitor at the purge exit to determine when all the fluorine has
been removed from the system. Cold gas initial purging followed by hot
gas purging will remove the residual fluorine.
A review of standard practices indicates that it would
be best to avoid the use of all solvents or any other form of liquid
cleaning solutions to avoid compromising the integrity of the fluorine
system. It may be desirable to incorporate a slight positive pressure
within the system after it has been decontaminated to assure that induc-
tion of external atmospheric air into the system does not take place.
^_.	 The most difficult area in which to achieve this maintenance of complete
cleanliness will be the propulsion system injector cavities and flow
passages downstream of the propellant shutoff valves. It may be necessary
to cap the engine at the exit because of this problem.
Prelaunch integration of the propulsion system into the spacecraft
may be somewhat more difficult with the fluorine oxidizer systems than
with the currently used storable bipropellant systems because of the
requirement to maintain passivation in the lines discussed above, and also
the desirability of utilizing welded joints in the feed system wherever
possible *.
* judicious use of bobbin seals is appropriate in practical systems.
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{	 3.7 PRELAUNCH AND LAUNCH LEAKAGE CONSIDERATIONS
The above sections dealt primarily with the aspects of spacecraft
design, engineering and test which imply criteria on the spacecraft that
are unique to fluorine oxidized propulsion systems as compared to storable
propellant systems. At the launch facilities, however, the primary area
of importance is the method of dealing with leakage or massive spill of
the fluorine oxidizer. The current, earth storable liquid propellants,
particularly the oxidizers such as N204 , are reactive and toxic in moder-
ate concentrations but are acceptable for use when proper precautions are
taken at the launch site. The very vigorous nature of the fluorine
reaction with most materials, including water, and its high toxicity add
to the difficulty of providing launch operation reliability and safety.
Malfunctions of the oxidizer system can be divided into two classes.
The first consists of slow leaks of fluorine which permit precautionary
measures to be taken and allow transfer of the bulk of the fluorine into
a holding tank or disposal by other means. The second are gross leaks in
the feed system which allow liquid fluorine to escape.
In the first case, if leakage is sufficiently small so that only l
gaseous fluorine is escaping from the system, two problems exist. The
first is provision for personnel safety owing to the highly toxic nature
of the gas, and the second is the effect of the high concentrations of
gaseous fluorine on adjacent spacecraft or launch vehicle components.
These two problems are not greatly different then those encountered in
the leakage of earth storable, liquid propellants. The measures presently
utilized to assure safety at the launch facility and in the launch vehicle
may be appropriate, allowing for the hi gher toxicity and-corrosivity of
the fluorine gas
Adequate means of preventing the possibility of gross leaks through
design and procedures will be essential and should be a significant part
of the development work.
In examining the means for protecting against liquid fluorine leakage,
an assessment was made of the various alternative means for rapidly
removing the fluorine from the spacecraft tankage. One method is to use
an overboard dump system which for ground operations would be connected
to a sump tank to receive the liquid fluorine. This will be discussed
in Task 4.
The present technology for dealing with gross liquid fluorine leaks
includes both liquid and powder forms of decontaminants. Studies have
indicated that both offer some potential (Reference 14). In the event of
a large spill with fire, the post-incident cleanup and decontamination
procedures will also affect the selection of the best means of insuring
safety. In general, while powdered materials such as sodium carbonates
have been shown to be moderately successful as neutralizers, water in
massive quantities may still provide the best means of insuring both
safety and minimum damage to equipment.
Obviously it is desirable to prevent leaks of any kind, however, pro-
viding against the contingency could take several approaches. Considera-
tion can be given to freezing of the fluorine with, for example, liquid
helium in the tank cooling coil line prior to launch of the vehicle. If
the time frame of the mission allows, the fluorine may warm up after the
spacecraft has been detached from the orbiter stage, such procedure
probably provides maximum crew safety for the orbiter since the frozen
fluorine should pose no leak hazard. Internal construction of the
fluorine tank would need to be such that damage from freezing would not
occur. (Further study is recommended).
One method of dealing with fluorine leaks while on orbit would be
to eject either the entire payload or empty the fluorine tanks Another
alternative would be a design such that the Shuttle bay is tolerant of
fluorine**, at least while in vacuum (at or near orbit). Obviously this
would not be true if there was a simultaneous fuel leak.
3 ^,. F	 4. STUDY TASKS
This section presents the statement of each Task of the statement
of work, then describes the important considerations and results.
Tasks 1 and 2 were combined as they related to prelaunch propellant
loading and spacecraft processing operations. Task 6 Feasibility Analysis
will be contained in section 4.12. The original Task 12 related to larger
quantities of fluorine not appropriate for planetary spacecraft and -was
deleted to allow more emphasis on the hazard analysis.
An additional task emphasizing flight safety, including the increased
level of effort on the hazard analysis, is introduced in Task 6 and is
presented in Appendix 9.
4.1 TASKS 1 AND 2 S/C MATING AND PROPELLANT LOADING OPTIONS
The requirements of Tasks 1 and 2 have been combined in this study
because of the similarity of the tasks. Because of this similarity all
of the requirements of these tasks are addressed most effectively via the
Processing Sequence Comparison Study (4.1.3.3) and the Hazard Analysis of
Chosen Processing Sequences (4.1.3.4). For a description of the method-
ology used to answer the task statements 1 and 2, see section 4.1.2
"Approach." The results and conclusions for Tasks 1 and 2 are found in
section 4.1.4.
4.1.1 Task Statements
The task statements that are analyzed in this section of the report
are presented below.
Task 1. Assuming the spacecraft propulsion system is preloaded and
pressurant bottles are prepressurized remotely, compare the mating of the
spacecraft in the Orbiter Processing Facility versus mating on pad in the
payload changeout facility. The comparison shall include the following
considerations:
a. Personnel safety
b. Shuttle safety
C.	 Effect on shuttle timeline
d.	 Effect on spacecraft timeline
4-1
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	 Effect on rapid turnaround for dual launch or relaunch
following abort.
Task 2. Examine the feasibility of loading and pressurizing the.
spacecraft propulsion system at the pad, considering alternatives which
include the following:
a. On board the shuttle
b. In the payload changeout facility at the pad
For case - (a), compare the merits of loading propellant before versus after
installation of the RTG. Compare cases (a) and (b) with preloading in the
Explosive Safe Fac il ity as has been typical for Mariner spacecraft.
The objectives of Tasks 1 and 2 as well as for the other tasks
are to:
• Compare the safety interfaces between the Shuttle
(considering both crew and hardware) and the spacecraft
propulsion system when using liquid fluorine (LF2)
as an oxidizer versus using nitrogen tetroxide 0204)
a Identify any new and/or unique propulsion system
requirements that would result from the use of liquid
fluorine (LF2) as an oxidizer in the propulsion
system of a planetary spacecraft launched from the
Space Transportation System (STS).
4.1.2 Approach
To accomplish the objectives listed above for Tasks 1 and 2 of the
SOW,* it was decided to combine the tasks and analyze them together since
they had many common elements from an analysis and safety effects point
of view.
The approach taken to meet the above listed objectives and to provide
the information required by the task statement was to perform the follow-
ing analyses:
r Determine the logical alternative processing sequences
required to load propellant on the pad in the Orbiter or
the payload Changeout Facility (PCF), and the processing
sequences required.to
 mate a prepressurized and LF2 loaded
system to the Orbiter in the OPF versus.mating the preloaded
system to the PCF then being placed into the Orbiter.
Next establish a more complete understanding of the spacecraft
f
	
	 propulsion and the associated equipment and operation. This
includes the Mariner spacecraft, Shuttle Orbiter, IUS/TUC
and launch facilities.
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4 Analyze the tradeoffs to determine the merits of the various
processing sequences from the point of view required of the
study objectives and task statements.
e For the most advantageous processing sequence, evaluate the
safety and timeline on the Shuttle Transportation System in
its normal state.
Next determine the required changes to the Shuttle Trans-
portation System (facilities, equipment, Orbiter, etc.) and
the Mariner spacecraft and the IUS/TUG, so that a space
storable automated spacecraft may be flown on the orbiter with
an acceptable level of risk.
a Compare from a safety' point of view the preferred LF2 pro-
cessing sequence with the processing of 8204 using the same
processing sequence.
To determine the location in this re port of the answers to the various
questions and requirements in Tasks 1 and 2, please refer to the cross
referdnce matrix in Table 4-1.
4.1.3 Analysis and Results
4.1.3.1 Processing Sequence Alternatives
7
Tasks 1 and 2 consider alternative methods of obtaining a loaded
spacecraft in the Shuttle Orbiter. These methods and options are shown
in Figure 4-1. Mariner 9 is shown as a reference. The first set of
processes described in Task 1 is the "preloading" process and the second
set is the Task 2 "pad-loaded" process. .For the preloaded process there
are four primary options or ways that the spacecraft may be processed in
the Shuttle Transportation System. For the pad-loaded system, there are
two primary options defined. All of the options are shown in Figure 4-1.
The figure also indicates which processes will be performed in each
facility. For the referenced Mariner 9 process, the specific buildings
and facilities are identified (e.g., ESA 60A propellant laboratory, build-
ing A0; etc.) but for the similar operations shown for the first five
processes of options 1 through 4 (Task 1), the specific facilities are
not indicated, for they depend on the tractability of LF2 with the facility
designs and operating concepts. Designs and operating concepts for these
facilities are defined in the hazard analysis presented in Appendix 3.
It has been dPL's intention to use ESA 60 as the loading site of the
preloaded systems, if possible.
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Section
4.1
4.1
4.1.3.5
4.1.3.5
4.1.3.5
ITask 2
Considerations on Board the Shuttle,
options 5, b, T
In the Payload Changeout Facility at the
Pad, Option 3.4
Merits of Loading Propellant Before vs
After Installation of the RTG
Comparison of Loading in ESF vs on Pad
^^ 1
4.1.3.1 to 4.1.3.3
4.1.3.1 to 4.1.3.3
4.1.3.1 to 4.1.3.3
4.1.3.1 to 4.1.3.3
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Table 4-1. Cross Reference Matrix
Task 1
Personnel Safety
Shuttle Safety
Effect on Shuttle Timeline
Effect on Spacecraft Timeline
Effect on Rapid Turnaround for Dual Launch
or Relaunch Following Abort
Comparison of N 204 and LF2	 4.1.3.4
For Task 1, four options are to be analyzed. These basic options
are described below:
Option 1. This payload processing sequence (see Figure 4-2)
consists of five operations, (1) loading the propulsion module with
propellants, (2) storing the module, (3) mating it to the space-
craft, (4) performing checkout, and (5) transporting it to the
next Iocation. After the first five operations, the spacecraft
is mated to the IUS/TUG in SAEF #2 and transported to the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF) where the payload stack is rotated to
e
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Figure 4-1. Processing Sequence Options
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TRANSPORT TO OPF
(HORIZONTAL TRANSPORT)
ERECT ORBITER (VAB )
Remote Propellant Loading
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_	 ".
SPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY AND
CHECKOUT IN EXPLOSIVE SAFE
FACILITY (WITHOUT RTG's )
TRANSPORT SIC TO
SAEF
FJ
YJ
-- - -
MATE PAYLOAD TO
ORBITER IN OPF
( SHUTTLE TIME 70th hr)
MOVE TO PAD
I
INTEGRATE S / C WITH
IUS IN SAEF
Tow TO VA B
INSTALL RTG's, FilAL
CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH
Figure 4-2. Uption I: Mate Spacecraft/IUS To Orbiter in OPF
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the horizontal position and placed in the orbiter cargo bay.
The cargo bay doors are closed and remain closed as the orbiter
and its payload are processed through the Vehicle Assembly
Building (VAB), and transported to the pad on the mobil Launch
Platform. If de_ red, the cargo bay doors may be reopened after
the Payload Changeout Facility (PCF) is put in place. The
cargo bay doors cannot be opened unless door supports are pro-
vided at all times while they are open. The doors were designed
to open without supports only in space. The doors cannot be
opened in the VAB. See Figure 4-3 for -Facility site plan.
Option 2. This option begins with the same first five operations
as Option 1 (see Figure 4-1). The propulsion system is then
mated to the spacecraft (loaded with LF2) and to the IUS/TUG
in the Spacecraft Assembly and Encapsulation Facility (SAEF 7#2);
it is then transported directly to the pad. The payload stack
is placed.in the PCF and mated to the PCF Payload Handling Fixture,
and the payload stack is mated to the Orbiter. See Figure 4-4.
Option 3. This is the selected option (see Figure 4-5). The
first five operations are the same as for Option 1. The loaded
spacecraft is then transported from the spacecraft checkout facility
to the PCF. (The present facilities that could be used for LF2
loading,if modified.and their locations are shown in Figure
(4-6).) After the spacecraft (loaded with propellant) is
installed in the PCF payload handling fixture, the spacecraft
is mated to the IUS/TUG which was previously installed into
the Orbiter Payload Bay. The system is checked out, the payload
bay doors closed, then the launch is accomplished.
Option_ 4. The first -Five operations are the same as for Option 3.
After the first five operations, the spacecraft (loaded with
propellant) is transported to the PCF and mated to the IUS/TUG
•	 ..	 .^w^	 ..f	 .	 _	 •	 ..	 __.	 .._	 ._ 	
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Figure 4-3. KSC Shuttle Facilities Site Plan
aSPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY AND CHECKOUT IN
	
TRANSPORT S / C TO SAEF
EXPLOSIVE SAFE FACILITY (WITHOUT R TG's )
TRANSPORT PAYLOAD TO PAD
INTEGRATE S/C WITH 	 (HORIZONTAL TRANS PORT )
IUS IN SAEF
INSTALL PAYLOAD ON PAD
	
INSTALL RTG's, FINAL
(SHUTTLE TIME 135th hr) 	 CHECKOUT AND LAUNCH
Figure 4-4. Option 2: Mate Spacecraft/IUS (Payload) to Orbiter on Pad
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SPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY AND
	
TRANSPORT TO PAD
,.	 CHECKOUT IN EXPLOSIVE SAFE
FACILITY (WITH RFC's)
a
INSTALL SPACECRAFT, H US INSTALLED IN OPF
CHECKOUT, AND LAUNCH ( S HUTTLE TIME
.35th hr)
Figure 4-5. Option 3: Mate Spacecraft to IUS in Orbiter on Pad
,^	 I	
1
i
I
For Task 2, there are two primary options to be analyzed. The third
question/requirement in Task 2, shown in Figure (TBQ), is analyzed as part
of options i and 2 of Task I. The basic options of Task 2 are described
below.
Option 5. The spacecraft and propulsion module are received
•	 3
from JPL, assembled and checked out in building AO. The space-
craft, with its empty propulsion system is mated with the IUS/TU_G
in SAEF #2, placed in the orbiter cargo bay in the horizontal
position, and processed through the VAB, transported on the Mobil 	 +,
Launch Platform to the launch pad. Propellant is loaded into
the spacecraft in the Orbiter Payload Bay with the PCF mated
to the Orbiter and the cargo bay doors open. The Orbiter is
then closed and launched. This option is similar to loading of
the OMS Kits.
Option 6. The first three operations are the same as for Option 5.
ei
After the spacecraft is checked out, it is transported to the PCF
and mated to the TUS/TUG in the PCF. The spacecraft in the payload
stack is then loaded with propellant in the PCF. After propellant
loading the payload stack is mated to the Orbiter, and launched.
O t^ ion 7. This option is similar to Option 5 except that loading
is accomplished in the Payload Changeout Facility prior to mating
with the IUS/TUG.
Figure 4-6 shows the location of Explosive Safe Area 60A (ESA 60A)
at CCAFS gust west of Saturn Complex 34. ESA GOA is used for Mariner
spacecraft propulsion loading.
Figure 4-3 shows tht KSC Shuttle Facilities Site Plan, and the
Landing Stripy OPF, VAB and crawlerway to the launch pads. This area
is north west of the area shown in the CCAFS map, and across the Banana River.
4.1.3.2 Criteria and Assumptions
This section describes the design, operations, and facility con-
siderations and assumptions for option tradeoff analysis and hazard
analysis. The chosen option is also based on the condition that certain
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Figure 4-6. Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) and Vicinity
a
i{	 assumptions and design considerations are met so that either the
probability of occurrence of the hazard or the effects of the hazard
are controlled. These assumptions include:
s System is designed so no single failure will result in a
category I or II risk (in dynamic systems).*
a No two human errors will result in a category I or 11 risk.
e All pressure vessels around the oxidizer tank are designed
for leafs before burst, or designed and operated such that'
a burst is an incredible event (10-6 occurrence/launch),
or both.
! The F2 tank is covered with insulation, that is essentially
compatible with LF2 and protects against impacts.
a A pressure regulated system or equivalent will be used such
that pressure from the 0He system will not be applied to the
N 0 /LF2, tank pressure will not exceed the vapor pressure
i^ Ihe Orbiter bay.
• The pressure of the regulated LF2 tank while on the ground
will only be about 0 psig when transported and launched.
For the N204 tank pressure will not exceed the vapor pressure
'	 at 1200F.
e For the LF2 system being analyzed, if complete loss of cooling
occurs, there is up to 20 hours maximum time available for
repair to the cooling system and for removal of the Spacecraft
from the on-line facility to a safe area. (See Section 4.2).
	
i
a Provision will be made to make maximum use of the flight
spacecraft shroud or fairing as a vapor contaminant device.
s An LF2 dewar will be provided at the launch pad to dispose of
LF2 in case of a leak, or decision to detank, respectively,
although normal disposition would be transportation to a remote
site, where the LF2 would be run through a charcoal bed. A
charcoal bed could also be used at the launch pad.
• Normal LF2 and N204 detection equipment and protective
clothing will be provided.
* Hazard categories are defined in Table 4-4.
^.;
	
*k e.g. the four tank blowdown systems shown in Figure 4-13.
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f-	 e During loading operations, the pressure relief valve on
the GSE (OSE) will provide over-pressure protection for the
spacecraft propulsion system. It is also assumed that the
GSE pressure relief is set to protect the integrity of the
LF2 tank.
e Automatic alarm available when a problem occurs. (Recommended
optional equipment).
a LF2 tank and other tanks around the LF2 tank are designed to
withstand an internal vacuum, (i.e. one atmosphere overpressure).
e Tank and piping adequately designed to withstand normal
handling shock without leak.
e All LF2 will be contained in the LF 2
 tank and none will be
allowed in the piping downstream of the tank until after
deployment.
e There is very high assurance that the LF 2
 system and support
system is clean and there are no contaminants in the system.
All possible measures must be taken to provide this assurance.
a The safety control on this program is comparable to a man
rated space program.
* All procedures and computer programs must not have greater
than 1 chance in a million of being the cause of a Class I
or II hazard. (i.e. "fail operational, fail safe".)*
a Only trained and certified personnel will be allowed to work
on the program and adequate security must be provided.
@ Personnel access controlled.
• Leak tested, proof tested, and passivated for a sufficient
amount of time before loading.
r Extra care taken in off-line facilities, to prevent accidents.
• PCF payload handling fixture is capable of stacking the
spacecraft to the IUS/TUG in the orbiter and is capable of
performing these functions in a smooth and safe manner.**
r The PCF payload handling fixture is adequately designed to hold
the payload safely even if a failure or human error occurs.
n The PCF will have sufficient water available to consume 3,000
pounds of LF2 quickly enough to prevent a Category I or 11
event. Required water flow raises are not presently known, but
can be determined by analysis or test.
F'.	
* To state an arbitrary but specific goal.
** or alternate technique.
4-14
hr	 a The Orbiter payload bay door can be closed or open when the
_..
	
	
payload stack is in the PCF. Supports are required to hold
the doors when in the open position and the fixtures are also
used to close the Orbiter payload bay door.
# It is assumed the spacecraft cannot be loaded with propellant
in the PCF before the PCF is mated to the Orbiter.
r When the spacecraft is loaded with LF2 in the PCF or the
Orbiter, it is assumed that this operation is performed
before propellants are loaded in the IUS/TUG on the Orbiter
tanks.
Assumed a dump capability may not be provided for the space-
craft at all times when loaded with LF2, whether during trans-
port or in the PCF or the Orbiter.
Assumed that the facility dump system at the propellant
loading site can receive LF2 safely at any--time while the
spacecraft contains LF2.
s Assumed that all LF2 passed through the dump system is
safely contained.
a Assumed that a special ventilation system is not available to
vent out of facility all F 2 vapors and is not capable of safely
processing the vapors removed.
e Assumed that during all transportation operations of LF2
between facilities, or internal to a facility, proper security
and traffic control is provided,
a Assumed that no LF2 transportation operations are allowed
unless the favorable environmental condition exist (ideally
offshore breeze). LF2 should not be transported when a
heavy fog exists'or the wrong wind pattern exists.
a Assumed that only portable (tank truck) storage facilities
will be provided for storage and supply of LF2.
• Assumed that standard ground and GSE and facility safety
codes are met.
s Assumed that a safety audit of a facility is performed
before the facility may be used'for handling or processing
a system containing LF2.
• Assumed that Fire Department support is available, trained
and immediately available during all loading operations.
r Assumed that an effective, reliable continuously operating
F2 and HF detection system is working at all times where LF2
or gaseous F2 is handled either at the loading site or at
the pad.
of the loaded spacecraft.	 4_15
a Assumed that the PCF itself is not specifically designed
for handling LF2 systems.
® Assumed that much of the GSE is not protected from the
atmosphere where the spacecraft loaded with LF 2 will be.
a The viscosity of LF2 is about the same as the viscosity
of boiling water.
a Assumed that when the spacecraft is loaded with LF2 it is
loaded remotely. It is assumed that hydrazine is loaded
into the spacecraft soon after the LF2 is loaded.
a In case of fire external to the LF2 tank it is assumed the
insulation material on the tank provides a time lag to prevent
the tank from heating up too fast, that corrective'action
cannot be taken.
Assumed that portable fire extinguishers are available at
the PCF for small fires (not F2 fires).
e All precautions necessary must be taken to prevent the tank
from rupturing, even if the rest of the spacecraft must be
sacrificed.
a Assumed that the SAEF #2 facility is not designed to handle
LF2.
s Satellite Assembly Building in ESA 60 does not presently
have an emergency drain system for hazardous propellants.
a The facilities in ESA-60 are not designed to handle LF2
system.
* Building AO is not designed for handling LF2 systems.
s No gas purging will be required around the propulsion
module which contain LF2 while being handled in facilities
or during transportation.
e A cannister will be used to handle the payload stack, or the
IUS/TUG on the spacecraft together or independently. This
cannister is needed to install the payload stack on the
spacecraft in the PCF. A crane on the pad service and access
tower will be used to lower the payload from the cannister to
the handling fixture in the PCF.
n The facilities in area 60A and AO are not high enough to
stack the spacecraft to the IUS/TUG.
4--16
3
i1	 • SAEF #2 is high enough to stack spacecraft to IUS/TUG but LF2
cannot be loaded or handled in this facility. This facility
is very near (few blocks) from many large KSC office buildings,
see Figure 4-7 for specific locations of facility.
• Assumed that the LF2 tank is made out of titanium* and under
normal conditions, the metal won't burn upon a leak unless
heated.
• Assumed that the majority of the LF2 system will be welded
and where mechanical seals are used, that all metal seals-
will be used.
• Propellant piping will be cleaned and purged only with inert
gas or aspirated prior to disconnecting the piping to prevent
reactions.
• Redundant means will be provided to prevent leaking of LF2
through the thrust chamber of the propulsion module.
• Assurance will be provided that all purge gases used in the
LF2 system will themselves be purged of all moisture.
• Redundant valves in service will be used to prevent LF2 tank
pressurant gas from leaking into and pressurizing the LF2 tank.
• LF2 tank pressure and temperature to be continuously main-
tained during loading operations and after loading (storage
and handling)
• No dump ca pability is available in the VAB, OPF or on the
Mobil Launch Platform. (These were ruled off limits anyway).
• Assurance that on the pad, a man must be available for connect-
ing up the F2 detanking system to the payload.
• Safety philosophy in case of a rupture is to protect the KSC
facility or shuttle orbiter a° the expense of the spacecraft
and/or IUS/TUG if necessary.
• When the spacecraft and propulsion module or when the propulsion
module alone is transported it is with a transporter and shroud
and carries a supply of LN2 for continuous cooling.
• Assumed that the propulsion module is a separate independent
unit from the remainder of the spacecraft a,id it can be pro-
cessed and checked cut independent of the spacecraft.
• Assumed that all shuttle flight and ground systems have seen
previous operational use when the space storable system is
flown.
* An Important assumption confirmed by recent testing at APL.
3
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Ref Bid& No. Facill *.g Feet
1 M7-355 Operations and Checkout Building iSpacecrafq 601,748
2 MG-342 Central instrumentation Facility 136,400
3 M7-409 Flight Crew Support and Training Building K.,31.i
4 117 9G1 Environmental Systems Test Facility 10, 309
5 3:7-1410/1412 Cryogenic Pest Buildings No. 	 1 and No. 2 3,600
6 M7-1061 Fluid Test Support Duilding 11,ZG5
7 IN7-1417 Ordnance Laboratory 1,589
8 >17-1469 Pyrotechnic Installation Building, now SAEF la, 000
9 M7-867 Radar Boresight Range 1135
10 M7-505 Spacecraft Spares and Equipment Building 200
11 516-33F Electromagnetic Laboratory i8a
M7-351 Auditorium and Training Facility n, 224
13 M6. 138 Communications Oistrlbution and Switching Center 25, 989
14 MG-791 Communications Maintenance and Storage Facility 28.420
15 M6-486 Base Support Building 83,7i:4
1s 516-535 lfeavy Equipment Maintenance Facility 3,Ou0
17 M7-1210/1212 Spacecraft System Support No 	 1 and No	 2 13,000
18 M6-495 Occupational health Facility 14.534
19 M6-744 Central Supply 206, 630
20 M6-399 headquarters Building 439. 4 .1 ':
21 b17-657 News Center (Parachute Building) 8. 27u
SAEF Spacecraft Assembly and
Ercapulation Building
let. Bldg No Facili ty ySq FcQt
22 M6-339 Communications Office 20.068
23 MG-493 Main Cafeteria 15,449
24 M6-688 Automotive Maintenance 4 Service 17.314
25 M6-698 Supply Warehouse Nu. 2 34,800
U. M6-794 Supply Warehouse No. 1 69,939
27 M6-894 POL Building 10.000
Figure 4-7. Location of SAEF
0
is Assumed that a closed (nonvented) LF2 system is being used
with no safety relief valve. (Vent capped during handling.*)
a The PCF is not needed for every launch; therefore some work-
around operation may be performed which would allow the launch
of the next shuttle on time,
Unique NASA/DOD Safety Requirements for Shuttle Payload Propulsion
System
The following are NASA Headquarters unique shuttle payload safety
requirements for propulsion systems found in "Safety Policy and Require-
ments for Payloads Using the National Space Transportation System,"
July 1974, revised Oct 1974, prepared by the Payload Safety Steering
Croup, NASA Headquarters, Code MQ.
a Design for Minimum Hazard. The major goal throughout the
esign phase shall be to ensure inherent safety through the
selection of appropriate design features. Damage control,
containment, and isolation of potential hazards shall be
included in the design considerations (Para. 2.3, a).
a Safety Devices. Hazards which cannot be eliminated through
esT` ignse ection shall be reduced to an acceptable level
through the use of appropriate safety devices or part of the
system, subsystem or e quipment (Para. 2.3, b).
c Protective Devices or provision against payload-generated
hazards shall be provided for STS safety at all times while
the payload is near to or installed in any element of the
STS (Para. 4.1).
s A safe interface between the STS elements and payloads shall be
maintained under nominal, contingency and emergency opera-
tions of either the STS or its payload. The safety of the
interface during attached and/or detached operations shall
be designed failsafe. At least two procedural operations
shall be required for initiation of safety-critical functions.
A hazard shall not result from any single procedural error
(Para. 4.2).
a The capability shall be provided for redundant transmittal
to the Orbiter Caution and Warning System that payload which
is critical to the safety of the STS or its flight personnel.
The redundancy may be accomplished via hardwires and/or via the
Orbiter PMF (Performance Monitoring Function), and it includes
redundant sensors. The parameters to be transmitted and
monitored will be mutually determined with the user.
Appropriate controls for safing the payload shall be
provided (Para. 4.3).
*As suggested by KSC personnel.
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1Payload safety-critical data and control functions shall be
capable of being tested for proper functioning from the
Orbiter and from the Spacelab where applicable (Para. 4.4).
a Hazardous materials, fluids and gases shall not be released
or ejected into the Payload Bay from payloads. Venting,
relief and release of material from payloads shall be designed
to use the Orbiter-provided vent system. Control of the
venting by the Orbiter for certain mission phases may be
required. Relief of inert gases under some conditions may
be permitted. A capability shall be provided for dumping
li quid propellants of propulsion stages and relief of pres-
surants overboard through the Orbiter dump and vent systems.
This shall be accomplished within the time constraints
imposed by abort and shall be applicable with the payload
doors open or closed (4.8). (This requirement is considered
provisional.)
s Redundant equipments shall be separated to prevent hazard
propagation (Para. 4.9).
All safety-critical command and control circuitry associated
with engine firing, primary propulsion systems or auxiliary
propulsion systems shall be designed to accept two failures
without causing a hazard to the Space Shuttle system
(Para. 4.23).
`._.	 KSC Shuttle Payload Ground Safety Requirements
Following are the unique propulsion system safety requirements found
in "Shuttle Payload Ground Operations Safety Handbook," 14 October 1974,
NAS 10-8583: These requirements have not been approved.
s The payload developer shall provide for automatic switching
to a safe mode and for a caution and warning display alarm
for potential hazards which could result in time critical
emergency conditions (Para. 6.4.1.1, d).
a The payload developer must provide sensors to monitor the
payload health and detect conditions potentially hazardous
to ground operations (Para. 6.4.1.1, e).
s The payload design shall provide self-sating arrangements
for payload-generated hazards (Para. 6.4.1.1, f).
v Safety critical single failure points shall not be permitted
in risk Category I and 11 (Para. 6.4.1.1, g).
s High pressure containers and pipe lines shall be protected
against inadvertent mechanical impact (Para. 6.4.1.3, f).
F
1
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ia ranking of highly toxic or cryogenic liquid propellants
aboard a payload vehicle must be performed as late as
possible during launch preparations. (A waiver will prob-
ably be given for this requirement. See next page
on KSC safety preferences). Para. 6.4.3.1, d,5).
a Water shall be available for decontamination of area and
personnel (Para. 6.4.3.1, d,6).
• Whenever pressure levels exceed 25% of the design burst
pressure in a vessel containing hazardous fluids, the
operation must be performed remotely (Para. 6.4.3.2, d,6).
IUS/TUG Payload Safety Requirements for Payload Propulsion System
Following are the unique propulsion system safety requirements for
Shuttle IUS/TUG payloads found in "Safety Requirements for Payloads to
be Flown on Orbit-to-Orbit Stages (OOS) and Tugs," Part B, Interim Draft -
Preliminary, 30 May 1974: (Later data could not be incorporated)
e Payload hazards while in orbiter shall either be controlled
by self contained protective devices or by protective
devices mounted on the orbiter, e.g., thermal shielding
(Para 3, a,7).
r Payload operations and energy levels shall be minimized
while aboard the orbiter (Para. 3, a,16).
• All electrical, mechanical and fluid connections between
the payload and OOS and the orbiter shall be designed to
be failsafe (Para. 3, a,21).
a Hazard controls shall be designed to accommodate the worst--
case condition (Para. 3, a,26).
i Provisions shall be made to detect incipient failures of
tanks containing hazardous fluids or high pressure
(Para. 3, a,28).
r Payload propellant drain, and vent interface with the
orbiter shall permit payload main propulsion system pro-
pellant venting, and emergency detanking (whether orbiter
is in horizontal or vertical attitude) until launch commit
and post-landing with the orbiter payload bay doors close
or open (Para. 3, b,4).
Pressure vessels shall be fragmentation-proof (leak before
burst), or be provided with fragmentation-proof container
barriers. If tank pressure during prelaunch through
deployment are kept below the maximum operating pressure,
these requirements may be relaxed appropriately
(Para. 3, b,9).
4
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f.	 r No single operation shall result in flow of propellant
through the payload propulsion system. The APS shall be
inhibited while in the orbiter payload bay (Para. 3, c,3).
a Payload propellant isolation valves shall be provided
upstream from all s^art valves (Para. 3, c,6).
a Electrical umbilical disconnects between the payload and
the oriiter and/or IUS shall be separated from hazardous-
fluids disconnects, and shall be qualified as explosion
proof (Para. 3, c,9).
Propellant tank pressures where practical shall not be
increased to operational values until (TBD) distance from
the Orbiter after deployment (Para. 4, p).
IUS/TUG Propulsion System Safety Requirements
Following are the unique propulsion system safety requirements for
the Shuttle IUS/TUG system found in "Statement of Work, Burner II Interim
Upper Stage (IUS) System Study," 74, duly 09 (according to MSFC these
safety requirements are typical of those to be required by DOD for other
IUS systems):
a Under all nominal, contingency or emergency operations:
(1) No single failure of a dynamic system of the IUS system,
or (2) no two (2) sequential procedural errors shall result
in the transmission of an accident potential to or from the
IUS system and its interfaces including flight and ground
personnel (Appendix IV, Para. 3.1.1, a).
s No single failure of a dynamic system of the IUS system
shall result in an accident which jeopardizes the general
public/private property, or the ecology (Appendix IV,
Para. 3.1.1, b).
a All dynamic systems of the IUS system shall be capable of
tolerating at least one failure before requiring mission
termination (Appendix IV, Para. 3.1.1, c).
a The spacecraft fill and drain line probably will not be
allowed to pass through the IUS system (extra from MSFC).
A kit may be allowed, so the oxidizer can be routed along
the outside of the IUS/TUG to the umbilical.
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4.1.3.3 Processing Sequences Comparison Study
Tradeoff Criteria
As a result; of tradeoff analyses performed, it has been determined
that the preferred option for processing a liquid F 2 system are options
3 and 4, 'Figure 4-I and 4-5. A summary of the alternatives is given in
Table 4-2.	 This conclusion is based on many assumed and actual design
and operational considerations. These considerations are presented in
Section 4.1.3.2 of this report.
Some of the key factors considered and used to select options were:
r The hazard category and likelihood of occurrence
The ability to implement safety requirements so that the
residual risks will be reduced to acceptable levels
• Whether the hazard can be controlled in sufficient time to
prevent a major amount of damage (category l or 2 risk) or
personnel injury or death, particularly on any facility
that would severely delay the shuttle orbiter processing.
• NASA requirements and preferences as they are described
in existing documentation and through discussions at the
centers
a The cost of implementing safety requirements
a The impact of the hazard on shuttle timelines, rapid turn-
arounds and relaunches
• Inability to control the effects of residual category I or
II hazards
a Whether there would be significant impact on the general
public and the environment.
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fTable 4--2. Processing Sequence Summary Safety
	
Sequence	 Evaluation
	
Reasons
Task 1
i
	
Option 1	 Not recommended	 1. Constrains timeline.
2. Requires transport through non
redundant key facilities OPF and
VAB, i.e., unacceptable residual
category 1 risks.
	
2	 Suitable alternative	 Greater damage potential and impact
on timeline than for option 3.
	
3	 Selected as safest
	
Least risks
	
4	 Suitable alternative	 Greater damage impact on timeline than
for option 3.
Task 2
	
Option 5	 Not recommended
6 1 Not recommended
	
7	 Not recommended
1. Constrains timeline
2. Large damage potential, high risk.
3. Much greater chance for hazard
occurring than for sequence are
through four.
1. Better than for sequence No. 5
if PCF is not mated to Orbiter
Similar to 5
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• The RTG installation sequence. Because of the radiation
level, personnel cannot work around RTG very long before
the crew must be changed.
Option Tradeoff Analysis
On-Pad/Off-Pad Loading of Propellant. The basic tradeoff that had
to be made was whether it is safer and acceptable to NASA to load the
spacecraft on the pad or off the pad. All the other trades presented
are variations of this basic tradeoff. It was determined by analysis
and also recommended by the KSC Safety Office that the preferred process
would be to load with propellant off the pad, then transport the space-
craft to the pad for installation into the Orbiter.
Loading of propellant into the spacecraft off the pad is con-
sidered best for the reasons given below.
The more numerous the operations, the greater the chance of a hazard
occurring. Experience has shown that most incidents occur when propellant
is flowing or when the system is being loaded. When loading propellant on
the pad, there are more operations required than when handling a space-
craftloaded with propellant on the launch pad.
Because of space available and severe time constraints the chances
of error during loading operations on the pad are much greater than when
the operation is performed off the pad. Any operation that is an in-line
function rather thdn a parallel function to the orbiter timeline subjects
the Shuttle Transportation System to higher risks because of the pressure
to meet the on-line timeline schedules. If the schedules are not met,
the payload contractor may have to pay a cost penalty or miss the launch
window. Time and cost constraints can produce a strong temptation to
relax the safety requirements, thereby increasing the risks being taken.
Due to the nature of the system the operations which occur on pad
when handling a spacecraft loaded with propellants, fewer hazards can
occur that are considered class I or II risks and credible or improbable
hazards. For example, there is a chance that (estimated at about 90
chances in a million, see Table 4--3) that a major failure will occur in
the LF 2 tank while loading the tank off the pad or on the pad, but the
chance of this hazard occurring on the pad when handling the spacecraft
4-25
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Table 4-3. Reliability Considerations
Failure Rate per 106*
Days Preliminary
. Units Cycles Seconds (86,400 sec Category	 i
Tanks
Pressurant Gas - 50 0.0001 9 Improbable
Propellant Liquids - 100 0.001 90 Improbable
Fill and Vent, capped - 30 - - Improbable
(redundant)
r
- -- - - Improbable
Lines and Joints,
welded - - 0.1 9000 Credible
Disc, burst 100 - - - Improbable
Manned Operations
r	
Basic Credible
( 10-3 )
"Fool	 Proof: Design" Improbable
( 10-4)
**Regulated system only
* From Reliability Estimation For Chemical Propulsion System, NAS7-751,
SRI project MSU-8075
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loaded with LF2 is probably very low because it may be strong and
isolated from damage. See Figure (TBO) for a brief analysis of this
hazard. As a result of considering all the potential causes (see Appendix 8)
of a leak occurring during handling of loaded spacecraft on the pad,
it was determined that there would be an incredible chance (less than
I x 10- 0 ) of a major rupture occurring in the LF 2 tank. It is considered
to be more likely that a smaller leak, if any, might occur.
At this time the LF2 or N204 tank would be under a low tank
ullage pressure, approximately 14.7 psia (0 psig). The conditions that
would be required to cause an overpressurization of the tank to cause it
to burst when handling a loaded spacecraft on the pad generally do not
exist as they might during filling operations. If cool down capability
of LF2 is lost, there are up to 20 hours available to correct the condition
before the tank safety factor is reduced below the normal operating value.
The analysis indicated that the probable major cause of the leak
hazard would be external mechanical damage to the tank due to mechanical
damage such as dropping the spacecraft during a lifting operation, etc.
Also due to the low tank pressure, and nature of the leak, the toxic
hazard is greatly reduced and all hazards can be more easily controlled
if one occurs. The damage from the rupture of a tank under high pres-
sure (which is not the case for the regulated pressure system*) 1s hard
to control, and toxic release is rapid once the rupture occurs and the
damage may be extensive. If a large leak occurs in the low pressure
system the damage can probably be controlled and minimized and possibly
the risk could be reduced to a Category III from a higher Category I,
if damage to the spacecraft is not considered in the damage assessment.
In this report, damage assessments are based on potential damage to the
Shuttle Transportation System and the IUS/Tl1C but not the spacecraft
system. With very small gas leaks, the hazard can be potentially con-
trolled by proper design of the spacecraft shroud to contain spills if
the spacecraft is dropped. In the PCF a special ventilation system
could also be installed that is compatible with F 2 gas that could be
turned on automatically and extract the evaporating F 2 and HF from the
LF spill. This ventilation system could have a high rate of -flow
and thereby could be used to reduce the toxic gas concentration in the
* or a 4 tank blowdown system, as shown in figure 4-13.
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ifacility, so that workmen could enter*. The gas that is drafted out of the
PCF could be vented through a chimney before it is allowed to enter the
atmosphere. It must be emphasized that the above considerations are
based on the assumptions, requirements and conditions found in
Section 4.1.3.2.
When loading the spacecraft remotely oft the launch pad,
the system can be thoroughly passivated and checked out over a period of
time so that it can be determined that the system is not leaking.
, The remotely loaded spacecraft is subjected to a certain amount of
shock and vibration before being placed in the PCF; this will provide some
assurance that the system is not too sensitive (by noting if a leak has
occurred prior to placing the loaded spacecraft into the PCF) to the shock
and vibration loads that will be experienced in the handling operations in
the PCF. Implications of this experience are contained in Appendix 4.
There are tradeoffs and risks taken with handling a loaded
spacecraft off the pad, but overall, Options 3 and 4 are preferred. For reasons
of eliminating other options that are within the two basic ones above,
see the discussion on each option in the following section. See
Table 4.2 for a summary of the evaluation of each option.
On-Pad Loading Options (Task 2). The three on-pad loading options
(5, 6 and 7) are described in Section 4.1.3.1 of this report. It is
considered safer to load propellant in the PCF (options b and 7) than
it is to load propellant in the Orbiter (option 5). Option 6 is safer
than 7 because the IUS/TUG is not at risk.
When loading propellant in the PCF, the damage potential is less
because the Orbiter payload bay doors can be closed during loading opera-
ti Ons , or possibly, the spacecraft cou'ld be loaded in the PCF before the
PCF is mated to the Orbiter. Of course, if the doors cannot be closed or
loading accomplished before the PCF is mated to the Orbiter, the damage
potential at the pad will be greater for option 6 than option 5, because
the Orbiter would be severely damaged as well as the PCF, the spacecraft
*In protective suits.
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(	 and the IUS/TUG. The safety philosophy that should be used is to minimize
the chance of a category I or II risk occurring to minimize damage and
injury susceptibility.
Assuming the Orbiter bay doors can be closed during propellant
loading operations in the PCF, another advantage of loading in the PCF
is that leaks can be detected before the spacecraft is placed in the
Orbiter. This gives higher assurance of Orbiter protection.
Options 5, 6 and 7 have been eliminated as candidates, in favor
of Options 1, 2, and 3 because of the following:
a The residual hazard of a Class I or II risk occurring when
loading on the pad is greater
• The nature of the hazard (any leak of N204 or LF2 ) is
difficult to control.
® In case a major hazard occurs, there will be a severe
impact on the Shuttle timelines.
Off-Pad Loading Options (Task 1). These options are described in
Section 4.1.3.1 and shown in Figure 4-1. Z i nce the first five operations
are common to options 1 through 4, they are not analyzed in this section
but will be analyzed in Section 4.1.3.4 of this report. The advantages
and disadvantages of option 3 and why it is preferable over the other
options are presented below.
The advantages of option 3 are:
s The transportation of the loaded spacecraft directly to the
launch pad in an environmentally protected enclosure pre-
vents the personnel in the OPF and VAB from being exposed
to the LF 2 potential hazards as they could be in option 1.
r The spacecraft is not subjected to as many operations and
stresses as it would be in option 1. The spacecraft can
always be held in the vertical position. In option 1 it
is rotated more than once.
a The r-sidual damage potential is not nearly as great as it
is in option 1 since fewer facilities are at risk.
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a The advantages of option 3 over option 2 is that if a
major hazard (spill, or major leak) occurs, less damage
will be incurred, because only the spacecraft will be .
damaged and not the PIS/TUG. Other advantages are (1) the
SAEF #2 facility does not have to be refurbished to be
compatible with handling LF 2
 systems; (2) ' the KSC
offices and industrial area that is located near
to SAEF rr2 will not be exposed to the hazards;
(3} the chance of external mechanical damage occurring to
the LF2 system is greater when handling the more cumber-
some and heavier payload stack than when handling the space-
craft alone, and (4) the IUS/TUG may have some items that
are hazardous to the LF 2 system and be the cause of a
category I or II risk (e.g., if any the pressure vessels
or batteries are pressurized during handling operations).
a The advantages of option 3 over option 4 are that fewer
items are subjected to damage if a hazard occurs in the PCF
(i.e., in option 4 the TUG/IUS would be damaged in addition
to the PCF). The chance of a hazard event occurring is
greater for option 4 than for 3 because of the size of the	 I
payload stack, its weight, and additional potential hazards
the LF2 system is subjected to form the IUS/TUG itself.
Option 4 is viable approach, however.
The Shortcomings of Option 3 are:
e The spacecraft loaded with LF is processed through facilities
that are not yet designed to andle liquid LF2 systems nor
is the electrical equipment, or personnel located in the
facilities properly protected from the LF2 hazard. One of
the concerns expressed at KSC is that electronic control
equipment will not be protected from a small leak in the
LF2 system; it was stated that solid state circuits, and
microelectronic circuits can be damaged by concentrations
of F2 gas and HF in the air at less concentrations than the
allowed TLV of 0.10 PPM.
a To process the LF2 loaded spacecraft through the first five
locations in the off-pad options the facilities
(ESA 60 propellant laboratory, assembly and, storage build-
ing, etc.) will have to be modified so that they will
be capable of handling systems or a completely new LF2
dedicated facility constructed. At the present time,
the above facilities are not equipped for handling LF2
systems. A new facility could be so equi ppA.
a There is a chance of major damage to the PCF and orbiter
when handling the propellant loaded spacecraft in the PCF
and orbiter if a hazard occurs and if the proper design,
operations and personnel requirements are not adherred to.
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io The present (ESA, etc.) facilities that would be used are
located a significant distance from the PCF and because of
this the LF2 system is subject to more external hazards than
may be necessary. See Figures 4-3 and 4-6 for location of
facilities. To assure public safety, only safe back roads
should be taken to the launch pad.
4.1.3.4 Hazard Analysis of Preferred_ Processing - Sequences (for LF2 M
N204)
The objective of the hazard analysis of the preferred option
(option 3) (see Section 4.1.3.2) is to determine the hazards from fluorine
to the Shuttle Transportation System (STS) (including personnel, facilities,
orbiter, etc.) Also, an objective was to determine the effect the hazards
would have on the risk of injury, death and damage, and what changes would
be required in the STS, Mariner Spacecraft, and the IUS/TUG such that a
liquid fluorine system could be flown on the STS and handled at AFETR
and KSC within an acceptable level of risk. The guiding criteria for this
study are that in assuring ground and flight: personnel safety, that "the
confidence shall be equal to or greater than that which exists today for
NASA space programs." Section 4.1.3.2 of this report may be used as a
guideline for determining the acceptable level of risk NASA headquarters,
KSC, MSFC, and JSC are willing to take.
The TRW interpretation of these requirements is that "the chance of
a Category II or greater accident (hazard occurrence) shall be reduced
to an incredible liklihood for each operation of a single launch."
(Definitions in Table 4-4.) Category II is defined as damage in excess
of $100,000 or severe personal injury and incredible liklihood is defined
as less than 1 chance in 1,000,000 per launch. See Note 1, next page.
In general, NASA does riot want to have a residual hazard that could
be the cause of credible category I or II condition.
3
A general review (Section 4.1.3.3) of the potential hazards that
may exist if option 3 is instituted reveals that if the present STS is
used as-is there are several hazards (e.g., spill of LF 2 , leaking F2 gas,
:a
etc.) that would not be sufficiently controlled nor would the risk taken
be sufficiently low. For example, it has already been indicated by KSC
Safety, that the use of the Propellant Laboratory (ESA-60) in the Explo-
sive Safe Area may not be acceptable as-is for processing an LF2 stage.
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1
Term	 Definition
Category IV - Minimal Damage, no injury
Category III - Minor Damage ($10K-10QK), minor injury, Shuttle turnaround
delay >3 days
Category II - Serious Damage ($100K-500K), ( 2 ) serious injury, Shuttle
turnaround delay 3 days
Category	 I -- Major Damage, death
	
ROM Liklihood	 Type of Activity
Credible event	 (> 10- /launch )	 Activities subject to human error,
e.g. temporary connections
Improbable event ( < 10 -3 to 105/launch) Activities subject to equipment
failures
Incredible evens: ( < 10
-5
/launch )	 Activities involving previous
similar activities which prove
adequacy - e.g., structural
integrity
Residual hazard - Hazards which cannot be eliminated or controlled by
automatic or manual backup operations and/or safety monitoring provisions
for other equipment.
f
ii
It is understood that these categories and/or their use gay not agree
exactly with those used by others. It was judged most useful for this
study to use these categories to get optimum resolution in the hazard
analysis. It was also deemed necessary to assign liklihoods so that
personnel of various disciplines could communicate in as ^oecific a
manner as possible.
2 
Or over 100K damage to ESR prcpeliant laboratory or payload changeout
facility.
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a
1To determine other changes that would be required at KSC and to
the orbiter to handle LF 2 , a "hazard analysis" was performed for option 3.
The basic elements of the "hazard analysis" are as shown in Appendix 8
"Mariner/Shuttle Oxidizer Hazard Analysis." The anal ysis was performed
for a Mariner type spacecraft which uses LF 2 as an oxidizer and a Mariner
type spacecraft using N204 as an oxidizer. It is assumed that both space-
craft will be processed through the same facilities. These facilities 	 j
are indicated in the processing sequence diagram (Figure 4--1), option 3.
The processes and facilities that are analyzed are similar to the pro-
cesses and sequences normally used by Mariner type spacecraft (see VO-'75
Reference process sequence in Figure 4-8).* The only major difference
in the option 3 processing sequence and the normal Mariner processing
sequence is that the spacecraft will be installed in the Payload Changeout
Facility, then inserted into the orbiter cargo bay onto the IUS/TUG.
Normally the Mariner Spacecraft is hoisted directly over on the top
of the launch vehicle from the spacecraft transporter and lowered onto
the launch vehicle with an overhead crane.
A unique feature of the hazard analysis is that two levels of risk
aro evaluated for an LF2 and an N204 spacecraft system. The first set of
risk categories (column 7 of Appendix 8) is estimated based on an LF2
spacecraft system processed at KSC, assumptions include processing option
3, use of the present KSC planned fatuities, STS Orbiter design,
and present IUS/TUG concapts, STS operational concepts and procedures.
The second set of risk categories (column 10 of Appendix 8) indicates
the reduced risks that will result if t "a anticipated safety controls
(column 11 of Appendix 8) are implement 	 aria operate effectively. It
should be recognized that if the recommended safety controls in column 11
are changed, the level of risk taken is changed accordingly. Also there
may in some cases be more than one level of risk for a particular hazard:
For example, it is possible to kill yourself by falling off a desk, but it is
*Viking (Mariner class) spacecraft launched in 1975
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Inot likely to occur. In the hazard analysis if it is possible to have a
residual category I hazard it will be indicated, but the most probable
risk will also be indicated first.
In addition to determining the risk catager (amount of damage,
injury, or schedule slip) taken, the causes of the hazard/risk and their
chances of occurrence are evaluated in the hazard analysis. The evalua-
tion or chance of occurrence of hazards is based on engineering judgment,
experience, over eight years of TRW test experience, and the experience
of many other companies (which was obtained by a literature survey). The
chance of a hazard occurring was placed into ..he following three classes:
s Credible hazards - estimated to be greater than 10- 3 chance
of occurring
• Improbable hazards - between 10- 3 and 10-6 chance of
occurring
* Incredible - less than 106 chance of occurrence
With the level of risk taken and the chance of the hazard occurring
known, it can readily be determined if the particular operation of concern
is acceptable.
In general, it is believed that NASA, will not accept a category I
risk that has a Credible or Improbable (as defined above) chance of
occurring.
See Appendix 8 for the detailed hazard analysis for Option 3 of
Figure 4-1.
4.1.3.5 LF2 and N204 Comparison
Safety Comparison Methodology
The purpose of this section is to provide the answer to objective (a)
in Section 4.0 of the Statement of Work (Exhibit 1) for Tasks 1 and 2.
Objective (a) is "to compare the safety interfaces between the Shuttle
(considering both crew and hardware) and the spacecraft prupulsion
system when using LF 2 as an oxidizer versus using N204."
This objective was met for Tasks i and 2 by using a logical process
of analysis. The process used was to first perform the "Processing
Sequences Comparison Study" which is presented in Section 4.1.3.3 of this
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report. The next step was to perform a hazard analysis on the preferred
processing sequences which is presented in Section 4.1.3.4. Then it
was determined (from the hazard analysis) which Lazards during which
operations presented the highest risk to the Shuttle program when handling
and processing a liquid fluorine system. This was determined by reviewing
the hazard analysis to determine where all the risk Category I and I
(possibles) and in some cases where Category II and II possibles appeared
un the modified Shuttle system. The next step in the N 204 comparison study
was to assume that a spacecraft containing N 204 was processed through the
same operations and conditions where the highest risk categories appeared
for handling an LF2 system. A review of the hazard analysis in Appendix 8
revealed that the worst conditions for equipment and facilities were when
a 1-inch equivalent leak of LF2 occurred in task 1-18, "Install spacecraft
in PCF," and in task 1-19, "Install spacecraft in the Orbiter." (A tank
rupture was not considered credible.) From a personnel Point of view, the
greatest risk occurred during loading operations (task 1-2, "Load propel-
lant, Dedicated LF 2 Facility") of the LF2 in a safe area away from the
launch pad and other important KSC and AFFTR facilities.
Once it was determined which operations were to be evaluated and
compared, a hazard characteristics table was developed for the N
.
O
.
 hazard
and the LF2 hazard. This table is presented in Table 4-5; the information
from this table is used to determine the potential extent of damage that
might occur if the 1-inch equivalent leak hazard occurs for either N204
or LF2 . The hazard characteristics table was also used to evaluate the
damage control characteristics of the hazard.
An evaluation was also made of the chance of the hazard occurring for
both the x1204 and LF2 hazards. This was determined so that the chance of the
hazard occurring as well as the level of risk would be known, and a proper
comparison could be made.
Table 4-5. Risk I and II Hazard Comparisons For N 204 and LF2 Spacecraft System
IHazard	 I	 LF2
 Spacecraft System	 N204 Spacecraft System
	 I
One-inch equivalent
leak in orbiter
cargo bay.	 Item
NO.
	 (2) of
Chance of
Hazard
Damage Potential, Damage
Control, Hazard Character
Less than for a When the leak occurs due to
Hazard Analysis, N204 system an external hazard, the
sec.	 4.1.3.4 because less first effect will be a de-
sensitive to lay	 because the tank
Appendix page A--43 external hazards pressure will probably be
because of system less than atmospheric. After
design. i.e.
	
3" a few seconds, the LF2 will
closed cell foam flow out of the tank by
insulation and gravity flow as water
double wall tank through an orifice.
-P
wV
When the rupture first
occurs, it will be detected
I	 by pressure transducers in
the tank and the aspirator
of the "catch pan" * will be
activated. The spilled LF2
will then be contained in
the "catch pan" system. The
boil-off of F2 vapors will
also be aspirated into the
"catch pan" system. Some F2
gas will probably escape and
cause a small amount of
corrosion to the orbiter.
The S/C may be
destroyed. The IUS/Tug will
be protected by a barrier.
a Not anticipated that there
will be a significant fire
if aspiration is provided
Damage Potential, Damage
Control, Hazard Character
* The N204 will spew out of the
tank spraying the orbiter
cargo bay and the plastic bag
on the inside surface of the
cargo bay. The plastic sur-
face may ignite and a fire
may result. If there is no
fire, there may be extensive
corrosion of the orbiter. If
spill occurs after the
orbiter and IUS/Tug is loaded
an explosion hazard
may result and if ignited,
the entire orbiter ma y be
destroyed. (No catch pan for N204^
a The fire could be controlled
by a heavy deluge of water,,
but the damage would be ex-
tensive. At the present time,
a sufficient amount of water
is not being made available
at the PCF or in the cargo
bay for fire righting.
a Anticipated that there will
be an extensive amount of
cleanup required and the
Chance of
Hazard
Greater than
for LF2 system
because of
being more sen-
sitive to ex-
ternal hazards
such as fire,
and mechanical
damage.
* catch pan concept could be combined with a double wall tank.
T,W
00
Hazard
continued.
LF2 Spacecraft System
Chance of	 Damage Potential, Damage
Hazard	
t	
Control, Hazard Character
M204 Spacecraft System
Chance of	 Damage Potential, Damage
Hazard	 Control, Hazard Character
a Impact on time line depends orbiter would have to be
on the amount of damage in- refurbished before use.t
curred to the orbiter due to
escaping F2 gas and fires.
Because of pl astic in the
cargo bay, a major cleanup
may be required and the
orbiter would probably have
to be taken off the launch
pad and refurbished.
One-inch I.Less than for N204 a The damage potential that Greater than for a See Note 1.
equivalent leak
E
system because it can result from this hazard LF2 system be-
a A spill may occur at any timein the PCF.
	 Item is less sensitive is greater than when the cause of being during handling of the S/C inNo.	 (q.) to external hazard hazard occurs in the or-biter more sensitive
the PCF. If a leak occurs,Hazard Analysis, because of system because at some times (e.g. to external
the major damage as a direct
sec. 4.7..3. desi gn. when lowering the S/C into
'
hazards such as
result of the leak will be
Appendix page R-47 ;Theg hazard
chance that th( the PCF and when placing itinto the orbiter) there is
fire and mech-
anica7 damage . extensive damage to electrons
will occur
not equal control of the
equipment, extensive corrosion
during placement hazard when it occurs. The of incompatible materials and
of the S/C into
'catch pan" will only be possibly some small	 fires.the PCF should be
used when the S/C is Major hazard to per5^onnel iflow because:
attached to the PCF handling they do not wear	 a	 Scape
1. The tank is fixture. suit,	 during the handling
2 well protected I operations as is required of
With shock absor- • The max. damage potential personnel during handling of
bent insulation. that can occur to the PCF is the LF2 system. Personnel may
a level	 II risk, or indi-
I
be killed or severely injured
2. The LF2 system cated in the risk category by the toxic vapo.--.
is designed to definitions presented in
take the shock & Figure
Hazard LF2 Spacecraft System N204 Spacecraft. System
Chance of Darr -e Potential, Damage Chance of Damage Potential, Damage
Hazard [	 Coi,... I , Hazard Character Hazard Control', Hazart: Character
handling	 oadsg k s If a leak occurs durin gg • if there hap pens to be fuelpp
without a leak placement of-the loaded S/C vapors in the area, there is a
occurring. into the PCF, a major amourt chance of a major explosion
3. The chance of of damage will be incurred occurring which would destroy
hethe	 being (level	 11 risk or less). the PCF and cause major damage
dropped is verydropp
During the operation when to the orbiter even if the
 the de- the hazard occurs, the cargo doors are closed.	 The damage
sign & handling bay doors of the orbiter potential of N204 is much
procedures will will be closed.	 A major greater than for the LF2 if
be reviewed to fire will result and all the explosion occurs; the LF2
assure that the- personnel will have to leave will not contribute to an
chance of droppin the area. The PCF should explosion as severly as N204
a
the S/C is: incred then be moved away from the
able. orbiter, so that the orbiter
.will not be damaged.g
a The chance of a large fire is
4. The S/C will b^ Tess with N204 than LF2, if
protected From alll a The time interval in which assuming an explosion does.not
known external hazard may not be ade^- occur.
hazards. quately controlled is small,i.e., the time it takes to s The ability to minimize the
5. The S/C propu7 lower the S/C into the PCF. extent	 t of damage is bet er
side tanks are no for	 than for LF2,	 an
under pressure. s Once the leak occurs, a fire explosion does not occur. The
will start and be sustained N204 may be cleaned up before
6. The hydrozine until the F2 is exhausted . a major fire occurs.
tank will be de-
signed to Teak * The size and length of the e A large amount of water is
before burst.  fire does depend on where needed to dilute the N204. A
(or
	
relied} the leak occurs in the tank.  possible problem may be that
e The effects on personnel out the water may not be available
side of the PCF and inside to the PCF in the quantities
the PCF at the time of the needed, which means that the
hazard are described in the chance of an explosion is
Table 4-5. Risk I and II Hazard Comparisons For N 204
 and LF2
 Spacecraft System (Continued)
Hazard LF2 Spacecraft System N204 Spacecraft System
Chance of Damage Potential, Damage Chance of Damage Potential, Damage
Hazard Control, Hazard Character Hazard Control, Hazard Character
Hazard Analysis in section greater than it would be if
2.1.3.4 of this report. the water were available.
s If the hazard occurs at other
times in the PCF than when
6 . being lowered in the ,POF, th
hazard should be well con=
trolled by the "catch pan"
designedand a specially
ventilation system to take
out toxic & corrosive vapors.
s As a result of the leak dur-
ing lowering of the S/C into
the PCF, the electronic
equipment in the facility
would probably be severely
damaged.
NOTES:	 11 is assumed that a 'catch pan" is not designed for he N204	 system.
i
Hazard LF2 Spacecraft System M204 Spacecraft System
Chance of Damage Potential, Damage Chance of Damage Potential, Damage
Major spill in the : Hazard Control, Hazard Character Hazard Control, Hazard Characterfacility used to
fill tanks : with
propellant. Chance of incident i See Note 2 see Note 2
Item No.	 ;2,
see.	 1 3.4
happening is great,'
er during this • A major spill would result A major spill would present
Appendix page A-^^`operatonpp	 p g
than on in a major fire and a very a major toxic hazard to per-
sonnel for personnel may bethe pad.	 See
Figure (	 } for
hazardous toxic environment, 
exposed to hazardous gasesl
list o causes a The spill would mainly be and not know it and injury
controlled by stopping the or death may result.
and chances of
occurrences'.
flow of liould, if possible,
by using propellant drain s. Fire may result but it can be
system to get rid of some controlled with large quan-
of the propellant and by ti ti es of water.
applying a water fog to e.If fuel vapors are present
the liquid fluorine so a major explosion hazard may
that the 9 F2 may be consumed occur, for the ignition so
with low heat release. sourr.e probably will be avail
• Disaster control around:and able.	 If this happens major
in the facility will be a damage to the facility will,
major problem if this i n- probably result and persormel
may,, be injured or killed,
cident occurs.
r A propellant drainage system
can be provided which would
minimize the effects of the
spi 11.
times:;	 (2) It is. assumed that- the facilities. are des i gned to
ha d1e LF2 or' N204.
i
t

II	 I
LF2/N204 Hazard Comparison
The results of the hazard analysis comparison are presented in
three sections. The first section is the comparison of the hazards in the
orbiter cargo bay, the second is the comparison in the PCF, and the third
is the comparison in the loading facility.
For the LF2 spacecraft system the conclusions drawn are based on the
assumptions listed in Section 4.1.3.2 of this report and on the safety
is	 contrDls recommended in the hazard analysis Appendix 8. It cannot be
emphasized strongly enough that the comparisons are based on the assumption
that the LF2 spacecraft is vtty wellNesigned from a safety point of view.
This also includes the design of the operations, procedures and computer
software. In general, it is assumed in this analysis that these elements
are designed so well that there is less than one chance in a million that
the basic design of the spacecraft, operations, procedures, and software
will cause a class I hazard, The hazards that are evaluated and compared
to N204 have been evaluated and it has been determined that for the causes
mentioned in the hazard analysis that there is greater than one chance in
a million of the hazard occurring. This is mainly due to the influence
of external hazards on the LF2 and M204 system..
The assumed M 204 and LF2 spacecraft system design characteristics
that have a direct impact on the system comparison are:
N204 Spacecraft System
# The N 204 liquid.is
 at approximately the ambient environmental
4-'43
ia The LF2 is cryogenic
v The tank pressure is equal to, or less than atmospheric
a The LF2 can be cooled down below its N.B.P.*
e The tank insulation provides for significant tank protection
from external fires. The insulation is not flammable in air.
a The spacecraft system is designed to incorporate a shroud
which has containment capabilities.
r The tank can do without cooldown for 5 to 10 hours before
a significant pressure buildup in the tank occurs
a The LF2 system is a not vented
LF2/N204 Hazard Comparison Conclusions
It has been determined, based on all the assumptions previously
mentioned, that LF2 is safer as compared to N204 when handled in the PCF
and when installed in the orbiter just before lift off. This conclusion
.at this point of the study, is for ground operations only. During
servicing (loading) of the spacecraft with propellants, N 204 is considered
safer from a facility point of view but LF 2 is considered safer from a
per s onnel point of view.` This is because of the inability of personnel,
by their natural senses, to be aware that they have been exposed to a
hazardous concentration of N204 vapors.
4.1.3.5 Timeline Effects
The assumed.timeline is shown in.Figure 4-,9a. On the right side
of this illustration, the safety impact on the timeline is noted.
For the selected option, option 3, the assumed assembly processing
operations at the launch site are as follows:
0 It is assumed that the IUS or TUG, whichever is used, will
be installed in the cargo bay of the orbiter i.n.the.Orbi*.ter
Processing Facility (OPF) in a horizontal attitude and will
be rotated within the vehicle in the Vehicle A-sembly
Building (VAB) and transported to the launch paC (39A or B).
It . is.as.sumed that.'it:.will: have an interstage truss installed
in the OPF. **
Normal boiling point
** Although this is not longer current ' 	is no difference ire the
result shown on page 4.45
a
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a If a solid propellant kick stage is used, it will be installed
with an appropriate thrust cone to the interstage by use of
the Payload Chargeout Facility so that a safety hazard from
the solid rocket will not exist in the OPF or VAB. This may
compromise the timeline as the PFC will not be available to
accommodate the spacecraft and its propulsion until after the
solid rocket is installed.
a When its upper stage(s) are ready, the spacecraft will be
transported to the pad and hoisted into the PCF (and cooling
reconnected in the case of 1_172). Approximately 1 hour time-
line delay for clear pad operations, and an additional hour
if LF2 to reconnect LN2 cooling for LF2 the pad may be cleared
prior to rollup of the transporter.
i The spacecraft will be installed within the cargo bay by the
equipment in the PCF (1 hour).
a The spacecraft will be joined at all disconnect points
through its field joint (interface) to the IUS/TUG. Recon-
nected through the lines which enter the car go bay via the
T-O umbilical). I hour plus 1 hour to reconnect. next LN2
cooling will be resumed and check-out of the GHe prechill
cooling mode is to be accomplished.
• When cooling of the fluorine tanks (if any) has resumed,
pressure and electrical check-out of the spacecraft to
IL5/TUG interface is appropriate.
• If the flight has fluorine propulsion and carries a Dump Kit
Peculiar, Fluorine (DKPF) line from the spacecraft interface
through the orbiter, it is next passivated with gaseous
fluorine, and "blanketed" with dry GHe 0 hour)
a It will be assumed that any radioisotope heating units
(RHUs) (such as on the spacecraft fuel tanks) and the RTGs
are installed (prior to arming the solid rocket, if one is
used).
The raps on the spacecraft propellant vent/relief lines are
removed.
a The Shuttle Orbiters doors are closed
• Other operations preparatory to launch .are accomplished as
shown in Figure 4-9b ; : i .l udi ng cabin closeout, vehicle
external -tank propellant servicing (loading) and IUS/TUG
hypergolic servicing (loading) prior to launch.
s At sometime prior to scheduled launch, after the.doors
{	 are closed, the LF coaling may be changed from normal LN2
to GHe prechill mo pe to provide greater heat soak capability'
in the propellant.
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Thus it can be seen that the safety effect on the Shuttle timeline
is 6 hours for N204 and 9 hours for LF2, the extra time being required
for connection of the cooling lines.
The ma in effect on the spacecraft timeline is that the spacecraft
propulsion system must arrive about l month early so that it can be stored
after propellant loading.
selected opti on, option 3' is the most suited to	 id turn-rapThe	 p	 , p	 ^	 p
arn^inri ac ii• ranitirac i-ha laaci- diCacGPmhl y and rainctallatinn with the
4.2 TASK 3. EXAMINATION OF LF 2
 TEMPERATURE CONTROL ALTERNATIVES 	 l
4.2.1 Task Statement
The task statement is:
Determine methods by which the LF2 temperature (nominally 85 + 60K)
j?	 can be maintained while on the ground, during ascent, and during
abort including the post-landing phase. Compare the alternatives
in terms of operational simplicity and shuttle safety.
4.2.2 Baseline Approach
Temperature conditioning of the propellant %, ithin reasonable
temperature limits is needed to prevent over-pressurization of the tank.
The baseline approach is to insulate the tank with approximately 2 inches
of polybenzimidazole (PBI) closed cell foam to prevent icing of the tank,
to keep it chilled with liquid nitrogen (LN2) near the LF2 normal boiling
point until just prior to flight, then subcool it approximately 25°F from ;a
-3050
 to -330OF with cold gaseous helium. With this subcooling, the
systems have the following allowable heat-up times shown in Table 4-5.
(Other system characteristics are shown in Table 4-6)
Table 4-5. Heat-up Time (to Tank Design Pressure)- Hours
System - 700 lb LF 2 Double Insulation or 250F(as per Table 4-6)
	 No Prechill	 Prechill
2 Tank Biowdown	 3	 6
(Figure 4-6)
Regulated (Figure 4-7) .
	6	 12 (20 hours
with prechiil and additional
insulation)
4 Tank Blowdown	 6	 I'2 (20)
^4.	
*JPL Communication to TRW September 10, 1974, A.N. Williams to
W. 	 Davenport.:
4-4g
4 Tank Bl owdown 
IRegulated	 2 Tank B1owdo,,4n
Fluorine propellant mass, kg lb	 318/700	 318/700
Tank design pressure, bar/psi	 191/420	 191/420
Initial pressure, bar/psi 	 10.9/16	 21.7/320
Pressure rise, bar/psi 	 27.5/404	 6.8/100
Heating rate, °c/sec//O F/sec	 2.2/4	 3.9/7	 with the tank
Allowable rise, oC//o F/sec	 14/25	 12/22
These systems are very similar to the one previously analyzed by TRW
in Contract NAS7-750. A comparison of the above data with that analysis
indicated that the data above may be conservative. The analysis from that
study is quite pertinent for a system of 1800 lb LF2 weight and the dis-
cussion of ground hold thermal analysis is incorporated as Appendix S.
The flight transportation environment is similar to the ground hold
situation as temperatures on the ground and in the cargo bay are similar.
Alternate methods are summarized in Table 4-7, Temperature Control
Methods.
Since the time specified for deployment is specified as one phasing
orbit plus three additional orbits, approximately 6 hours are needed for
deployment. The 2 tank blowdown system is thus marginal, unless it is
both prechiiled and double insulated.
The externally pressurized system has a safety factor on time of over
3.6:1 and is considered quite reasonable. This is especially true if a
dump system is available.
A comparison of safety and simplicity of the alternatives is shown
in Table 4--8. This comparison is by mission phases. Table 4-9 summarizes
the comparison. These comparisons assume that vent and dump are not per--
mitted and the system is independent. Vent and dump are backup (safety)
modes which incapacitate the mission.
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`-	 Table 4-7.	 Temperature Control Methods
Method Description Comments
Insulation Approximately 2" of PSI foam Selected -- appears
insulation to prevent icing essential
Thermal inertia-LF2 Inherent heat capacity of Selected - inherent
the LF2 and its tank.
Thermal inertia - GHe Heat capacity of the pres-
3
Can be "heat sunk" to
surant GH2 and its container LF2 tank
GHe relief cooldown Cooling effect of emergency Small effect - only
pressurant blawdown - may good for emergency Use
Use heat exchanger or not
LN	 carry along2 Auxiliary L,N2 dewars ground Sack-up approach -^ flightbased or flight dewar creates hazards**
GHe/LW	 prechiller2 GHe bank + LH22 dewar for Ground based
.	 pack ground prechilI
_	 LHe carry along. Auxiliary LHe dewar ground Complex, unnecessary
or flight
Use orbiter trapped SSMF propellants Complex
residuals
IUS/TUG vent gas Due to heatup of IUS/TUG Complex
LF2 vent/ dun;p From LF2 tank Very undesirable in
populated areas
Refrineration system. Use refrigeration cycle, Very complex and
i.e., condense and expand expensive	 heavy not
state -of--the-art.
V
-	
* 5 centimeters
** heatup and overpressurization
i
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0Table 4-8.	 Comparison of Simplici ty and Safety Al ternatives
k
METHOD PRO CON COMMENTS
1 .'(ON..CROUND)
EriSUI.RTIQf
	
(FOAM) PREVENTS ICE LOSERS OBVIOUSLY NEEDED	 I
HEAT LEAK USE PB.I FOAM
THERMAL INERTIA = FZ -
- OK DURING TRANSFER
THERE+iAL ICiERTIA
	
GHe
OPERATIONS
EASILY AVAILABLE
-- SUPPLEMENTS F I
CHe RELIEF COOLDOWN N/A LIMITED CAPACITY THERMAL INEPT .^A
LOP, PACY. INEXPENSIVE GROUND EQUIPMENT
GHe%Litz RACK AVOIDS F2IH2 .REACTION MORE COMPLEX.THAN LN2 PROVIDES 25° + PRECHILL
e	 LHe PACK SIMPLER THAN ABOVE MORE EXPENSIVE THAN GHeN
0	 USE ORBITER TRAPPED RESIDUALS NIA NOT AVAILABLE HIRE NOT APPROPRIATE THIS PH
0	 I. US/TUG VENT GAS NIA ADDS COMRLE]XITY-NOT NOT APPROPRIATE
ALWAYS AVAILABLE
XLFZ VEidTlC1Ut1P SIMPLEST TOXIC VENT IS NOXIOUS UNACCEPTABLE AT KSC
AND A HAZARD EVEN IF (CAP UNTIL LAUNCH)
- BURNED( 2
(1)	 MULTI-LAYER INSULATION'NOT SUITABLE FOR PLANETARY TRANSFER -
(2)	 WITH HYDROCARBON OR H2O - (O.K. IF .REACTED WITH CARBON) '^	 PREF-ERRED 0	 NOT AVAILABLE
(	 ) IF REQUIRED
R
(o) NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLL
R	 OTHER TECHNIQUES
N!A NOT AVAILABLE
X
	
t4fiT RCC01410AED
FTable 4-•8. Comparison of Simplicity
I
and Safety ..A7ternatives (Continued)
14ETHOD
(2)	 DURIN^T AND ON ORBIT PR
,.	
CON
	 COMMENTS
INSULATION (FOAM) ^T) OPERATES IN ATMOSPHERE MAY BE UNNESSARY
ON ORBIT
THEPSAL INERTIA - F2 SIMPLEST LIMITED DURATION 	 2O HR. PRECHILL
6-20 HOURS	 PROBABLY ACCEPTABLE
THERMAL INERTIA
	 GHe EASILY AVAILABLE CARRY GHO AT LF2 TEMP
'GHa.RELIEF COOLDOWN
- LIMITED CAPACITY	 SMALL EFFECT VENT
VIA HEAT EXCHANGER
L IN	 PACK2
MODESTWEIGHT CARRY IN SHUTTLE
PENALTY
^ GHQ/LEiz
 PACK.
-
NOT REQUIRED
S LHa PACT;
-
NOT REQUIRED
MUSE ORBITER TRAPPED RESIDUALS LOW WEIGHT PENALTY ADDS COMPLEXITY-DNLY	
TOO COMPLEX.
AVAILABLE AFTER-STAGING 	 _
IUS/TUG VENT GAS LOW WEIGHT PENALTY ADDS COMPLEXITY	 c-
(-*)LF' VENT/DUMP STRAIGHT FORWARD ORBITER MODIFICATIONS	 INCAPACITATES MISSION IF	 -
{EXATti05PHERIG} REQUIRED	 ANY VENTING
fR[=FERRCD	 0	 NOT AVAILABLE
	
I
(	 ) IF REQUIRED	 (o) NOT AL14AYS AVAILABLE }
N/A 140T AVAILABLEOTHER TECHNIQUES
X	 NnT RFCn f4tll- nFn

Table 4-8, Comparison of Simplicity" and SafO-ty Alternatives (Continued)	 j
14 THOp PRO CON COMMENTS
(NORMAL LANDING)
INSULATIO N! (FOAM) ^ SLOWS . AERO HEATING
L^^
a THERMAL INERTIA SIMPLEST DURATION LIMITED- SHORT PERIOD
if THEPMAL INERTIA -< GHQ .. - SHORT. PERIOD 4
.0 GHe RELIEF COOLDOWN
- SHORT PERIOD
L142 PACK N/A
N
/A
r
GHe/LH2 PACK N/A N/A --
• LHe : PACK N/A
N/A
•
i
USE ORBITED"TRAPPED. RESIDUALS N/A N/A
f15jTUC VEi1T 'GAS" N IA N/A -	 -
LF VENT/DU`  ^P+^	 ^f DUMP 'SYSTEM MUSS' NOT DUMP SYSTEM MUST NOT NOT PERMISSIBLE TO
OPERATE DURING THIS OPERATE DURING THIS. USE -MUST NOT MALE
PHASE PHASE FUNCTIOX HERE
PREFERRED 0	 NOT AVAILABLE -
IF. REQUIRED (n) NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLI.
OTHLR T4;cHfIrurs
N/A JOT AVAILABLE I---
-X
	
NOT	 RCC01,141PidDFi^-
Table 4-8. Comparison of Simplicity and Safely Alternatives (Conti hued)	 ^
METHOD PRO CON COMMENTS
--^
(POST LANDIN-G ! -- BEFORE HOOKUPS:!.
INSULATION SLOWS HEATING
^+ THERMAL INERTIA - F DELAYS :PRESSURE RISE - LIMITED DURATION
E THERMAL INERTIA	 We . DELAYS PRESSURE RISE.' -
G e RELIEF COOLDOWNH	 DELAYS PRESSURE..RISE
_
O LNG PACK AIRBORNE ONLY
.: GHe/LH? PACK :: N/A N/A
• LHe PRECI{ILLE.R PACK NIA N/A PROBABLY CONSUMED
(o) USE:ORBITER TRAPPED.RESIDUALS N/A 11/A MAY ` NOT BE AVAILABLE
^o) IUS/TUG VENT; GAS N/A. N/A MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE,
LF^ VENT/DUMP MIA N/A NOT PERMISSIBLE.
PREFERRra	 0	 WT AVA ILABLE
()` IF RECiUIRED
	
(o) NOT : ALWAYS AVAILABLE .
fi^/ll, E(]T 1lVAILABLr
	
GTHER TECHNIQUES
Y , ;'1^,T
	 f?rf^11^fE^^r^
Tahle 4-8. Compar son of Simplicity and 'Safety Alternatives (Continued)'
METHOD
. PRO CON. COMMENTS
(POST LANDING-AFTERHOOKUP)
• INSULATION (RAM)(3 ) SLOWS HEATING t
PROMOTES COOLING
e TFEP44AL: INERTIA - FZ DELAYS '-PRESSURE .
" RISE
THEWL.'INERTIA - GHe „
GHe RELIEF:COOLDOWN
1
LIN	 PACK MANDATORY
At!-	 GHeJLH , PACK (GROUND)(PRE CHILLER)
v,.
0 LHO PACK
USE ORBITER"TRAPPED RESIDUALS N/A:
f IUSJTUC VEN T GAS --
* Lt=	 LfFiTjDUf±P VENT%DUMP MUST.CONTAIN PROPELLANT'
- (THERMAL. CONDITIONING PROCEDURE FOR
PROPELLANT:REMOVAL AT LANDING SITE.
IS MANDATORY:- :EITHER:DETANK OR
DEMATE) -	 -
PRCFkRRED	 0	 NOT AVAILABLE
(	 1 "IF: REQ[fIRFD	 (o}. IlOT ALWAYS AVAILABU
rljn OTHER : TC^:H^^IIQUESNOT AVAILl^BL^:
Y r.E^I fni	 urmtjjjrrn

f	 ,
E
_	
-- ......
	
-	 -
b	 Table 4 .9.	 Comp ari son of Si mpl i city and Safety Al ternatives ( C ontinued)
:GROUND
	 ASCENT/	 RORMAL
	 POST-LANDING	 POST-LANDING	 CRASH
-3-
	
-4-	
-5-	
-6-.	 -7-	 g-
METHOD	 HOLD	 ON-ORBIT ..	 DESCENT	 LANDING
	 BEFORE HOOKUP
	 AFTER -HOOKUP	 LANDING
	 SUMMARY
	 CO[dMENTS
F	 • INSULATION F F 	 {}'	 OBVIOUSLY NEEDED
I
•	 THERMAL INERTIA	 FZ
	 INHERENC
n ' THERMAL INERTIA - GHe f	 n 	 {o}	 EASILY DESIGYED IN.'
+ <GNe RELIEF', COOLDOWN
	 ?YE'.	 n .	 n 	 (a)	 SMALL EFFECT EASILY DESIGNED
IH-USE INCAPACITATES MI55ION
•	 LNZ PACK 	 f)	 { }	 n 	 m	 ©	 GROUND SYSTEM JIANDATORY
FLIGHT SYSTEM 
.
D	 1r
s .:GHe/LHZ" PACK
.
	PRECI{Il1ER
	 +	 •	 n 	 •	 •	 (o)	 GROUND SYSTEM ONLY
•	 .LHe PACK
	
•	 a	 w	 •	 •	 r	 {o)	 n.	 NOT REQ1b. - USE LN2
	 .-..w	 .
b
+ `USE ORBITER:TRAPPED RESZ-	 p	 r	 s	 {o}	 (o)	 {a}.	 r	 TOO COMPLEX
DUALS
:3U5/TU6.VENT GAS	 o	 (a)	 (o)	 (o)	 (a)	 (a)	 (a)	 (o).	 COMPLEXjMAY NOT BE AVAILABLE
i	 n .LFZ VE^{T/DUMP 	 xQ	 X 	 TBD	 MAY OFF LOAD THROW& 	 FILL
AND DRAIN. USE COMPROMISES
OTHER SYSTEMS DUMP SYSTE14 IS
A SIGNIFICANT HAZARD IF IT
E	 MALFUNCTIONS;
SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL HAZARD	 f
7}E .	PREFERRED. METHODS
{	 IF REQUIRED
k	 o	 OTHER TECHNIQUESX	 NOT RECOHMENDEU 
i
E
a	 NOT AVAILABLE {q} MAY NOT BE ' AVAILABLE'
`:	 ^' __ I_ 1	 I	 I	 J	 i __. . . . ....... .

i
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Detection of fluorine vapor at rocket test sites is usually accom-
plished by odor or by means of'a hand pumped detector. More sophisticated
vapor instrumentation used in the past may have given false indications
due to other chemicals or insufficient development for the direct
application.
Although olfactory and manual techniques together with corrodible
wires and sensing papers may be combined to form satisfactory emergency
procedures for early launches, remote sensing techniques, if demonstrated
practical could after suitable development, result in a more convenient
and perhaps safer system for subsequent launches.
Leaks occurring during propellant loading operations in an expl'o-
!1 ve safe area may be handled in the same man..-sr as those at a rocket test
site. This means to repair if ;possible, remove to a safe location, or
spray with water to cool and react F 2 to less toxic HF.
Spills should be handled as determined by a program conducted by
Allied Chemical Co. at the Air Force rocket Propulsion Laboratory at
C
	 Edwards Air Force Base, California ,Relarence 13).
A judgement as to the credibility of a leak of the Ioaded and
sealed fluorine tank at the pad has not been made, however, if a leak
were to occur, the same basic techniques would be used, i.e., repair,
remove, or extinguish. A leak or spill at the pad would, of course, have
greater ramifications and procedures would involve more considerations.
For the amount of fluorine considered, 0-3000 pounds, typically
700 pounds, procedures are defined which should contain any damage to the
immediate area of the leak or spill.
For larger quantities, the problem of toxicity increases
because of the higher hazard potential inherent in the larger quantity,
if a spill were to occur.
4.3.3 Toxicity.
Toxicity is of interest in this study as it is one of the param-
eters needed to determine the necessary controls.
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	 If one can smell fluorine, the concentration may be considered to
be excessive for continuous exposure, and personnel should leave the area
within a few minutes. It has been found, as could be expected, that venting
of fluorine in a still atmosphere creates heavy pockets of the ga.; in areas
that originally contained no fluorine. Inhalation of a lethal concentration
of fluorine is considered impossible because its stifling effect is so
severe that choking and asphyxia would result if relief or escape were
delayed beyond a few seconds.
Fluoride dusts are toxic; and, any deposits formed on equipment
exposed to fluorine should be handled as toxic material. Intake of fluo-
rine compounds, such as metallic fluorides can cause nose bleeds and sinus
trouble, loss of weight, back stiffness and spinal chord paralysis.
Following the ingestion of fluorine or fluorides, reaction of body
fluids with fluorides releases potent hydrofluoric acid. Whether poison-
- ing is caused by the fluorine itself or by the hydrofluoric acid formed
by the reaction of fluorine with water in the body is a moot question.
The levels of the maximum allowable toxic gas concentration and
exposure to dosages defined under the "Clean Air Act," Public Law 88-206,
Reference 16,are to be considered in defining the specific hazard poten-
tial of the site for fluorine and fluorine compounds. The legal values
are based on the Threshold Limit values, which were applicable prior to
1972 and which were established by the Americc.n Conference of Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists (and cited in Reference 1). These values
were 0.1 ppm for fluorine and 3 ppm for hydrogen fluoride. These values
were recommended as a guide in the control of health hazards and repre-
sent conditions to which nearly all workers may be exposed, day after
day, without adverse effect. The values are for time-weighted average
concentrations for a normal work day. After passage of the law and
incorporation of the 0.1 ppm value, the ACIGH changed this value to 1.0.
The amount by which these figures may be exceeded for short
periods without injury to health depends upon a number of factors, such
as: the nature of the contaminant; whether very high concentrations,
even for short periods, produce acute poisoning; whether the effects are
cumulative; the frequency with which high concentrations occur; and the
duration of such pe.rinds .
-	 i *Occupational Safety and Health Act.
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Table 4-10. Toxicity
	F 2	HF	 N204	 NO 2 No
1. Threshold Limit Value (i) ,,	 O.I.	 3	 2.5	 5	 25
(TLV). ppm
2. KSC SPGO Handbook( 2)	 2.5
3. OSHA( ' )	critical value	 O;i	 2.5*	 2.5
4. ACGIH EEL 10 minute, ppm 	 15	 20	 (converts	 30
	
Values (1) 30 minute, ppm 	 10	 10	 to NO2 }
	
20
	
60 minute, ppm	 5	 8	 10
) American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, 1972
(2) Shuttle Payload Groun. 1
 Operations Safety Handbook-Draft, 14 Oct 1974
(Prepared for NASA KSC by TRW, FLorida Operations)
(3) Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA
(4)Cp
IA PUB No. 194, Rocket/Propellant Chemical Hazards, Vol. 3, May 1970
*N204 dissociates to NO in the atmosphere.
Due to the occasional use of LF2 anticipated on this program, the
OSHA critical value is probably not the main concern since the processing
selected will not cause continuous exposure of personnel at ,.SC to low
concentrations of vapors, either 
L12 or N204 .
 
This value will, of course,
be very important at the site of
- hardware development.
Due to vaporization and dispersion, the concentration versus
time from any leak or spill first increases !,.then peaks and decreases at
my given location. Emergency Exposure Limits (EEL) limit the safe expo-
sure of personnel to, for example 15 parts per million (ppm) F2 for 10 min-
utes whereas only 0.1 ppm is considered the safe Threshold Limit Value
'JLV) fur an 8-hour day.
1.3.4 Spill Tests
In the testing at AFRPL described in Reference 14 with 1070 pounds
LF 2 a maximum of 56 ppm was occasioned at a distance of 500 feet down
vind with the wind at 10 to 15 knots. Boiloff from the spill lasted approx-
imately 4 minutes. Concentration versus time was not reported; however,
)eak concentration undoubtedly did not last for the entire 4 minutes.
=figure 4-10 shows the distribution of fluorine on this test.
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I Test Without Neutralization
This data probably represents the approximate condition for a
1000 pound unneutralized spill and is much more severe than a test with
340 pounds of F2 in which the concentration at 500 feet was measured at
0-10 parts per million. Although the technique used may have erred on
the low side in concentrations, especially for the lower concentrations, it
also counted HF as F2. Use of the data could be quite conservative, since
allowables for HF are greater than those for F 2. Thus the primary hazard
is from unreacted F2.
The humidity at KSC is a factor which could help reduce the prob-
lem by reaction of airborne moisture with F2.
Deliberate exposure of personnel to 25 ppm resulted in sore throats
and minor chest pains for a period of 6 hours and no further after effects
were noted.
In a test with a 1605-pound spill neutralized with water, the tank
was ruptured and water spray turned on 3 seconds later. F2 dissipation
required 2 minutes 30 seconds. White laboratory rats located 150 feet
from the spill suffered no ill effects from the test.
From this data it is estimated that perhaps on the order .1.000 to
2000 feet is a suitable distance for unprotected operating personnel to be
removed from the site of a potential 1000 to 3000 pound LF2 spill. The
distance might be reduced to somewhat less for N 204 , although a common
location might be more economical and efficient.
It is recommended that control equipment trailers be located away
from the building during propellant loading operations. This will neces-
sitate some rather long electrical cables.
It is understood that this is much more conservative than current
spacecraft practice or practice at rocket test sites; however, it is in
keeping with practices on Titan booster launches wherein all personnel
move back to the Vertical Integration Building for the launch.
4.3.5 Propellant Vapor Detection-- Current Rocket Practice
Fluorine and hydrofluoric acid are both very toxic substances which
are detectable by odor.
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3Detection techniques in current practice are summarized in
'	 Table -ll. The human nose is one of the best and most sensitive detectors
of fluorine. Tests at Lewis Research Center indicate that the threshold
concentration for detection by smell is I ppm or Iower. Some claims have
been made that quantities as low as a few parts per billion (possibly 3-17)
might be the minimum concentration detectable by odor.
Reference 3 concludes: "Although the objective methods of detec-
tion possess considerable merit and one form or another seems to justify
a place at every bulls fluorine facility, the subjective method of detec-
tion (with one's nose) is still the most reliable method of detection of
small quantities of fluorine."
This provides a measure of protection by signaling a potentially
hazardous situation. However, excessive or prolonged exposure deadens
sensitivity or damages tissues so that reliable instrumentation is desire-
able for safety. Also, area monitoring is desireable to sense leaks or
malfunctions in remote areas when no one is nearby.
-
	
	 For the detection and location of small gas leaks, ammonia in
plastic squirt bottles can be used as a rapid qualitative test. If fluo-
rine is present, the reaction produces a white smoke which is easily visi-
ble. This test must be performed with caution, however, since a larger
leak may produce a flame jet.
Potassium iodide paper provides another rapid detection method.
This paper will react by discoloration on exposure to fluorine concentra-
tions as low as 25 ppm.
Potassium iodide paper turns to a shade of red in the presence of
F2 . There are also other available paints and papers and solutions which
change color in the presence of strong oxidizing agents, fluorides or
halogens. Mine Safety Appliances, Harrold and Kitagawa offer piston oper-
ated instruments based on these principles. Such portable, handpumped
instruments are used during Titan (N 0
4
 /A-50) hopping operations, in
Minuteman silos (N 0 4/MMH) and at rocket test facilities (including F 2 use).
a
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Table 4-11. Summary and Evaluation of LF2 Propellant Vapor Detection Techniques
(Not A Ranking) -
Method	 Experience	 ApplicabilitY
1 Visual	 Rocket Test	 Yes
I Olfactory Rocket Test Yes
1 Audible Rocket Test Yes
Change of Pressure Limited Should be used
1 Change of Temperature Limited Should be used
1 Corrodable Wire Sensor Limited Where applicable
(Fl eak Detector)
01	 1 Portable Detectors Rocket Test, other During flightLD
1 Sensitized Paper Extensive TBD
1 Electro Chemical Monitors Commercial systems available may Requires further investigation
be easily "spoofed" by other involves many complications
oxidizers or have other problems
1 Attached Leak Sensor — Pressure and temp easily measured — Desirable, costly
Flight Hardware leakage may be indicated by one of
several methods, e.g., chemical
reaction with corrodable wire.
1 Optical. Methods Optical Methods in Cargo Bay If available
^b
Leak-indicating paints that undergo vivid color changes when
exposed to halogens, have been investigated and may be applicable. How-
ever, their reported low sensitivity to vapor exposure and their weather-
ing characteristics indicated additional development would be required.
Systems using fluorine oxidizers may have wire detectors wrapped
on sensitive areas such as joints and gaskets. Leaks or impingemen" of
the oxidizer burns the wire which causes a signal to shut off the oxidant
flow at the source, thus limiting damage.
Paper tape wrapped at selected locations may be used to indicate
leakage of lesser amounts by exhibiting a burned, discolored or deterio-
rated appearance.
TV coverage during transfer operations is an aid in detecting
gross leaks quickly and cannot be overlooked in any method of instrumenta-
tion. This system requires continual attention from an observer to be
useful, but is a useful adjunct to launch site caution and warning systems.
By combining automated oxidizer sensors with human detection
capabilities a functional system can he formed, even without the use of
a specialized : 4 instrumentation system.
It may be advisable, however, to have a hazard warning system for
fluorine leaks to supplement these techniques before fluorine launch oper-
ations are implementrA. To meet the demands of fluorine operations the
hazard warning system should ideally be capable of detecting relatively
small concentrations of fluorine and/or hydrogen fluoride. It would meet
the following requirements
o It should only be sensitive to fluorine and/or hydrogen
fluoride. It should not give false warnings due to
detection of other substances.
• It should be capable of detecting concentrations of
fluorine and hydrogen fluoride of less then 1.0 ppm.
# It should give an accurate indication of the fluorine
concentration continuously. One exposure should not
desensitize the detector for more than a few seconds.
a It must be reliable and require only a minimum of
maintenance.
j
4
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FSome instruments are available, however, none appear to be in
common use for rocket testing for various reasons, listed below.
Mine Safety Appliance Billion-Aire. This instrument consists of
a radioactive source which ionizes a stream . of air from the sampled envi-
ronment. A steady ion current is produced unless a contaminant is present.
Contaminants react with reagents to form aerosols which change the ion
current. The change in ion current is a measure of the concentration of
contaminant. This instrument is sensitive to materials which affect the
ion mobility or quantity. This instrument is large, bulky, and not
portable.
Tracerlab Fluorine Indicator-Recorder. This instrument uses a
sensing element of krypton-85 quinol clathrate. Exposure to fluorine
releases krypton-85 which is measured with a radioactivity counter. It
is also sensitive to moisture and other materials, however, compensating
adjustments may be made (Model FM-2, Laboratory for Electronics, Inc.,
Waltham, Mass.).
TelegXne Recorder. This instrument operates as a fuel cell. A
steady state current flows until the presence of oxidant perturbs the
equilibrium of a bridge circuit and signals leaks. Humidity affects this
instrument (Model 5100). Significant maintenance may be required.
Davis HF Indicator-Recorder. This instrument measures the conduc-
tivity of a stream of water through which the atmosphere is bubbled. It
is therefore sensitive to. all Pnvi,onm"n4u1 cuiitaminctrits wnicn form con-
ducting ions in solution. (Model 11-7010-RP Special, Davis Emergency
Equip. Co., Newark, N. J.).
Thomas Fluorescent and ADAK Colorimeter Instruments. These instru-
ments have been used but are heavy, bulky and not too sensitive.
M.S.A. Pump Kits for Sampling Atmospheres. The number of strokes
on the instrument required to change the color of a sensitive reagent is
used.to measure contaminant concentration, and is affected by many inter-
fering substances which-may-change the color of the sensor material. This
unit has been used afte r rocket tests to determine if an area is safe to
re-enter.
t^
1
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Convair Fluorine and Fluoride Dosimeter. This instrument measures
total integrated fluoride and is not adapted to continuous real time
monitoring (Model 00509).
Convair Electrochemical Molecular Fluorine Indicator-Recorder.
During work in connection with FLOX, a fluorine detector was developed
that is capable of detecting concentrations in the ppm range. It is
based on the principle of displacement of chlorine ion by fluorine bubbled
through a lithium chloride solution. A silver wire immersed in the solu-
tion forms a silver--silver chloride half cell and a platinum electrode in
the same solution farms another half cell. The voltage generated between
the platinum electrode and silver wire is nulled out by a mercury cell.
Fluorine passing through the cell displaces chlorine from the solution.
The chlorine undergoes oxidation-reduction with a transfer of one electron
per each atom of fluorine so that the fluorine is measured quRntitatively.
Hence the current is proportional to the amount of fluorine present.
One ppm of fluorine in a flow of 100 ml per minute through the cell gener-
ates 1.4 microamps.
This current is easily measured so that the instalment is specific
and selective because only fluorine oxidizers (and perhaps ozone) give this
reaction (Model 00510).
This instrument works well, except that prolonged idleness caused
polarization of the electrodes so that they must be reactivated. The pumps
also require periodic lubrication, but diaphragm pumps might alleviate this
problem. Also, the lithium chloride solution gradually evaporates so that
additional solution is required. It is not commercially available.
Optical detectors operating in the infrared region may be used for
detecting small concent rations of gases in the atmosphere. These cannot
be used for directly detecting -fluorine as fluorine is nonpolar. They can be
used as an indirect detector of fluorine, since fluorine reacts with
atmospheric moisture to form hydrogen fluoride which is detectable by
infrared techniques.
*A mixture of liquid fluorine and liluid oxygen.
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ments'in which the apparatus is designed to selectively transmit the spec-
trum of the desired gas, which is placed in a gas.celI. The characteristic
gas radiation is compared with radiation through a similar clean cell in
the optical path.
An optical correlation instrument was developed by Convair`under
AFRPL Contract F04611-70-C-0064, 'Development of HCL and H5 Detection
System. ". The goal of this program was threshold sensitivity of 0.01 ppm...
However, maximum sensitivity was to 0.1 ppm. The results of this program
indicated a more sensitive instrument could be developed by using a longer
optical path,. a more intense source, and/or a better detector.
Several other types of fluorine detectors have been tested or pro-
posed (see Reference 4). The techniques suggested for detection include
mass spectrometry, ionizations, lasers, and electroaconductivity. None
of the proposed systems is considered completely satisfactory and most
require development.
4.3.6' Organization and Personnel Factors and Procedures
4.3.6.1 Ground Crew
There are many aspects of human or personnel considerations. The
goal is to properly deploy the system and send it on its mission. In order
to accomplish this goal, it must be loaded, transported, installed and
boosted into orbit and deployed. At each of these steps there are some
potential hazards which might allow escape of oxidizer. While it is
believed that these hazards may be controlled and that they tend to
decrease as the system moves toward deployment, an organization is required
wt'lich can;
s Conduct efficiently normal operations.
a Conduct efficiently abnormal operations and preclude
accidents.
r	 a Repair or work around difficulties.
Properly "safe" the system i n event of malfunction or
damage.(	 ft	
^
• If necessary, perform operations to minimize damage.
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Some of the personnel considerations that must be considered are
shown in Table 4-12. 	 It is believed that in order to properly and safely
conduct these operations with a loaded spacecraft propulsion:system and the
very valuable facilities (PCF) involved, that the NASA will wish to have a
24--hour watch crew at--the-ready from the time that the system arrives at the
pad until launch.	 This is a pF:riod on the timeline from approximately
130 hours to liftoff which could occur at 170 to 180 hours. 	 Fifty hours
on the timeline could be approximately 6 days so provisions would be needed
for three crews for that period of time.	 They might consist: of:
Shift
PL	 Swing 	 Night
Cognizant Engineer	 1	 i
Asst. Cognizant Engineer 	 1	 1	 1 i
Mechanical Leadman
	 l	 1
Electrical Leadmar,	 I	 1	 1
a
Propellant Safety Qualified 	 3 -	 3	 3
Technicians
,i
Electronics Technician 	 1	 S	 1
All these personnel should be well versed in propellant safety and
checked out on the systems.	 They may have other normal functions and only,-
be activated for these types of launches. 	 The cognizant engineer should be
whomever has primary responsibility for the safety of the PCF and Orbiter.
Members of this crew may be the same personnel who will - be responsible
for loading N204JMMH into the shuttle or rocket test personnel on temporary
assignment.
A training program for these personnel appears appropriate to both
create familiarity with both the equipment, and procedures for coping with
credible failures on the ground.	 Specific recommendations are summarized
U in Tables 4--13 through 4--15 whirh consider leaks and spills general and
. specific leaks and spills.
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Table 4-12. Personnel Considerations - Precautionary Procedures
Precautions for When Tankage not in Explosive Safe Storage
e TRAINING IS KEY TO PROPER RESPONSES
a PERSONNEL MUST BE FORMALLY TRAINED IN F2 HANDLING AND SAFETY, AS WELL AS
FOR 14204.
@ PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CERTIFIED TO CARRY OUT LF2 OPERATIONS.
* PERSONNEL FORM PART OF DETECTION SYSTEM (WHEN WORKING ON NEARBY SYSTEMS).
a TIME ELEMENT CRITICAL -- RECOMMENDED A WELL-►HOUGHT--OUT APPROACH
• 24 HR. RESPONSE CAPABILITY REQUIRED TO REPAIR OR REMOVE.
it FIRE EQUIPMENT AT THE READY, WITHIN SIGHT OF SYSTEM -- WITH F 2 PROTECTED
EQUIPMENT.
e LOADING AND HANDLING PROCEDURES FORMALIZED AND PERFORMED BY USING A CHECKOFF
1. A PERSON SHOULD BE ASSIGNED OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR'SAFETY OF THE FLUORINE
SYSTEM WITH AUTHORITY TO INITIATE SAFETY PROCEDURES. COVERAGE SHOULD BE PROVIDED
WHENEVER THE SYSTEM IS NOT SECURED IN A SAFE STORAGE LOCATION. THIS PERSON CAN
HAVE OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES.
2. CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF FLUORINE STATUS PRESSURE., TEMPERATURE AND VAPOR DETECTION
IS RECOMMENDED. THIS MAY REQUIRE Z4 HOUR COVERAGE INCLUDING MEAL TIMES.
3. SIMILARLY A TRAINED PROPELLANT SAFETY TEAM READY TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY IS REQUIRED. THEY
ALSO MAY HAVE OTHER TASKS TO PERFORM UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS. (IT MAY BE NECESSARY
FOR EXAMPLE TO PROVIDE MEALS SO THAT PERSONNEL WILL BE AT Th EIR EMERGENCY STATIONS)
ALL PERSONNEL SHOULD BE TRAINED TO RECOGNIZE FLUORIN£ BY ITS COLOR AND ODOR AND BE
ABLE TO REPORT CONCENTRATIONS IN STANDARD TERMS,* E.G., SLIGHT, MODERATE, STRONG,
SEVERE AND INTOLERABLE.
SAFETY PROCEDURES SHOULD INCLUDE:
r DETECTION AND REPORTING BY HUMANS
s AUTOMATIC DETECTION
DETERMINATION OF HAZARD
RESPONSE TO HAZARD LEVEL, E.G., TURN ON FAN & EVACUATE AREA,
DUMP PROPELLANT OR, INITIATE L014 DATER FOG, EVACUATE, INCREASE
WATER FLOW.
IICH HAVE THE SAME MEANING TO ALL PERSONNEL.
7. AN INDOCTRINATION SESSION FOR THE PROPELLANT SAFETY TEAM SHOULD BE HELD PRIOR
TO EACH OCCASION OF USE OF LF2.
8. A SIGN-IN SHEET ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF SAFETY EVACUATION INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD
BE ESTABLISHED FOR ALL PERSONNEL WHO WILL BE IN THE PAD AREA DURING LF 2 HOLDING
IN THE ORBITER.
9. SAFETY EVAUCATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERSONNEL OTHER THAN PROPELLANT SAFETY TEAM
SHOULD DESCRIBE HOW TO EVACUATE THE AREA IN EVENT OF A LEAK OR SPILL AND WHERE
^	 TO GO FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, E.G., REASSEMBLE IN LOBBY OF MISSION CONTROL BLDG.
v
10. CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR RECOVERY OF ORBITER TIMELINE SHOULD BE PREPARED.
11. AUTOMOBILE PARKING SHOULD BE ARRANGED SO THAT TRANSPORT IS AVAILABLE FROM TWO
SIDES OF THE PAD SO THAT EVACUATION IS POSSIBLE INDEPENDENT OF PREVAILING WIND.
12. FIRE TRUCKS SHOULD BE KEPT AT THE READY AND SHOULD CONVOY WELL BEHIND THE SYSTEM
WHEN IT IS BEING MOVED. FIREMEN SHOULD HAVE SCAPE SUITS AND PARTICIPATE IN PROPEL-
LANT SAFETY TEAM TRAINING.
13. RECOGNITION SHOULD BE GIVEN THAT UNUSUAL CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO
AVOID DAMAGE TO THE ORBITER FROM LEAK AND SPILL PROCEDURES.
14. ON DISCOVERY OF A FLUORINE EMERGENCY, AN ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD 5E
MADE ON THE PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM AND ALSO AT THE FIRE STATION AND SECURITY OFFICE.
15. TRAINING SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO SECURITY PERSONNEL AS REGARDS
EVACUATION AND TRANSPORTATION.
16. PUBLIC ACCESS TO AREAS WHERE FLUORINE IS KEPT OR LOADED SHALL
BE FORBIDDEN.
Table 4--14. Considerations and Recommendations -- Leaks
1. GROSS LEAKS MAY NEED TO BE TREATED LIKE SPILLS. (SEE NEXT PAGE)
2. ' LEAKS ARE MOST LIKELY FROM THE GSE CONNECTIONS AT THE LOADING SITE.
LEAKS ARE NEXT MOST LIKELY FROM THE GSE DURING TRANSFER OPERATIONS.
LEAKS ARE LEAST LIKELY FROM THE PROPULSION SYSTEM ESPECIALLY AFTER TRANSFER IS
COMPLETE - UNLESS IT RECEIVES GROSS DAMAGE.
FOR THESE REASONS:
p	 4 LOADING SHOULD BE DONE AT AN EXPLOSIVE SAFE FACILITY 	 -cV
`O	 ° THE LF2 TANK SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM DAMAGE
3. SMALL LEAKS FROM LINES DURING ISOLATED FILLING OPERATIONS MAY BE STOPPED BY STOPPING
FILLING OPERATIONS AND ASPIRATING THE LINES.	 Y-----
4. SMALL LEAKS FROM GSE MAY BE SIMILARLY HANDLED EXCEPT TANK LEAKS, WHICH REQUIRES DISPOSAL
OF TANKED PROPELLANT
5. IF THE SOURCE CANNOT BE ISOLATED OR TRANSPORTED, AS A LEAKING TANK*, THE
SYSTEM SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO VENT OFF AS SLOWLY AS POSSIBLE THROUGH A CHIMNEY OR
ASPIRATION.DEVICE. (UNNECESSARY PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EVACUATED)
*SOME LEAKING TANK SHUTOFF VALVES CAN BE REPLACED BY PERSONNEL IN SCAPE UNITS.
Table 4-14. Consideration and Recommendations - Leaks !Continued)
6. IF IGNITION HAS TAKEN PLACE, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE THAT IT CAN BE SUFFOCATED BY N2.
HOWEVER, UNDER SOME INSTANCES, THIS IS AVAILABLE AND CAN BE TRIED BEFORE WATER.
(IF THE FIRE IS SMALL)
7. IF IGNITION STOPG,THE WATER CAN BE TURNED OFF PENDING DETERMINATION OF LEAK RATE.
8. IF IGNITION HAS TAKEN PLACE AND INVOLVES MORE THAN A SMALL AREA, PERSONNEL PROTECTION
MATER FOG SHOULD BE INITIATED AND THE ARE EVACUATED EXCEPT FOR NECESSARY
PERSONNEL.
00
0
Table 4-16. Considerations and Recommendations -- Spills
1. 'rHE RECOMMENDED DECONTAMINANT FOR LIQUID FLUORINE SPILLS IS WATER FOG AND WATER FOG COUPLED WITH
A SETTLING TANK FOR LARGE BUNKER SPILLS. REFERENCE 13.
2. PERSONNEL MUST BE TRAINED IN FLUORINE HANDLING PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURES FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION.
3. FLUORINE-FLUORIDE DETECTORS ^"SNIFFERS") SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO A FACILITY. THESE
DETECTORS SHOULD OPERATE AUTOMATICALLY SO THAT A SPILL WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY SOUND AN ALARM, TURN OFF
FLUORINE VALVES, AND ARM THE NEUTRALIZATION SYSTEMS. 2 OUT OF 3 DETECTORS ACTUATE AUTOMATIC DELUGE.
4. ALL PERSONNEL WORKING WITH FLUORINE SHOULD HAVE PRE-EMPLOYMENT PHYSICALS AND REGULAR PHYSICAL
EXAMINATIONS TO DETERMINE IF THEY ARE ASSIMILATING FLUORINE; MEDICAL ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
IMMEDIATELY IN CASE OF ACCIDENT. PERSONNEL MUST BE CERTIFIED YEARLY BY KSC.
5, ROUTINE ANALYSIS OF FLORA, SOIL AND WATER IN THE AREA WILL GIVE DATA ON ANY BUILDUP OF FLUORIDES SO
THAT NEUTRALIZATION METHODS MAY BE OBSERVED AND MODIFIED IF NEED IS INDICATED IF MORE THAN
co OCCASIONAL USE OF FLUORINE IS ANTICIPATED,
6. FUSIBLE LINKS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR THE SERVICING SYSTEM. IN THE EVENT OF SPONTANEOUS FIRE IN
THE MANIFOLD, THE FUSIBLE LINKS WOULD MELT OUT AND SAVE THE MAIN STORAGE BUNKER AND VALVES.
7. THE VOLUME OF LIQUID FLUORINE STORED AT ANY LOCATION SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM FOR OVERALL SAFETY.
I	 8. A WEATHER SUB--STATION WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE MAIN BASE SHOULD BE A PART OF THE FACILITY TO
GIVE DATA AND ADVICE ON LOCAL WINDS FOR PROPELLANT LOADING OPERATIONS WHICH IDEALLY SHOULD BE DONE
WITH FAVORABLE WINDS.
9. ADDITIONAL WORK SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON THE DESIGN OF SUITABLE WATER SPRAY INCLUDING GEOMETRY OF THE
SPRAY PATTERN AND THE DROPLET-SIZE OF THE WATER SPRAY TO EFFECT THE GREATEST EFFICIENCY.
10. ALL PROCEDURES SHALL BE WRITTEN, PRE-APPROVED, AND CHECKED OFF AS THEY ARE COMPLETED
IN THE COUNTDOWR.
4.3.5.2 Flight Crew
Similarly, the flight crew should be prepared for emergencies in
flight. As described elsewhere, propellant status monitoring is
suggested.
Duties of the flight crew will be to:
a Monitor propellant status
e Take note of caution signals
s Take action on warning signal
}	 8 Override automatic dump sequence (if needed)
a Provide safing commands
• Dump helium bottles if appropriate.
4.3.7 Essential Equipment
Essential equipment is summarized in Table 4-15. The listing of
trained personnel under the equipment heading is . to emphasize that well
trained, aware personnel are the key to successful operations. Although
it can be expected that flight operations with these propellants will be
much more routine than, for example, rocket test operations, the ability
to respond properly in case of accident is of prime importance. This will
be discussed in more detail below.
d
Repair equipment and spares are an important aspect of operations
I
since continued abnormal operations may add to the hazards. The most
likely equipment to encounter difficulties is expected to be the loading
GSE even though considerable effort may have been spent to "de bug" it.
The development cycle is the same as the propulsion system but typically
GSE hardware does not see use until after the propulsion system is nearly
developed.
}
	
	 Protective suits with self-contained breathing apparatus are needed
if operations are to be performed on an open or leaking propellant con-
' twiner. These are required for the propellant safety team who would repair
the system and for any firemen expected to work close to the propellant
tanks. It may be advisable to have only fluorine compatible suits available
because in an emergency, personnel might make use of whatever equipment.
is available.	 +
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Table 4-15. Essential Equipment
'E
E
f
•	 TRAINED PERSONNEL
•	 REPAIR EQUIPMENT/SPARES FOR LOADING GSE** AND LINES
•	 F2 SCAPE SUITS (WITH RF COMMUNICATIONS IF POSSIBLE) PROPELLANT SAFETY TEAM 	 i
AND FIREMEN***	i
*	 SPARE LN2 COOLING EQUIPMENT OR CAPACITY
•	 LN2 PURGE (OPTIONAL)
*	 PROPELLANT OFF LOAD DEWAR/F2 RECYCLE SYSTEM, (OPTIONAL) OR
*	 F2 EMERGENCY ASPIRATION/BURNOFF STACK OR CHARCOAL BURNER (OPTIONAL) (ESA AND PAD)
•	 TWO LEVEL MATER FOG FIRE SUPPRESSION
a	 FIRE HOSES
•	 F2 CAPABLE PROPELLANT SAFETY CONSOLE (COMBINE WITH N 204/MMH CAPABILITY)	 --
•	 COLOR SURVEILLANCE T.V.
a	 PROPELLANT VAPOR DETECTION INSTRUMENTS - HAND HELD
*	 AUTOMATIC AIR SAMPLING AND VAPOR DETECTION SYSTEM
LEGEND: 
*F2 PECULIAR EQUIPMENT
**ALSO CALLED OSE OR AGE
***IDEAL TO HAVE ONLY F2 SUITS AVAILABLE WHICH ARE ALSO
SUITABLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES
ipp
a
I
Spare LN2 cooling equipment or capacity is needed in case of mal-
function of the cooling systems.
Ability to chill, quench and decontaminate (purge) the oxidizer
tank area with liquid nitrogen in an emergency would be desireable but may
not be practical. This is considered an optional accessory which should
be investigated.
Another desirable optional accessory for use at the PCF would be
an off-load dewar and fluorine recycle system for use at the PCF. This
could use a transport truck but would require lines at the PCF. It is not
considered a very practical approach for fluorine as it involves an oxidizer
line and would be expensive and does not result in a very safe off-load of
propellant. It is considered better to remove even a leaking propellant
tank from the area. A connection to the tank would be required and it
would need to be passivated before further operations occurred. Similarly,
an aspirator/burnoff stack or charcoal burner requires an oxidizer line,
and passivation procedure. These two items could be used but the KSC
i Safety Office favors a closed up system without dump capabilities. Articu-
lation of the line during PCF motion would be another complication.
A remotely controlled two level water fog fire suppression system
located in the PCF is essential in case of fire. This appears true regard-
less of the origin of the fire. Two levels are to provide one level to
protect personnel who might be in the area and a second level for all out
control.
This system may be sized for IUS/TUG requirements, and would be
adequate for the spacecraft propulsion. If the tug is not loaded until
after PCF roll back, then it should be sized to handle up to 3000 pounds
of LF2
 or N204.
Fire hoses should be provided to handle small fires not originating
in the oxidizer system. Well worked out procedures are required.
A safety console is desireable at a location remote from the PCF,
perhaps in the VAB for monitoring propellant status and vapor detection.
Propellant specific vapor detectors are desired to differentiate vapors,
but are not absolutely essential. They will be discussed in the next
section.
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Color TV surveillance should be maintained on the propulsion sys-
tems. Color is needed to be able to differentiate between a BFRC and a
BFGC (Big foggy red or green cloud) representing N 0^ or F2 , respectively,
so as to know which system is leaking. Hand-held vapor detection instru-
ments will also be useful.
An automatic air sampling and vapor detection system is desirable
which incorporates propellant specific vapor detectors in the PCF.'
4.3.8 Conclusions
The conclusions of this task are;
I) Direct human odor sensing of fluorine is the most state
of the art method.
2) Combined use of the other methods appears prudent.
3) Personnel must be highly trained to avoid over response
or response to false alarms caused by other oxidizers
and halogen sources.
4) An evaluation program for fluorine detectors is
desirable.
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4.4 TASK 5 N 20  VERSUS LF2 PROPULSION SYSTEMS COMPARISON
4.4.1 Task Description
The task statement is:
Assess the schematics of the propulsion systems shown in
Figures 1-4 through 1-6. Clearly identify modifications,
if any, that you recommend for LF2 use in the shuttle-
launched spacecraft. Compare LF 2 and N204 to determine
the differences, if any, in propulsion system design.
4.4.2 System Modifications
For purposes of this safety study, the comparison of the propulsion
systems s lmn previously in Figures 1-4 through 1-6 can be mainly confined
to the components which contact or might contact fluorine. This includes
primarily the oxidizer tanks and isolation valves. In addition, the other
system lines and valves, e.g., the engine valve and the helium isolation
valve, can be considered as a redundant leakage containment system.
The system used should be fail-fail-safe or tolerate two failures.
The system shown has been considered from the standpoint of safety con-
'd	 th d	 h'1	 h	 re a ted 'n A ndix 1 and that beforesz ering	 a es "^ gn p i osop y p s n	 ppe
flight the system will have been through flight qualification program,
safety reviews and a safety development program.
The modifications to the schematics described below are recommended
for further APL consideration.
The configuration shown in Figure 4-11, the externally regulated sys-
tem or equivalent*, is recommended as safer than that of Figure 4 . 12, provided
that an isolation valve is added at the pressurization line inlet at the top
of the tank. This %%stem is recommended because (1) it can normally be
handled in the unpressurized mode (see the comparison in Table 4-16), 5
(2) it has maximum storage life without cooling. All components in the
helium system from the latching solenoid down must be fluorine compatible
because they are redundant propellant containment devices, and must be
passivated.
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Assumed Characteristics Regulated* Blow Dawn
Regul-; ited -
Fquiva1en.t Blowdown
Material 6A1-4V Ti 6AI-4V Ti 6A1-4V Ti.
Operating pressure, psi M 300 N 300 300
Design concept Safe l.i fe Safe 1 i fe Safe. 1 if e 
Safety factor on burst — 1.7 - 2.0 — 1.7 - 2.0 N 1.7 - 2.0
Ground hold temperature -306 -3060F -306
Heatup time, hr M 20 N 6 over 6
Vapor pressure, psi 14.7 14.7 14.7
Tank pressure, psia' — 14.7 N 300 —14.7
Launch temperature, o f -325 --325 -325
Launch vapor pressure, psia 4.0	 (--10.7 psig) 4.0	 (-10.7 psig) 4.0
Design for buckling at 14.7 psi g Yes Yes Yes
Safety factor at normal conditions 1.7 -- 2.0 m
Applicable failure rate
From internal pressure 0 10-5/day estimated 0
Normal operlat'i ons Incredible Very improbable Incredible
Consequence of leak Drip Spray Drip
Use of the burst/relief valve as shown in Figure 4-11is recommended
as better than allowing even the possibility of tank bursts, however,
redundancy of the burst discs is recommended and caution in the location of
the vent is needed. The TRY Capistrano Test Site does not use vent/relief
valves. However, use of redundant burst discs appears appropriate for this
application. A system using no vent valves would also be considered
satisfactory.
Use of the system shown schematically in Figure 4-13 described as
4-tank blowdown in Table 4-15, is considered acceptable if:
t^ Pressurization occurs after deployment of the spacecraft
and separation of the orbiter
• Extra thermal protection (insulation, etc.) is provided
to extend the storage time to well over 6 hours* (pre-
ferably 24 hours) or if LN 2
 cooling is provided in
-Flight
Both systems, LF2 and N204 , are provisionally mandated by NASA
Headquarters to have dump systems. The dump system would consist of
approximately a 1 1/2-inch line size valve and line connected to the
engine feed line (for a 1000-pound propellant load). This line size
should allow dump of the unpressurized tank acting under vapor pressure
alone to space vacuum in under 1 minute. The isolation valve would also
need to be of similar size.
If it is determined that a fast, pressurized dump is required, an
orifice in the pressurization line below the-regulator may be appropriate
to limit pressurization of the tank during dump to a value lower than the
normal regulation pressure. This would allow additional safety margin 	 i
durI ng propellant dump.
A redundant vapor detection shell as shown i n Figure 4-14 is con-
sidered feasible and may be considered for erhanced safety on the fluorine
i
system. Although this item adds some system weight, it can provide a
positive means to assure propellant containment. Such a shell is not
The normal time required for deployment, design for unpressurized dump
is needed to allow dump in care of a leaking tank.
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required for the N 204 in the OMS kits and so, by precedent, it should not
be required for spacecraft propulsion.
Use of the second shell, if one is used, as a vapor detection
cavity is recommended. For N 204 the shroud could serve as a vapor detec-
tion cavity. Vapor detection in flight will be discussed in Task B.
In Figure 1-6 se of a common pressurant tank with isolation pro-
vided by series redundant check valves, not by isolation valves, is underw
stood to be a state-of-the-art practice. However, it raises the possibility
of propellant contact if the check valves were to malfunction due to any
combination of causes. This is not recommended for manned spaceflight on
the Shuttle. Separate pressurant systems or isolation valves are recom-.
mended. No manual valves should be used.
A capping procedure is desirable for the vent/relief line. (Caps
are always installed on the fill and drain lines after loading.) See
Table 4-16.
i
Table 4-16. Vent/Relief Line Capping Procedure
Vent Open	 Vent Capped	 Comments
i
On ground
Load Propellant	 TBD
Storage	 X	 To save system in
case of over--
pressure
Transport to pad	 X	 To reduce hazard
F
At launch	 x	 For deployment
During Flight	 x	 To prevent burst
During deployment	 x	 After dump is
•	 disconnected
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4.5 TASK 6 — OXIDIZER BUMF SYSTEM ANALYSIS
4.5.1 Task Description
4.5.1.1 Task Statement
Task 6 requirements are as follows:
"Determine if an oxidizer dump system is required for the
case of (a) shuttle abort, and (b) oxidizer system failure.
If a dump system is recommended, then for both cases (a)
and (b) describe the design criteria for a dump system
recognizing the existence of a shroud over the spacecraft.
For case (b) describe the fundamental processes that
would govern a non-catastrophic leak of the oxidizer into
the shuttle bay and its effect on the shuttle and payload
hardware. Determine the disposition of the oxidizer con-
sidering vaporization and diffusion rates and concentra-
tion gradients."
4.5.1.2 Analysis Approach
General Approach and Summ_a_ry. The general approach used in this
task was to (1) define the mission operational sequence, (2) define system
characteristics, (3) perform a hazard analysis and postulate corrective
actions and hardware, and (4) compare alternative dump system options in
view of the hazard analysis.
The "hazard analysis" format used is very similar to the hazard
analysis described in Section 4.1 of this report, although in this task
two slightly different hazard analysis formats werE used. The first for-
mat was used to analyze the "primary hazards" that exist or may exist, when
launching the Mariner spacecraft and the IUSJTUG when using LF 2 and N204
during normal mission operations (includes Orbiter abort operations) and
.the abnormal operations that may occur during an unplanned extended mission
and other conditions. See Appendix (9) for this analysis.
The second type of hazard analysis format was used to analyze
secondary hazards that exist or may exist during dump of the oxidizer
during launch, orbital, and abort conditions. See Appendix (9) for this
analysis. From the primary and secondary hazard analyses the information
needed to answer the Task 6 is derived. Appendix 9 is summarized in
,.	 Figure 4--17.
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1 1) Lift off of orbiter 2) Internediate leak through the o	 Normal vibration, Improbable ORBITER
: •ral to SRM separation primary tank wall and the outer acceleration or (Current _ffects)
:!z • ations leak protection shell. shock.
Burn through the shroud may occur
3) Vent of F2
 through vent/relief. o	 External hazards to improbable and allow gas to leak into the
the payload; e.g., cargo bay.
rupture of pressure
vessels, fire (Delayed Effects)
hazards to payload Continued corrosio.l due to earlier
from the tug and leak.	 Also possible over-
orbiter, etc. pressurization of shroud and fire
in the shroud which if released
o	 Overpressurization Improbable would cause extensive damage.
of the LF2 tank
from the He tank. ORBITER FERSOrIpEL
(Delayed Effects)
o	 Small	 fire external Improbable
of the tank could Possible damage to space suits and
be caused by small possible injury	 o personnel	 if
leak igniting non- IVA is performed and toxic and
metallics or fuel corrosive gas hazard exists
vapors.
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;UMMARY OF PRIMARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK 5 AND 6
RISK
CATEGORY
(7)
SAFETY
CONTROLS & ASSUMPTIONS
(S)
REMARKS
(9)
I7 If an intermediate leak occurs, the 1) All aspects of specified controls are comparable for N204
11 possible shuttle orbiter should continue to orbit except that the normal orbiter hypergolic dump lines can be
:ur
because of or gain altitude to quench fire and dump used.	 The shroud would replace the second tank wall as a
cost propellant and RTLS. The S/C mission leakage barrier.
should be cancelled.	 The orbital	 leak
procedure (dump or deploy) should be 2) This page of the analysis assumes dump lines will be
T1 instituted mandated by NASA.
Her Assumed a special orbiter LF2 compatible 3) Ascent to altitude will moderate all 	 leakage effects provided
dump system is used for dumping the LF2. vents are open.	 Lea<age around the door is expected to
ire provide some venting even when vents are closed.
i. The earliest time possible to open the
cargo bay doors is T = 22 minutes
S/C design is that assumed in Table 2.
II The gases in the orbiter cargo bay are
and continuously vented during boost
F
operations.
Prior to boost, the cargo bay is purged 3
with N2 gas.
The shuttle crew area is isolated from
a
the cargo bay area during boost via an
airlock.
The LF2 tank has a fluorine compatible a
shell around it to contain any "fuzz
leaks" or "intermediate leaks."
The time the orbiter is exposed to a
fuzz leak will	 be small.	 If a fuzz leak 1
occurs, the a6,uttle should continue to
orbit then proceed to the orbital leak
procedure.
The complete S/C is covered with a shroud
which isolates leakage gases from the
orbiter.
The shroud is designed to be as resistant
to F2 as possible.
The shroud is designed so as not to
contain significant pressure buildups.
The shroud must also be vented to the
outside of the orbiter cargo bay to allow
pressure relief from inside the shroud
on ascent.
Once the leak is detected, the LF2
may be dumped.
Personnel not allowed in the cargo space
in any phase of flir 	 when there is a_
leak in the LF2
 tank.
Assumed that instruments are aboard that
can detect a leaking F2 tank.
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Normal 2) SRI Separation 2)	 Intermediate leak through the a	 Same as for Mission Improbable ORBITEROnerations to MEC0 primary tank wail and the leak Phase T, Primary(Continued) protection shell. Hazard {2). (Current Effects)
r	 High shock loads to Improbable Leak through of the shroud will
the payload due to cause damage to cargo bay due to
SRI separation. corrosive gases.
s	 Longer period of tim Improbable
time for leak througi
to occur than for
Mission Phase	 (1).
ORBITERContinued
(Delayed Effects)
Same effects as for primary
hazard	 (2) of Mission Phase (I)
above.
ORBITER PERSONNEL	 i
(Delayed Effects)
Same effects as for primary	 !
hazard (2) of Mission Phase (1)
above.
3A)	 Earliest opening 1)	 Intermediate leak through Fire external to the Improbable ORBITER
of cargo hay doors the prirrary tank wall and the tank.	 Could he (Delayed Effects)to deployment of outer leak protection shell, caused by small leak
the S/C and IVS/ igniting hardware or Same as Phases 1 and 2 above.
TUG into orbit. fuel vaoors that
exist in the area.
a Excessive heat trans Improbable ORBITER PERSONNEL	 3
fer through the (Delayed Effects)
thermal coating
causing early rapid Possible toxic and corrosive gas
pressure rise in the hazard in the cargo bay and could
LF 2 tank.	 Failure cause dama ge to the IVA suit,	 then	 t'
to dtSc)nnect all possible injury to personnel.
appropr'ate Tines Same as Phases
and connections to Possible injury to other arbiter
the orbiter before personnel if the hazard
deployment of the propagates.
payload into orbit
(e. g .,	 dump line),
and other mechanical
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((Incredible
III,
	
	 See ap propriate section of the pr1nary
•II possible hazard analysis for detail safety
controls and desinn requirements.
i_
.III,	 Same as for Operation I, Mission
II possible Phase 1.
:(impraba-
`ble?
1. See dote 3 above.,
2. Si gnificant s pills of fuel and oxidizer required to allow
combustion in hard space vacuum with the cargo bay doors
open. Continuing flow of fuel and oxidizer would be
required to damage the cargo bay.
III,	 Sense overpressure and dump propellant.
II possible
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ns orbiter after an internal	 tank pressure. o Mainly because of heating o There is a 1001 chance Possibletocorrosion
1I	 passi6
unplanned mission
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or
of LF2 due to extended the tank will rupture
external	 surfaces of the
Assumed that the
vent relief,, time without coolant. if there is no ccoldown orbiter including optical
F2 dump system has
capability or dump
capability in the time
surfaces.	 The extent of
been disconnected. allowed.
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removed and when the
incident occurred.
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I] possible
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I: possible
See appropriate section of the primary
legend analysis for other detail safety
controls.
T. Use vent relief with redundant burst
discs; ducted overhead
2. Do not allow IVA or EVA if tank
pressure is near vent/relief level.
3. 14ay need a dump line reconnect
capability
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Dump alternatives are shown in Section 4.5.3.1. Only the selected
alternative was considered in the hazard analysis.
In addition to performing the above hazard analyses, a qualitative
hazard analysis tradeoff was made to determine if it was safe to land the
orbiter with LF 2 in the tank or to dump the L F2 in flight, then land the
orbiter.
Foundational Data for the Hazard Analyses
To perform the hazard analyses and thereby derive the data needed
for Task n, several bits of data had to be correlated and defined, includ-
ing operation, design characteristics and possible actions. The data
required was a detailed description of the various operations to be per-
formed during a normal mission (obtained from mission profiles), during the
abort missions, and during normal missions when unplanned orbiter/payload
anomalies occur. Also ground operations at primary and secondary landing
sites had to be considered, various possible payload configurations and
oxidizer removal systems were defined, orbiter operational and design data
was determined, and possible modes of corrective action were determined for
various hazards that might occur during various mission phases.
Mission_ Operations. For this study mission operations consist of
normal and abnormal operations. All of these operations are described in
the DOD "Space Shuttle System Summary," 1 August 1974, Capt. Paul H.
Kruppenbacher, SAMSO/LURE. 	 This document describes the NASA as well as
the DOD missions. Also SSV74w32, "Space Shuttle System Summary," August
1974 was used to define mission profiles. Under the normal missions, the
mission profile for the 65,000-pound payload was assumed, also for the
purposes of this study, an unplanned extended mission was considered as
part of the normal mission profile. The abnormal missions were the abort
missions, crash landings, and landings at secondary landing sites.
For the normal mission, it was assumed to have the following
,i
basic mission phases:
a Lift off to SRM separation. SRM separation occurs at
approximately 122 seconds.
Part of the Air Force space and missile organization.
Solid rocket motors.
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a SRM separation to Main Engine Cutoff (MECO). MECO is at
481 seconds.
• MECO to mission injection. Mission injection occurs at
T = 588 seconds. The OMS is fired after MECO to boost
AV 100 fps.
After mission injection, the earliest time the cargo baby
doors can be open is T = 22 minutes.
* Mission injection to apogee. Apogee kick occurs in the
first orbit and occurs at about T = 35.9 minutes. The
first orbit is a 50 x 100 nautical miles.
• Apogee to circularization occurs normally in the
eighth orbit.
a Circularization to predeployment activation and check-
out. Checkout occurs after attaining orbit circulariza-
tion and the cargo bay doors are normally opened at this
time (approximately one orbit).
e Activation and checkout to payload/TUG or IUS deploy-
ment occurs at within three orbits.
The sequence. is: Payload/TUG/IUS deployment; payload/TUG or
IUS checkout and release; and TUG activation.
a The TUG and orbiter are separated about 1500 to 2000 feet
from the TUG when the TUG is fired,
a Unplanned extended hold after the cargo bay doors are
opened at T = 11 hours to when normal mission opera-
tions are considered.
Abnormal operations were assumed to consist of the Return to
Launch Site (RTLS) and Abort Once Around (AOA) abort operations, crash
landing and normal landings at secondary launch sites. Of the above
operations, the hazard analysis was performed on the most dangerous oper-
ations only. The RTES abort mode and the crash landing were considered
the most dangerous operations. The RTLS abort mode consists of the fol-
lowing mission phases:
a Same as for normal mission up to SRM separation at
T = 122 seconds
® SRM separation to last RTLS point (+ = 242 seconds.)
The two orbiter main engines continue to burn at
100% EPL until the propellants in t he ext real tanks
are expended. The entire OMS propellant supply and RCS
propellants are expended as soon as possible during RTLS.
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• Last RTLS point; to MECO at T = 561 seconds.
a MECO to External Tank (ET) release at approximately
T = 561 seconds.
a ET release to shuttle lands with power :off.
Normal landing will be at the landing strip at KSC. The
secondary landipg sites will be Patrick Air Force Base in Florida
or Vandenberg AFB, California. A crash landing may occur at any one
of the above landing sides.
System Design Characteristics. In the hazard analyses previously
mentioned two different oxidizer related system designs were evaluated.
One system design concept was the Shuttle/Mariner Baseline System and the
second concept considered was the Shuttle/Mariner Preferred System. The
baseline system is considered a nominal system, whereas the preferred sys-
tem is considered a much lower risk system because of the design character-
istics that control the hazards and minimize the chance of hazard occur-
rence. The design characteristics of these systems was shown in Table 2--1
In addition to payload design requirements, the STS* design and.
operational constraints were considered. Some of the significant con-
straints are:
o The earliest the cargo bay doors can be opened is
T = 22 minutes after launch.
s There is no fixed flooding fire extinguishing system
aboard the shuttle orbiter.
9 There is no means to purge the cargo bay once it is
launched.
All the data on the STS*
 design was taken from JSC 07700, Vol. 14,
Rev. C "Space Shuttle System Payload Accommodations."
Corrective Action. In performing the hazard analysis it was neces-
sary to determine potential modes of corrective action during various
normal and abnormal mission phases. Therefore, an analysis was performed
to determine these corrective action modes for the postulated hazardous
conditions which may occur in the mission phases. The following modes of
corrective action were determined to be acceptable and were used in the
hazard analysis:
v Launch Phase (normal mission). The only corrective
action possible during launch is to drain the
oxidizer via a dump system. This is the only mode
possible up to +22 minutes, which is the earliest
time the cargo bay doors can be opened.
f Orbital Injection and Orbital Operations (normal
mission). During this mission phase, the oxidizer may
be off-loaded by dumping or by deploying the payload
(contains the oxidizer). Depending on the design of
the payload, other off-load modes may be possible such
as vent the oxidizer from the oxidizer tank directly
to space from the cargo-bay. One other corrective action
considered in the study was to return to the launch site
with the propellant.
r Return to Launch Site (abort mod-e ). During this abort
condition it was assumed that the only oxidizer disposi-
tion mode tenable was to dump the oxidizer after SRNs
separation. It was not considered a desirable cor-
rective action to land with the oxidizer aboard the
shuttle because of the risk of crash landing or having
to perform a normal landing at a secondary landing
site.
4.5.2 Design Criteria/Shuttle Abort
The design criteria for ,jettisoning the oxidizer during the Shuttle
abort modes may be categorized as due to operating constraints and orbiter
safety considerations and ground safety considerations.
The design criteria that should be considered in the dump system
due to abort operating conditions are:
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• During the RTLS abort, the oxidizer must be dumped
before other hypergols and propellants, probably
immediately after the last RTLS time (T = 242 seconds).
The propellant must be dumped in a very short period of
time (TBD) to allow time for the other propellants to
be dumped. 300 seconds are allocated for all.
# All propellant must be dumped in the time allowed.
e During an ADA abort, the propellant is to be dumped
after orbit is achieved.
• Propellant should not be dumped below several thousand feet
because of atmospheric contamination. Safety of the Orbiter
is the overriding concern, however. ( p lans call for no dumps
below 100,000 feet.)
r The dumping of propellant should occur only after SRM
separation.
The design criteria that should be considered on the dump system
due to other safety considerations are:
• The dump system must be compatible with LF2.
a A specially designed vent system may be provided
to offer a secondary means for slow dumping, in orbit.
e The normal orbiter OMS kit (earth storable) hypergolic
dump system cannot be used without major modifications
for F2 . it should be adequate for R?_040
r The dump system must be passivated before launch and
leak tests must be performed to determine that the
dump system is leak free. A positive pressure of He
gas must be maintained during all mission operations.
This pressure must be monitored by the engineerin g data
system aboard the Orbiter and the caution system activated
if it is determined that a leak has occurred. The leak
detection system must be designed such that the leak rate
in the dump system can be ascertained, so that correct
procedures can be determined.
at The dump system is to be sealed off on both ends, so that no
contamination can enter.
a . The dump system must be designed to contain low order pressure
surges of the-type that occur when minor contamination and F2
gas mix, without leaking.
.s
i
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All possible joints in the dump system should be welded and
of the same quality. of weld used on the spacecraft oxidizer
system (except disconnects, of course).
s A warning plate shall be placed on the dump system in
conspicuous places indicating that the system contains
:
	
	
a hazardous gas (see warning signs required by the OSHA
for information required on the plate).
a The dump system should be designed so that the valves
to the system can be automatically opened when a dump
is required. The command for dump shall be initiated
by the orbiter crew.
• The passive portions (piping) of the dump system shall
be designed to be fail safe. All valves and controls
shall be designed to be fail-fail-safe.
• The dump system shall not have a relief valve or vent
valve, which could leak during passivation, etc.
u The dump system piping shall be routed such that there
will be minimal damage if a hazard occurs.
• The operating pressure in the dump system should be
r
	
	
kept as low as possible. The dump system shall be
designed to have a safety factor of at least 3.0 under
worst case conditions; this would include dumping when
the pressure in the oxidizer tank is at the MEOP value.
Only metal seals should be used for LF 2 and only where
it is absolutely necessary to have a mechanical joint.
• Assure there are no sections in the piping that will
cause pockets of LF2 to exist it cause pockets of F2
gas to exist.
• Assure that the dump system piping is isolated from
all sources of fuel vapor.
• Consider an outer shell around the dump system piping.**
• The dump system piping must be capable of enduring the
thermal shock of the dump process.
a Assure that the outlet of the F2 dump system is located
so that any possible backwash of the F2 gas during
dumping is minimized.
i Allow no joints in the dump piping between the attachment
to the payload to the Orbiter main engine bulkhead.
Ii	
Design the exit nozzle of the dump system so that the
external orbiter surfaces will not be damaged under
any dump conditions.
The dump system shall be designed so that it will not
collapse due to low internal pressure and normal
external pressures.
4.5.3 Design Criteria/Oxidiz-er System Malfunction
	 J
In general the design criteria for the dump system is the sa goit as
that required in Section 4.5.2, "Design Criteria/Shuttle AboO-.` Some of
the design requirements that are peculiar to oxidizer system malfunction
are:
r The propellant should be dumped at the first moment that is
safe for the Orbiter.
y
• The dump system interface with the payload should be
designed so that it will readily disconnect safely
from the payload when the payload is being deployed.
A redundant disconnect mechanism should be designed
so that the oxidizer tank is not damaged if the pri-
mary disconnect fails. An alternate solution would
be to assure that the disconnect is fail-safe.
4.5.3.1 Oxidizer Dump System Tradeoffs
LF2 and N204 Dump Considerations
One of the basic questions of Task 6 addresses is whether a dump
system is required during abort operations and if an oxidizer tank failure
(leak) occurs. A hazard analysis was performed, as previously mentioned,
and it was determined that a dump system is desirable in this event. Of
course the systems should be reliable enough that either event is an
exceptional one.
A review of the primary hazard analysis (Appendix - 9) reveals that
there are several hazards to the orbiter and its personnel if a dump sys-
tem is not available. In addition to the vacuum of space which removes
propellant rapidly, the dump system provides the only means to mitigate a
hazard during certain phases of flight where the ergo bay doors are closed,
such as during the RTLS abort condition. Even if a hazard event does not
occur to the LF2 of N2OX tank it is desirable to off-load the propellant during
the RTLS abort to reduce the effect of hazards to the oxidizer tank and to
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Fundamental Process Oxidizer Dump System Design Characteristics
lower the risk to the orbiter, and flight and ground personnel during
various landing conditions (e.g., crash landing and landing at alternate
landing sites for the RTLS abort conditions present special problem areas).
Since one of the payload safety requirements is "a safe interfa;.e
between the Shuttle and its payload shall be maintained under nominal,
contingency, and emergency operations of either the Shuttle or its payload,"
it has been interacted that it is necessary to supply the dump capability
during all mission phases where deployment of the spacecraft and IUS/TUG
cannot be achieved. The times when this may occur are from liftoff to
T + 22 minutes on a normal mission and during the RTLS abort. The dump
system also provides a capability for hazard control if for some reason
the payload (spacecraft and IUS/TUG) cannot be removed from the cargo bay
when required. If this occurred after excessive warming of the tank has
occurred, the dump system would be the only means available to protect the
orbiter and its personnel from a catastrophic incident unless the oxidizer
tank is designed with a vent system as indicated previously. Since the
dump system is planned, other systems are not necessary.
For the RTLS and AOA abort conditions it is considered necessary
to dump propellant before landing because of the increased risk to the
orbiter and its personnel if a crash landing occurs and the increased risk
to ground personnel and the general public if the orbiter has to land at an
alternate landing site: the airports will not have the facilities required
to safely handle liquid fluorine at a time when the LF2 is more hazardous
than any previous phase of the mission including handling at KSC. This is
because of the increased pressures in the tank due to the normally slow or
possibly accelerated heating of the propellant, from abnormal conditions in
the cargo bay.
It is also felt that although it is feasible to design the oxidizer
tank to undergo crash landing stresses, the risk from other systems to the
oxidizer tank during a crash landing should be considered,.
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Fundamental processes that would govern a noncatastrophic leak
include: Propellant leakage, vaporization, flash freezing, sublimination,
diffusion, impingement, molecular motion and possibly, ignition. Some of
the considerations related to effects of noncatastrophic leaks are:
s Leak rate, a function of fluorine pressure, ambient
pressure (if any), hole size, and to some extent, LF2
temperature
• Vaporization and diffusion rates (if there is an atmos-
phere into which to diffuse)
e Presence or absence of reactable fuel vapors and their
concentration
* Presence or absence of liquid or solid fuel, capable of
being ignited
e If in the presence of water, corrosion.
Simply restated, the leak can be expected to be noncatastrophic if
the leakage is small enough that no appreciable vapor pressure is built up
which could cause reaction and heating of components.
It should be noted here that a 5 psi vapor pressure of LF2 is used
for typically 1 hour to create a passivation layer in test hardware after
which pressure increases to 50 or 100 psi are commonly used. `thus a 5 psi
pressure would not be expected to damage reasonably thick sections of
clean aluminum, citanium or stainless hardware. In space, all volatile
contaminants on the surface of hardware can be expected to disappear rapidly.
At low pressures as would be expected above 50 to 100,000 feet or
when leaks are small compared to the weight of air or nitrogen purge in the
cargo bay, reaction with combustible nonmetallic materials is of most con-
cern. If ignition were to occur at low altitude, it may extinguish at
altitudes. Example: Volume of the cargo bay is nominally 65 x 15 feet and
contains more than 11,486 cubic feet.
If the entire 1000 pounds of oxidizer were suddenly released and
flashed to vapor at-306oF absorbing a quantity of heat equal to its latent
heat of vaporization, a pressure of approximately 4 psi would result in the
cargo bay. Naturally this could not occur instantaneously and a combina-
tion of vapor droplets and solid frozen fluorine snow might result. Under
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zero g conditions vaporization would take several minutes. Spill tests at
the Air Force rocket propulsion laboratory indicated several minutes were
required to vaporize spills into a tray even where reactants were provided.
Small leaks can produce no appreciable pressure in the cargo bay
if the vents are open since they contain an area of several square feet.
Based on experience with attempting to obtain hypergoiic ignitions
of earth-storable propellants in rockets at low chamber pressures, it was
found that reliable ignitions at less than 1 psi N 204 pressure with N204
and amine (hydrazine based) fuels were difficult to obtain probably due to
the low temperature resulting from the evaporation process. Although simi-
lar data for LF2 has not been found, it is expected that rather gross leaks
would be required to ignite hardware in the cargo bay at altitude unless
there was direct impingement and recovery of velocity heads of the leak
steam. Fire can be expected to extinguish when the fuel is consumed.
Although testing should be performed with materials of interest
(such as insulation and electric wiring) in vacuum chambers, ignition in
the cargo bay by less than an "intermediate" leak is considered improbable
to incredible (<10-3 occurrences per launch) since vapor pressure of LF2
would be so small as to preclude significant heating. Leaks intermediate
or larger are considered improbable in themselves and are expected to be
from external causes, e.g., failure of other equipment.
Thus the hazards from low level leakage in vacuum are considered small.
Dump Alternatives
It was concluded that there are at least six alternatives for
emergency propellant off loading. These may be described as follows.
Dump Kit Peculiar Fluorine DKPF Selected for LF2. This is an
independent dump system or kit designed to be added to the Orbiter and IUS/
TUG to accommodate for the 
LF2/N2U4 propulsion system or an adaptation of
other lines to make them compatible with the propellants. Possible advan-
tages include:  (1) abi Y 1 ty to dump at any time in gravity fed, vapor
pressurized or helium pressurized modes, (2) satisfaction of the require-
ment defined by the Level 1* safety document, (3) provision of a vent
-	
function, (4) elimination of the need to design for crash and landing
*
NASA Headquarters
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site problems, and (5) it is believed that safety approval* can be obtained
if this approach is used. Disadvantages include: (1) system would be
costly in that a new larger line size propellant valve would be needed
(<l inch line size), (2) introduction of other hazard modes, i.e., the
dump line, and possible valve leakage, the system requires passivation
in the PCF or OPF, with F2 gas and (3) involves the IUS/TUG and/or Shuttle
Orbiter interfaces.
Through Doors Dump. This system would vent propellant through the
doors either when they are open or by means of a small protrusion through
the doors. This system has the advantages of: (1) no IUS/TUC interface,
hence, less cost; (2) it would be adequate for many hazards but is not
suitable for use before altitude is obtained (after altitude is achieved,
need for the dump kit is decreased); (3) it would operate even if the pay-
load jammed during deployment or after a DKPF would have been disconnected.
Its disadvantages include: (1) limitations on dump times, and (2) possible
problems with plume impingement. [Considered for complet.eness.)
Use of OMS Kit Dump Lines. The OMS Kit dump lines appear suitable
for N204 and MMH and for N H 4 fuel but would not normally be suitable for
LF2, because it is cryogenic, and requires passivated,compatible materials„
No Dump Lines. In this option, only inherent capabilities of the
system would be used. It is assumed off-loading of the propulsion system
could only be done by deployment of the spacecraft or an Orbiter landing
and removal of payload in the Orbiter Processing Facility. Improvement of
the probability of containment of the propellant can be accomplished by
increased strength of the tank, tank damage protection, redundant isolation
values and double walled banks. Advantages of this system include:
(1) minimum secondary hazards due to the dump system, (2) Iow cost, and
I}
r
*Because it is entirely equivalent to the system to be used for other pro-
pulsion systems, i.e., the OMS kits and the IUS/TUG.
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1(3) highest possibility of mission success due to Ieast compromise of
IUS/TUG and Shuttle hardware.
Use OMS Kit Dump, This alternative would utilize the OMS kit dump
lines essentially "as is." This is considered unsuitable as the lines for
LF2 need to be designed to handle cryogenics and be passivated and capped.
The OMS Kit lines are presumed not to have these capabilities.
Another approach would be to mount the spacecraft sideways so that
the rocket engine could be fired through the open doors to eliminate pro-
pellant. This is not considered very practical.
4.5.3.2 Flight Hazard Analysis Summary
The hazard analysis (both Levels I and II analyses) Appendix 9,
summarized in Table 4-17, indicates that there are several conditions that
present a significant risk to the Orbiter and Orbiter personnel, but it is
believed that through design and hazard control the risks may be held to
an acceptable level for the Mariner/Shuttle program; the risks should not
be greater than other risks that the Shuttle Orbiter must be exposed to
due to its own design and operating concepts.
Under certain conditions there will be some residual hazards that
are rated as Category I or II hazards. These hazardous conditions 4-esult
from double malfunctions such as:
• Crash landing after an RTLS or other abort with FL still
in the oxidizer tank. (Faiiure , of sensing system land/or
crew or failure of the dump system.)
a Failure of cargo bay doors to open with the baseline
system installed and an unplanned extended mission of
over 20 hours and a dump system failure.
The preferred system incorporates the features described in the
third column of Figure 2-1.
As previously mentioned in the Hazard Analysis Approach section 	
3
F	 (4.5.1.2) of this report, all mission phases for normal and abort conditions*
were not analyzed via the hazard analysis format found in Appendix 9. As
a result of a general review of all the operations that the oxidizer tank
may see, only the most hazardous cperations were analyzed. A summary of
the hazards and their effects and their chan r-e of occurrence for the normal
and abort missions are shown in the Primary Flight Hazard Analysis summary
in Appendix 9. A summary of the hazards and their effects for the pro-
pellant off-load modes is shown in the Secondary Flight Hazard Analysis
summary in Appendix 9.
A review of all the potential operations reveals that the following
would be high risk operations:
• Any crash landing with LF 2
 or N.H4 aboard.
• Unplanned extendod mission while in orbit when near the
20-hour LF2 tank warm-up time limit.
s Landing at alternate landing sites with LF 2 or N.HO4
aboard.
a RTLS abort.
a Normal mission folloiwng an extended hold on pad which
occurs during placing of loaded spacecraft and IUS/TUG
into orbit.
s Ground operations after an abort and LF 2 oi- N204
has not been completely dumped.
a Early termination of mission and the spacecraft cannot
be ejected or deployed before landing.
In addition to recommending that the regulated system or equiva-
lent be used, it is also recommended that the orbiter not land with LF2
or N 2H04 in the oxidizer tank; in the hazard analyses performed, it was
assumed that this would be the case. 	 The landed spacecraft should be
treated as though dumping is incomplete until it is verified.
i
..,
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4.6 TASK 7 — FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
The feasibility analysis is contained in section 4.12 as it logically
follows the rest of the report.
This section is placed here to maintain continuity of Task numbers.
4.7 TASK 8 -- ORBITER COCKPIT WARNING DISPLAY
4.7.1 Task Description
The statement of work states that this task shall consist of the
following:
"Determine requirements of the spacecraft propulsion system
for caution and warning displays in the orbiter cockpit.
Identify the action to be taken by the crew, and the result-
ing state of the orbiter's mission following credible fail-
ures of the propellant system.
4.7.2 Parameters, Displays and Actions
To determine the appropriate parameters required to be monitored to
assure that the orbiter and its personnel would be safe, the primary and
secondary hazard analyses shown in Appendix 9 were reviewed. It was deter-
mined that there are several analog and digital parameters that should be
monitored to assure orbiter and personnel safety. In determining the
parameters to be reviewed it was assumed that the Mariner/Shuttle preferred
system design would be flown in the Orbiter, the safety considerations for
this design are described in Figure 2-1.
Caution and warning definitions*'` for the Shuttle are:
Caution - notification of an impending unsafe condition. Corrective
measures are required immediately.
Warning - an indication that the safe limit has been exceeded and
emergency procedures are to be initiated.
Leakage and overpressure are the two critical conditions which could
endanger the Shuttle and crew. Monitor of parameters which indicate potential
or existing leakage or rising pressure are indicated. Precautionary actions
could include:
That were in use during the study.
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1) No response in case of a leak through the primary barrier or
other critical anomaly
2) Additional surveillance of an anamalous condition
3) Preparation for propellant dump either during ascent, RTLS,
abort or on-orbit
4) Preparation for orbital deployment if on-orbit of the anomaly
is not an imminent hazard
5) Propellant dump
6) Payload deployment (for non-payload disabling anomalies) or
jettison (for payload disabling anomalies) of the payload
spacecraft.
Propellant dump, deployment or jettison of the payload or space-
craft could, of course, also result from anomalies in other subsystems than
the spacecraft retropropulsion.
4.7.3 Parameters to be Monitored
Due to the many situations that may be the cause of a hazard,
several parameters must be maintained to first determine what condition or
potential condition exists and the rate at which the condition is changing.
The rate is needed so that optimum corrective action can be taken. For
example, it is desirable to know the rate at which the tank pressure is
increasing in relationship to the predicted values; it will be very desira-
ble to establish trends.
There are eight areas or conditions that are of interest:
i Condition of the LF2
 tank
a Existence of external hazards
r Environment in the shroud
e System failures (valves, - hp'rst. d:,sks, :etc.)
* Environment in the cargo t-ay
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e Conditions during deployment of the spacecraft and
IIJS/TUG into orbit or during a deployment off-load
mode
'	 a Status of the dump system
a Status of safing mechanisms.
For the above there are several parameters that must be monitored
and some are more critical than others. The criticality of the parameters
can be determined, in general, by reviewing the hazard analysis in
Appendix 9. All the parameters that have an effect on orbiter and
personnel safety will be listed below; as shown in the hazard analysis,
some of the parameters monitored that indicate an imminent hazard exists
or will exist are more likely to occur than others. For example, it is
more likely that the allowable LF 2 tank pressure will be exceeded if an
extended  mission occurs than that the Mariner spacecraft hydrazine tank
pressure will be exceeded and cause a rupture which may damage the LF 2
 tank.
The parameters of the spacecraft which may be monitored are:
a Condition of the LF 2 tank
- LF2
 tank pressure (anaiig measurement) (essential)
- LF2
 tank temperature (analog measurement) (essential)
- F2 gas detection inside the outer LF2 tank leak containment
shell (analog signal desired so that the size of the leak
can be determined).
s System Malfunction (essential)
- Indication of leakage of valves between the He tank
and the LF2 tank; could be caused by the launch
environment.
- Indication of burst disk failure.
a Environment in the Shroud (desirable, not essential)
- Pressure and temperature in the shroud
- Gas detection in the shroud (analog measurement).
Detector should ideally be able to discriminate
between different types of oxidizers and fuels.
Gas may leak into the shroud via plumbing or valves.
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j- Indication of leaking past valve seats and burst
disks (e.g., isolation valve leak).
Inadvertent opening of valves by electrical control
system.
Not all of the above signals are considered essential. Caution
and warning signals are to be handled in redundant pairs. For each signal
pair, one is to be routed via hard lines and one by means of an interleaved
encoded signal which is also telemetered to earth. From the above men-
tioned signals the following are recommended as practical signals from the
Fluorine/oxidizer containment vessel/oxidizer containment system and are
sufficient to identify credible hazards are shown in Table 4--18.
Signal conditioning of the above parameters can include:
1) Display parameters
2) Caution (amberlight) signal if parameter exceeds
nomina l
 condition by a percentage of limit conditions
3) Darning (red light) signal if the parameter exceeds
the nominal condition by a predetermined amount
(limit condition)
4) Rate of change of the above parameters.
Voting logic could be employed in which a single temperature or
pressure signal would not elicit a caution or warning unless confirmed by
other signals. Alternatively, the mission payload specialist could decide.
Implementation of the caution and warring system might be accom-
plished with only a modest increase in spacecraft propulsion weight, if
attachments are limited to transducers and a minimum of ancillary equip-
ment. It appears that much, if not all, ancillary equipment might be
mounted in the orbiter bay and conditioned proportional signals and/or
caution and warning signals generated there.
Other systems should be monitored for:
r Existence of External Hazards
- Detect leaking fuels
- Other tank pressures in the Mariner spacecraft
and IUS/TUG.
- Temperature of RTG and other hazards on the RTG.
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Table 4-18. Suggested Caution and Warning Instrumentation
System
Symbol	 Name	 F2	 Caution	 Warning	 N204	 Comment
TOPC Temperature oxidizer (1) and (2) -306 iV.P=300 Not required Thermocouple or resis-
propellant container +TBDoF psi)* 21 bar tance thermometer
POPC Pressure, oxidizer pro- (1) and (2) TBD e:.g.300 psi (1) and	 (2) Pressure gauge
pellant container 21 bar
SOPC Strain, Oxidizer pro- (1) and (2) Equiv. to (where p	 = (1) and (2) Optional alternate to
pellant container above 300 psi) POPC
MOXSS Leakage, oxidizer (1) and (2) If detected If detected (1) and	 (2) May be a discrete signal
secondary shell from a corrodible wire
PDKPF Pressure, dump kit (1)	 and	 (2)	 -1 psi	 -2 psi Not required Normal pressure GN2 at
-'	 peculiar F2 (19 Asia	 (18 psi« approximately 20 psia.
—' 1.3 bar)	 1.2 bar) Pressure indicates line
co intact
MOXDF Leakage, oxidizer (1) and	 (2)	 If detected Not required In dump line, S/C propul-
dump F2 (if feasible) Sion
( ' ) Via hardline
(2) Via encoding
*Based on tank designed to operate at, say, 420 psi (23.6 bar)
s Cargo bay
F2 gas detection in the area of the cargo bay.
Detector should be able to discriminate between
oxidizers.
s During Deployment
-- Indications that all lines are adequately disconnected
that could cause damage to the LF 2 system if the lines
failed to disconnect.
- Monitoring of LF2 tank parameters required up to
firing of iUS/TUG. Monitoring is to be switched
from the hard lines to the RF system.
- Monitor all payload tank pressures during all deploy-
ment modes.
- Indication of failure to remove the shroud
properly.
s Dump System
- Monitor the F2 dump system gas Ieak rate before
dumping (analog monitoring probably required).
ai Safing of payload
- Monitor all safing mechanisms to assure that the pay-
load is in the proper condition at the proper time.
- Assure that all valves are properly positioned.
4.i.4 Imminent Danger
Some hazards present an imminent danger to the orbiter and to one
or more of its crew. Some of the conditions that would be , cause of alarm
and would require immediate corrective action would be:
s If the LF2 tank pressure increases above red line value
during any phase of the mission
s If a major Ieak (intermediate leak or greater) in the
LF2
 tank was indicated during any phase of the mission
s If a pressure vessel external to the LF^ tank explosively
ruptured or if any other external hazar^ comes into
existence that would cause a major leak in the LF 2 tank.
s If integrity of the dump system is lost (if it is needed).
i
• If payload cannot be removed from the cargo bay in
allocated time scale plus time added for safety.
4.7.5 Corrective Actions
There are several corrective actions that can be taken by the crew
once it is known that one of the hazards described in the hazard analysis
exists, and which are determined to exist by an evaluation of the above
parameters. For conditions where an imminent danger exists, the
propellant should be dumped as soon as possible, except for the condi-
tion where the dump system integrity is lost. If the dump system integrity
is lost, other means of removal are to be used, either deployment or
removal on the ground.
For other conditions, the propellant should be dumped after orbit
has been achieved. It is recommended that the orbiter not land with a pay-
load containing LF 2 , if a dump system is available. Design should allow
for normal landings.
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4.8 TASK 9 — PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS SAFETY PROCEDURES
4.8.1 Task Description
The task statement is as follows:
Describe the technical safety procedures during prelaunch
operations which you believe must be followed in order to gain
approval to use LF2 in the shuttle launched spacecraft.
4.8.2 Prelaunch Technical Safety Procedures
Shuttle and spacecraft
In order to gain approval to use LF 2 in shuttle launched space-
craft it is considered appropriate to implement a number of technical
safety procedures. In order for these procedures to be fully meaningful,
the ground and flight equipment with which they are used must be appro-
priate. Spacecraft propulsion hardware considerations were discussed
under Task 5 and hardware impact on the Shuttle and spacecraft are
described in Task 10. The key to safe LF2 operations is (1) the avoidance
of contamination of the system, and (2) avoidance of significant leaks.
Tasks 1 and 2 describe in considerable detail the suggested pre-
cautions for prelaunch technical safety procedures. These are procedures
that are considered to be necessary to achieve a ver high degree of system
safety. These procedures are, of necessity, in excess of those that
would be required at, for example, a rocket test facility. The reason for
this is that the facilities involved and the recovery time effec ts are
much more severe in the KSC/Shuttle context than in less valuable
facilities.
Once the feasibility of fluorine propulsion.is shown and questions
regarding its stability and toxici ty are satisfied, it is believed that
approval for its use may be obtained.
It will be necessary that a design approach such as described by
JPL in Appendix I is used and a consistent set of safety procedures is
implemented.
This report provides one set of recommended procedures which could
be used.
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These recommendations include: (1) use of appropriate propellant
handling procedures as described in Reference 1, (2) acceptance of the
(over 70) appropriate criteria and assumptions described in Task 1, and
(3) acceptance of the conclusions and recommendations of 11 tasks. It is
acknowledged that these may not be the only set of criteria but they are
believed to be an appropriate set. Some of the key points are:
Isolation of the oxidizers to their tanks while in transit,
with no exposure of the oxidizer to lines and valves, except
the tank isolation valves.
a Design consistent with the best available knowledge,
especially as to design and welding. An all-welded pro-
pellant containment assembly is recommended and double
wall construction may also be used.
@ A development program which is conducted without
unresolved technical difficulties, so as to provide
assurance of safety.
* A safety development program which is instituted con-
currently with the hardware development.
a Appropriate propellant loading -Facilities are provided
and dedicated through siting. leak detection should be
automated at the launch site.
® Appropriate processing and procedures are instituted at
the launch site and during flight.
a Appropriate staffing and training are implemented,
including a propellant safety crew from arrival of
spacecraft on the pad until launch.
a Appropriate accommodations are made in the Orbiter.
Especially as to hazards from other systems. LN2
cooling of LF2 should be provided until liftoff. Pro-
pellant status instrumentation should be provided.
a A dump system is to be considered if external hazards
to the LF2 or N204 tanks from other systems in the
cargo bay are credible.
An expanded list of the appropriate criteria are included. as Table 4-19.
This table contains criteria which summarize this comprehensive safety
pw^,gram. Additional detail is contained in the various task sections
of this report.
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Table 4-19.	 Recommended Propellant System Safety Criteria
N 204 and F2 Propellants
APPLICABLE TO
LF2 14204
GENERAL
1. No planned leaks or uncontrolled vents to atmosphere. 	 See X X
Tasks l
	 and 2.
2. Reactive propellants should be separated whenever feasible. X X
3. Failures of single system valves and controls shall not result X X
in oxidizer tank failure.
4. Pressurized tanks shall not fragment in the event of failure X X
(design to leak or vent before structural 	 failure).
5. Isolation of the oxidizers to their tanks while in transit. X X
6. Design consistent with the best available knowledge, expecially X
as to design and welding.	 An all welded propellant containment
assembly is recommended and double wall construction may also
be used.
7. A propulsion development program which is conducted without X
unresolved technical difficulties, so as to provide assurance
of safety.
8. A safety development program is instituted concurrently with X X
the hardware development.
9. Appropriate propellant loading facilities are provided and X X
dedicated through siteing.
10. Leak detection should be automated at the launch site with X X
an alarm system. 	 See Task 4.
11. Appropriate processing and procedures are instituted at the X X
launch site and during flight.
12. Appropriate staffing and training are implemented including a X X
propellant safety crew from arrival of S/C on the pad until
launch.	 See Tasks f.,	 2,	 8.
13. Ancillary systems shall be designed so as to preclude single X X
failure malfunctions which could result in release of oxidizer
14. Propellant leaks shall be individually contained or controlled X X
sa as to prevent mixing of fuels and oxidizers with the
resulting possibility of fire or explosion. 	 (This means all
combinations of all propellants in or around the orbiter.
15. Launch processing development without unresooved incident. X
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PREFLIGHT
16. Ground crews shall not be required to be exposed to propellants 	 X
during filling or draining of the propellants.
17. Each item of GSE shall have been acceptance tested, passivated 	 X
and demonstrated with propellant prior to first use with a
spacecraft propulsion system to double check its function
in a low risk environment and verify personnel	 training.
18. Fluid lines shall be purged and empty of propellants before 	 X
disconnection from the loading equipment.
19. All	 pneumatic and/or hydraulic interface connectors shall be 	 X
pressure checked after mating.
20. Remote loading in suitable facility and transfer of loaded 	 X
spa--ecraft to pad for insertion within cargo bay - See tasks
1	 and 2.
21. Load under favorable weather -- See tasks 1 and 2 (daily opportunity).	 X
22. Clear launch pad of unnecessary personnel when oxidizers are	 X
moved - wear SCAPE suits - See task 4.
X
Y
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
23. Time limit on holds.	 See Task 3.	 X
24. Fully developed "backout" procedures - ground and flight - See 	 X
Task 9.
25. Loading of mxidizers will be done remotely from the launch pad	 X
in a dedi:ated facility sited for oxidizer toxicity.
26. The spacecraft (S/C) propulsion system shall be replaceable/	 X
removeable on the launch pad without compromising the safety
of the associdted systems, tngether with the S/C.
BOOST AND DEPLOY
27. Restricting of oxidizer to a "Propellant Containment Assembly"
	
X
with no exposure of oxidizer to propellant lines during propellant
loading, payload processing or launch.
	
-- See Task 5.
28. Extreme cleanliness & hardware passivation - See Task 9. 	 X
29. No (or very low) pressurization of the Propellant Containment 	 X
Assembly until after deployment from the orbiter and performance
of a back-off maneuver - See Task 5.
30.
y
Use of emeraenr y di jmn nrnnPllant lines rnnneCted from the space	 X
craft propulsion to the orbiter - See Task 5.
X
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Table 4-19. Recommended Propellant System Safety Criteria
N204
 and F2
 Propellants (Continued)
Table 4-19.	 Recommended Propellant System Safety Criteria
N 204 and F2 Propellants (Continued)
31. Use of a redundant or secondary propellant containment shell Opt.	 May not
which may also serve other functions such as a vapor detection or	 be re-
cavity - See Task 5. TBD	 quired
32. An in-flight vapor detection device - See Task 8. Desire- Desire-
able
	
able`
33. Caution and warning signals to be generated from a com5ination X	 X
of pressure, temperature and vapor detection instrumentation
See Task 8.
34. Adequate Margin on time to deploy from disconnect of GSE 1.N 2 , X
E.G., externally regulated system - See Task 3.
35. Critical	 systems hazardous to the orbiter in the event of X	 X
malfunction will not be activiated until there is adequate
separation between the spacecraft propulsion and the orbiter.
.	 electrical power to the spacecraft propulsion shall be,
interlocked.
36. Propellant status ano perhaps leak detection monitors shall	 be X	 X
provided from installation of propellants in the orbiter through
deployment.
37. If propellant dump capability is provided, it shall be operational X	 X
during these phases insofar as possible. ^{
3
RECOVERY AND ENTRY
38. Propellant tanks shall be located where they are not exposed X	 X
to damage during operations.
39. Propellant monitors shall be operational during recovery X	 X
operations for use in abort unless dump capability is provided
in which case they may be optional,
40. In flight propellant conditioning method shall
	
be passive or X	 X
double malfunction safe or alternate system provided.
41. Spacecraft propulsion shall be designed to survive and/or X	 X
minimize damage in the event of a crash landing. 	 If a dump
capability is not provided, design requirements of the propul-
sion system should include capability to withstand of crash
loads per JSC 07700.
42. Sloshing of residual propellant shall not result in a hazard X	 X
to the orbiter under any flight or landing conditions including
crash landings.
43. Propellants shall not be dumped under condition which will 	 adversely X	 X
affect the Orbiter, i.e, during re-entry.
44. Tanks shall be capable of maintaining positive pressurization in X	 X
order to ensure return to earth without tank collapse (crushing),
or able to withstand outside pressure.
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ITable 4-19.	 Recommended Propellant System Safety Criteria
N204 and F1
 Propellants (Continued)
45. Removal of propulsion from the orbiter will only f„; accomplished X X
with tanks empty and purged.
46. Ventilation purge of the infra-shroud area should be used as a X X
precaution prior to de--tanking.
POSTFLIGHT
47. The safing system shall not expose crews to ha-ardous materials X X
unless protective clothing is required, even .nough a dump
capability is provided.
48. Remote monitor and con^rol of propellant systems shall be provided X X
during the safing operation.
49. Procedures -for decontamination and refu:-bushment shall be provided X X	 1
to provide for reuse of hardware after an aborted mission,
(preferably on a minimum duration turnaround.).
It can be seen from this list that the recommended precautions are
somewhat more stringent for LF2 than for N204 . The reason for this is that:
(1) no consensus yet exists which equates LF2 to N 204
 in safety, therefore
greater caution will be mandated by NASA in its use until it is flight
proven, (2) safety precedents have not yet been established for other
shuttle launched propulsion systems such as hydrazine systems and the OMS
kits, and (3) there is no experience base which shows that the other
Shuctle cargo bay elements will not cause hazards (damage) to the fluorine
propulsion system. If this third item were not the case, use of double
walled propellant tanks and dump systems might not be recommended.
It is recommended that prior to commitment to a system development
for flight hardware that the double wall tank and dump system decision be
reviewed. For technology work and program planning it appears advisable
to carry them as tentative requirements. Also, design of the orbiter
should leave ronm to add the dump lines.
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4.9 TASK 10 — SHUTTLE AND SPACECRAFT
4.9.1 Task Description
The task statement is:
Describe the impacts of the procedures of Task 9 on the
Shuttle and on the spacecraft in terms of required hard-
ware, mating procedures, shroud design and operational
timelines. Identify the spacecraft hardware and ground
support equipment that is unique to the use of fluorine
as a spacecraft propulsion fluid. Determine the effects,
if any of the RTG and the shroud on the results of the
study.
4.9.2 Evaluation of Shuttle Payload Accommodations/RTG/Shroud
4.9,2.1 Space Shuttle Accommodations
There is little impact on the Shuttle in terms of hardware because
of prelaunch operations safety procedures, a design study is needed. The
main impacts are those of:
(1) The LN cooling line which may be approximately a
1/2-inh insulated line. This line should be routed
through the T-0 umbilical and through to the spacecraft
IUS/TUG interface with a highly reliable disconnect
devi.ce.
(2) The propellant dump line which is approximately a
1-1/2 inch line, must be routed through the space-
craft - JUS/Tug interface.
(3) An oxidizer relief line is also needed.
4.9.2.2 Ground Support Equipment*
Ground support equipment unique to fluorine includes:
(1) The propellant transport truck which might also be
used as an emergency drain tank
Fluorine specific vapor detector (this presumes
that there is a safety console at loading and
launch sites)
(3) LN2 coolant reservoir and related equipment
(4) Fluorine compatible SCAPE suites, see Appendix A
*Also referred to as GSE, AGE, or OSE.
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(5) Insulated lines to connect between propellant
transport truck and propulsion system
(6) Hand-held propellant vapor detection units unless
this is a launch site supplied item not GSF.
Other items such as TV monitors, permanently installed vapor detectors,
and safety console are included under section on Task 4.
4.9.2.3 Mating Procedures and RTG.Installation
As described in Tasks 1 and 2 Processing Option 3 was selected as
most efficient and simple, consistent with safety. of.personnel, equipment
and facilities. This approach anticipates insertion of the spacecraft
into the Space Shuttle and mating with the IUS/TUG interface inside the
cargo bay. A general description of how the spacecraft is transported
from the storage site to the PCP is contained in the hazard analysis. The
mating operation will consist of:
a Move the PCF up to the Shuttle Orbiter
e Open Shuttle cargo bay doors
• Prepare IUS/TUG interface for mating
r Verify same
! Prepare Spacecraft interface for mating
s Verify same
e Clear pad of unnecessary personnel
• Disconnect L,N 2 cooling lines from spacecraft
Position Spacecraft vis-a-vis !US/TUG and connect
e Verify physical and electrical compatibility
• Verify ground readout of propellant status
o Within approximately TBD hours from step 7, the L_N2
must be reconnected to the spacecraft, and cooling
initiated
s Passivate the dump line
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• Sound all clear. Personnel may resume work on other
systems. Although work on nearly all systems should
have been performed prior to this sequence. No visitors
or unnecessary personnel should be allowed on the pad
from this lame until launch.
r The RTOs should next be installed
9 Close doors
Roll back PCP
• Launch.
4.9.2.4 Operational Timelines
The launch timeline is shown in Figures 4-9a and 4--9b. Either pro-
pellant affects the timeline. Time required for LF 2 is slightly longer
because of additional pad clear time, LN 2
 connection time and time to
passivate the dump line.
4.9.2.5 Shroud Design
The design as described by JPL anticipates no penetrations of the
shroud except for the RTC. The only design impact on the shroud is the
desirability to make the shroud compatible with leaks. If it is aluminum
It should be compatible. Some consideration has been given to making the
shroud a third level vapor containment shell for fluorine. Feasibility of
this ap oach could not be evaluated in this program and so the secondary
tank shell is suggested. For N 204 , use of the shroud as a vapor barrier
may be practical provided all materials contained therein can be nonflam-
mable with N204'
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4.10 TASK 11 — COMPARISON WITH GDC BNZ-69-013-9
4.10.1 Task Statement
The statement of this task is:
Compa, ,e the results obtained from Tasks 1 through 10 above
with the results presented in Reference G and identify
portions of that study which appear to be affected.
4.10.2 Comparison Made
The results of this General Dynamics Convair Division Report
prepared on Contract NAS7-742 were summarized as follows:
SUMMARY
Under the guidance of JPL and using inputs from AFETR/
KSC launch operations personnel, Convair has documented
the feasibility of prelaunch operations with a Space
Storable Propulsion Module.
In spite of their toxic, reactive, and cryogenic prop-
erties, oxygen difluoride {OF) and diborane (BZH6) or
FLOX/methane propellants can a safely used. The
3,000 pounds of propellant, typical for retro propulsion
on unmanned outer planet orbiters, can be handled in
the same flow sequence successfully used for Surveyor
and Mariner. Convair recommends this proven operating
plan of tanking in the Explosive Safe Facility Propel-
lant Lab about 30 days before launch because this
allows excellent checkouts for maximum asburance of
mission success.
Personnel safety can be assured by a number of reasonable
precautions. Toxic waste from routine blowdowns during
tanking and draining should be neutralized or burned.
In case of propellant module leakage, emergency drain
provisions are recommended using the supply trailers as
receivers. Passivation techniques, including 24 hours
at full pressure propellant vapor, have been demon-
strated. Thermal control based on a simple ground-based
LN2 system can assure indefinite standby without venting.
During propellant passivation, transfer, and pressuri-
zation (allowing for the worst case of a rapid cold
release of all the oxidizer), reasonable weather restric-
tions and evacuation radii would be imposed, as is done
with the Titan booster. Once the module has been
remotely loaded, pairs of technicians can work around the
spacecraft wearing splash type suits. Handling a loaded
propellant module can be routine for a well-trained crew
using careful procedures. Operational support equipment
can be simple and dependable.
3
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The Mission Program Office may elect to tank at the
Iaunch complex (which is the current Centaur practice)
for maximum personnel safety. The period of greatest
hazard is during passivation, propellant transfer, and
pressurization. Once these dynamic conditions cease,
the risk to personnel and hardware decreases progres-
sively as the system remains in a quiescent state. Convair
recommends tanking the module once before encapsulation,
even though the unit may then be drained and final tanked
at the launch pad, in order to minimize the risk to the
expensive payload.
Prelaunch operations can have a significant influence on
the flight vehicle design. An access door should be
provided in the acrodynamic shroud for instaliation of
the radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) and
manual access to drain and/or vent the propulsion module.
This will minimize the spacecraft launch and in-flight
disconnects, which reduce reliability. Accurate propel-
lant weighing is required. Quick demating of an encapsu-
lated spacecraft is recommended. The arrangement of the
propulsion module valving is dependent on passivation,
purge, checkout, and leakage requirements. As the pro-
pulsion system becomes better defined, test techniques
and prelaunch checkout methods must be evolved and
capabilities built into the design to maximize chances
of mission success.
Prelaunch operations using FLOX/methane are inherently
similar to those with OF2/B2H6. The fact that methane
is not toxic is of little benefit because handling
restrictions are determined by the oxidizers. The
differential boiloff of FLOX will force the use of more
complicated LN 2 jacketed lines and mixing and composi-
tion sensing equipment. Similar thermal control tech-
niques wire applicable to both propellant combinations.
Differences in prelaunch operations are more likely to
result from airborne design features such as thin-
walled tanks with the pump-fed propulsion systems
normally considered with FLOX-methane.
Fallow-on studies are suggested in several areas.
Perhaps the greatest challenge is the development of
really leak-tight propellant shutoff valves and
reasonable checkout tests to assure that these valves
will function after a 550-day space flight. Thermal
insulation systems must be compatible with minute
propellant vapor leaks. New hazard sensing instru-
ments for remote, selective indications would be useful
on current programs. Toxicity studies should be
completed to loosen the extremely tight, currently
accepted exposure limits on OF2.
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This study has not uncovered any major technology road
blocks, but rather indicates that prelaunch operations
will not restrict the development of a space-storable
propulsion module.
In that study, 3,000 pounds of propellant was considered typical
rather than the maximum as is considered in this study. This difference
may be due to the difference between the Titan booster considered and the
use of the Space Shuttle.
It is believed that routine blowdowns during tanking and draining
are undesirable activities and that, if possible the tank should be filled
only once. Emergency drain using supply trailers is considered appropriate.
More sophisticated passivation techniques including thermal monitoring
are suggested. Weather restrictions are appropriate, as is done with the
Titan booster. Remote loading is presumed. Technicians may then work
around the spacecraft, however, fluorine SCARE suits are recommended
rather than just splash suits.
Propellant loading is not expected 'to be allowed at the launch
complex due to the very high investment in facilities at that location.
It is concluded that it is safer to personnel as well as equipment and
facilities to load the tanks remotely.
It is agreed that the greatest likelihood of accidental escape of
fluorine is during passivation, propellant transfer (because of the large
number of components in the GSE and temporary lines) and pressurization.
For these reasons it is recommended to load remotely from the pad and to
avoid pressurization all together.
The Convair study anticipated boiloff of FLOX and resulting differ-
ential loss of F2 and 02 . With the suggested system described in Task 5,
no bo'i"loff is allowed. This is the procedure followed in fluorine ground
transport operations.
The follow-on work as suggested in the Convair study considered
valving, thermal insulation compatible with minute leaks, hazard sensing
instruments and toxicity studies related to OF2.
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TRW would suggest that at the present time, the mission spectrum
and its constraints are well enough defined, and for pure liquid fluorine,
technology has advanced to the point that an integrated component program
can begin. Appropriate areas include advanced development on flight pro-
pulsions systems containing 500-3,000 pounds of fluorine and having
engines in the 200-800 pound thrust class.
It is believed that the key areas of technology include:
(1) Exact definition of propellant containment material
for long flight life (compatibility suitable for safe
launching has already been established).
(2) Valve technology for leak tight propellant containment
(3) Demonstration of flight engine performance, duration
and weight
(4) Demonstration of a flight type propellant containment assembly in
such a manner as to promote safety assurance is considered especially
appropriate at this time.
Spill testing of OF2 is, of course, not appropriate to the LF2
system.
Table 4-20 summarizes the detailed comparison of conclusions,
recommendations and suggested follow-on tasks of the Convair report.
Four other aspects of design warrant additional investigation,
they are:
(1) Dump line — A dump line could be needed in case the
tank is known to be leaking or in ca ,-e of a fire.
Basically the dump line is only nee(ad during the
ascent phase when the cargo bay doors are closed.
If a dump line is used, it is a source of consider-
able expense, and it is a potential source of
hazards.
(2) Vent/relief — A vent/relief is needed primarily
during deployment phase after the dump line is
disconnected and before separation from the Shuttle.
(3) Catch pan — A catch pan under the oxidizer tank has
been considered; however, it would be difficult to
implement because of the need for cleanliness. Also
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A MODIFIED ESA-60 MAY NOT BE AC-
CEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED (BUT
APPEARS REASONABLE)
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Table 4-20.
TASK 11
COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITH GDC BNZ 69-013-8
FINAL REPORT CONTRACT NAS7-472
i
f
RESULT. CONTRACT NAS7-472
CONCLUSIONS
1. BETTER FUNCTIONAL AND LEAK CHECKS
IN ESF
2. PROPELLANT FLOW IS GREATEST
HAZARD
3, MINIMUM PERSONNEL HAZARD DUE TO
LOADING ON PAD
4. MINIMUM OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS
5. OF2 TOXICITY LIMITS TIGHT
6. SIMPLE OSE REQUIRED
7. EXCELLENT TANK SAFETY
COMMENT BASED ON THIS STUDY
CONCUR ON REMOTE LOADING
GREATEST HAZARD TO PROPULSION SYSTEM
MOST LIKELY TIME FOR HAZARD EVENT -
CONCUR
NOT APPROPRIATE FOR MANNED SHUTTLE
SYSTEM
24 HOUR RESTRICTION OF PAD MAY NOT
BE APPROPRIATE, 9 HOUR COMPROMISE
OF TIME-LINE APPROPRIATE
OF2 LIMITS ARE MORE RESTRICTIVE
THAN FOR L52
GENERALLY SIMILAR
PRESSURE SAFETY MARGIN IS OF SECON-
DARY IMPORTANCE COMPARED TO CON-
STRUCTION SUITABLE FOR LF2 SERVICE
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. RECOMMEND ESF TANKING
2. FACILITY AND PROCEDURE VALI-
DATION
3. INITIAL LOADING
4. MINIMUM INFLIGHT DISCONNECTS
5. ACCESS DOOR
6. HAZARD SENSING IN THE PROPULSION
MODULE
7. EMERGENCY DRAIN
{t
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Table 4-20.
TASK 11
COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITH GDC BNZ 69-013-8 (CONTINUED)
FINAL REPORT CONTRACT NAS7-472
MMENT BASED ON THIS STUDY
ITY STUDIES OF LF 2 MAY BE
PRIATE
R DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATE FOR
AN N204
IONAL DATA WOULD BE BENEFICIAL
ONSIDERABLE WORK HAS BEEN DONE
INSULATION SHOULD BE TESTED
APPLICABLE
R
GLY AGREE
CONDARY IMPORTANCE
3
RESULT, CONTRACT NAS7--472 CO
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON TASKS
1. TOXICITY STUDIES - OF2 TOXIC
APPRO
2. SENSOR DEVELOPMENT SENSO
LF2
 
3. DIFFUSION STUDIES ADDIT
BUT C
4. INSULATION COMPATIBILITY FOAM
5. STUDY OF DIBORANE FREEZING NOT
6. HISTORY OF PRELAUNCH PROPELLANT CONCU
PROBLEMS
7. DEVELOP LEAK TIGHT VALVES STRON
8. STUDY WEIGHING TECHNIQUES OF SE
a
fS.
it must penetrate the shroud. It would only be
functional in the PCF and in the cargo bay prior
to launch. It is not known if such a device is
technically feasible. The likelihood of it being
needed appears remote. Further investigation is
needed.
(4) Double wall tank — A secondary shell could provide
additional leak containment and some protection
against external hazards. It is an additional
expense and adds weight to the spacecraft.
While it is difficult to argue with the desirability of being able
r
to mitigate effects of leaks, each of these tends to create other hazards
which tempt the designer to make a simple clean design and rely on its
inherent safety.
a3
4.11 TASK 12 — FLIGHT HAZARD ANALYSIS
4.11.1 Task Statement
The task s- -cement is:
Include a flight hazard analysis.
This task was to include a flight hazards analysis in this report.
Since it relates so closely to Task 6 Oxidizer pump System, the flight
hazard analysis is included in that section (Section 4.5). The tabular form
appears in Appendix 9.
4.12 FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
4.12.1 Task Description
Task 7 requirements are as follows;
Assess the feasibility of using fluorinated oxidizers for
a Shuttle launched spacecraft in terms of personnel safety
and the requirements developed under tasks 3, 4, 5 and 6
above (e.g., temperature, control, leak detection and con-
trol, system comparison and oxidizer dump system).
4.12.2 Statement of the Reasoning and Feasibility of Using Fluorinated
;f
Oxidizers
Bases of Comparison and Definition of Feasibility
The purpose of this study has been to compare safety interfaces
between the Shuttle and spacecraft and identify new or unique propulsion
system requirements that would result from the use of liquid fluorine in
the propulsion system of a planetary spacecraft launched from the
Space Transportation System or Shuttle.
The oxidizer N 206 was taken as a point of reference because it
also is a toxic, highly corrosive, hypergolic propellant.* when it is used
with MMH, it represents a widely accepted propellant. If it were not an
accepted propellant, it would not be used in the Shuttle Orbit Maneuvering
System or reaction Control System or be considered an acceptable Shuttle
cargo as in the OMS Propellant Kits. It can only be concluded that use of
N204 is considered feasible.
If it can be demonstrated that propellants other than N 204 are
desirable, and that there are suitable techniques which can be used result-
ing in equal safety, then that propellant must also be feasible.
i_
The term feasibility as used in the aerospace industry may be con-
sidered to mean whether it is practical or whether within the present
state of the art s)mething can be done at all. It appears clear from the
task description that the first definition (which is the dictionary defi-
nition), practicability, is meant. Feasibility or practicability for this
study must mean whether fluorine can be practically used within reasonable
economic constraints. For it to be practicable it must be useful, economi-
cal, -technically feasible, and safe.
and is to be used on other payload, and in the Orbiter itself.
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Performance and economic analyses performed by JPL indicate the
economic desirability of LF2 propulsion. There are a number of missions of
great interest which involve the orbiting of Mariner (and also Pioneer)
class spacecraft around the outer planets. In order to do this consistent
with anticipated Shuttle Upper Stages (SUS) and with reasonable flight
times, it has been found most effective in many cases to utilize the high
level of propulsion performance that can only be obtained with fluorine
containing oxidizers such as liquid fluorine or fluorine oxygen mixtures.
The cost of developing the F 2 propulsion system is less than the
cost of a single Shuttle flight (which is approximately 10 million dollars
for the flight), while the overall cost of performing a mission is many
times the cost for a Shuttle flight. For some Mariner missions, LF 2 can
carry twice the payload, and in many cases more than double it. For some
missions, it can save the cost and technical risk inherent in a weight
reduction program for the spacecraft. It appears possible then,to save
more than the entire development cost in a single mission.
In spite of the safety procedures, design constraints, hardware
impacts, and suggested modifications defined in this study, it appears that
the economic impact of safety will be a minor (relative to total program
cost), although necessary, addition to the spacecraft propulsion program for
its first use and will be altogether negligible for subsequent users.
4.12.2.2 Propulsion Feasibility
The propellant combination liquid fluorine and neat, unmixed hydra-
zine (LF2/N2f14) has been selected by JPL for planetary orbiter work. This
combination has the advantage that it can draw on a large existing tech-
nology base from the chemical industry and, in the case of hydrazine, a
large amount of flight history from military and NASA flight programs.
Significant, perhaps extensive progress has been made towards the type of
propulsion needed for this application. Numerous programs have been spon-
sored by NASA involving many aspects of fluorine rocketry. The Department
of Defense has also sponsored extensive work in fluorine rocketry.
t
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r4.12.2.3 Testing and Ground Operations
As described in Appendix I dPL has conducted hoc; firing crests on a
prototype self-contained (but not flight weight) propulsion system. Suc-
cessful safe demonstration of such a system is prima facie evidence of tech-
nical proficiency in those systems listed. No unexplained difficulties were
experienced.
As a result of these related efforts, in which many millions of
dollars have been invested, there can be little question that the technical
feasibility of fluorine propulsion has been demonstrated.
That ground handling of LF2 is feasible is an opinion in agreement
with the viewpoint of many in the propulsion community. in regard to ground
handling, there are several reports, see Table 4-21, by major propulsion
contractors attesting to the feasibility of ground operations with propel-
lant loads (weight of fluorine) greatly in excess of those stated, up to
20,000 pounds. For typical 1000 to 3000-pound propellant loads, this study
must certainly agree.
The last item in Table 4-21 is particularly relevant considering
the extensive experience with large amounts of N 204 at AFETR and that the
Emergency Exposure Limit for LF 2 is only a factor of two lower than that of
N204 , and the quantity is less than 2 percent of that of N 204
 in the Titan
booster, or 20 percent of that in the OMS kits.
It is therefore concludca that use of LF2 is considered feasible
for ground transportation and for ground handling at rocket launch sites.
4.12.2.4
	
Shuttle Transportation
No technical reason was found which might exclude transportation in
the Shuttle except if other systems are so unreliable as to damage the
fluorine container. The added precautions of double wall tankage and a
workable dump system are believed technically feasible precautions which,
U considered necessary, can be used to increase confidence that the system
will be safe. (Details of F2
 disposal after abort modes require definition)
Ample heat-up margin can be designed into the thermal design of the
spacecraft or supplied by auxiliary cooling systems.
i
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1TABLE 4-21_
LF2 HANDLING-FEASIBM fY REFERENCES
CONTRACT OR CONDUCTED
REPORT NO. REFE REN CE SOURCE FOR	 • PROPELLANTS	 -BOOSTER SITE DATE COMMIENT
E. 	AFRPL-TTR- Orbit to Orbit Shuttle General AFRPL 20,000 lb Space WR 1971 "These types of precautions
i
71 -71.7 Propellant Integration [7ynarrics Shuttl e should make fluorine vehicles
and Handling Study
"OOS" operationally feasible." (ini
r
the Shuttle, ed.)
14AStir-28 Launch Area Ser- Bell NASA F Ill2	 2 ` ilas AFETR Dec.
J.
Recommends ".	 .ope^•ational a%ash vicing of a Fluorine
/Hydrogen Upper Stage
Aero-
systems
7000 lb Centaur 1960 procedures and equipment to
^
safely and reliably maintain a
fl uori ne-hydrogen upper stage	 j
through all prelaunch operation=	 k
'	 h NASA LF^ Dike 1970
4
evidentaLF	 was-	 lly safely
N Langley. 1515 Tama hahl ed and	 1 owne hawk
i1R57-742 Prelaunch Operations General JPL, 0I /B H2
	
2 6 Titan AFETR/ May "Convair has documented theFor a Space Storable D namics/ NASA 0300	 1b Centaur KSC 1970 feasibility of pre-launchPropellan	 Module Canvair OAR1 LG-41 operations with a Space.e Storable
Ref 1 5 Nith inputs Propul si on Module,"
,roar "ticket--
dyne) -
^NAS 10- . Launch operations Martin: 3-15,000 Delta, August '"The system developed is econo-
7704. with Upper Stages Marietta lb of LF 2 LC-•17 1972 mical, flexible and relatively	 i
containing Fluorine Titan safe." Launch operations with
Ref , 16 Centaur, upper stages containing fluorin::
. LC-41 could be conducted with less
Space hazard than those associated
Shuttle with launching boosters using
LC-•39 storable propellants.. i
y	 4
4.12.2.5 Conclusions as to Feasibility of Using Fluorinated Oxidizers in
Shuttle Launched Spacecraft
The result of the study is that the safety interfaces have been
compared considering crew and hardware when using the H2O4 and LF 2 and new
and unique propulsion system requirements have been identified which would
result from the use of liquid fluorine as an oxidizer in Shuttle Launched
Spacecraft.
The study utilized system safety engineering methodology to investi-
gate potential hazards and system design engineering to define how existing
technology could be used to provide safe operations.
Feasibility of safe operation was investigated and the unique
equipment and procedures necessary to maximize the probability of success
determined. Hazards are similar in kind if not in degree to those encountered
in use of nitrogen tetroxide (also a -toxic oxidizer) in the Shuttle.
It was concluded that residual risks from spacecraft using fluorine
and nitrogen tetroxide oxidizers during ground and flight handling may
be reduced by isolation of the oxidizer to only its tank. Operation of
spacecraft propulsion in the vicinity of the shuttle or launch site is
not required. Proper recognition of the characteristics of both oxidizers
must be given in spacecraft design and in ground and flight operations.
The primary hazard to personnel was identified as propellant loading
operations which are very similar in nature to routine transfers from the
truck trailers used during delivery of fluorine to industrial users. These
operations should be accomplished in an area reasonably remote from
personnel and facilities concentrations.
Other.important.potential. hazard is related to the transportation
and installation of the loaded propulsion system, where great care must
be exercised.
Because of the relatively small quantity of LF2 that would typically
be used, 1000 pounds, toxicity is expected to be less of a difficulty
than the other properties. This is borne out.by the.extensve and routine
use and transportation by highway of up to 5000 pounds of liqui€i fluorine
around the United States in trailer trucks. ReferencR I indicates a 2:1
ratio of toxicity of fluorine compared to N204 on the bas;is.of Emergency
Exposure Limits.
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From the study results it is believed that the necessary technology
is available and with a systematic approach based on system safety engineer"
ing, a suitable system can be developed, provided that the precautions
- described in this report are followed. Study results and these precautions
are summarized in the following section.
Due to the value and manned aspects and reuseabiliiy of Shuttle
Orbiter operations, significant. safety , precautions appear.i•ndieated.
response to this need, compromises of the spacecraft propulsion to achieve
safety have been considered which appear to be acceptable in terms of per--
formance and cost.
The safety interfaces when using either LF 2 or N204
 are very similar
and differ mainly in degree rather than kind, with the exception that
fluorine must be treated as a cryogenic as well as a hypergolic.
It is believed that the unique propulsion system requirements
which would or should result from the use of -Fluorine derived from two
characteristics of fluorine, its cryogenic storage and its high reactivity
with fuels.
The primary hazard to personnel was identified as propellant load-
ing operations which are very similar in nature to routine transfers from
the normal truck trailers used to transport fluorine to industrial users.
It is suggested that these operations be done in an area reasonably remote
from personnel and facilities concentrations. High safety factors are
available in tankage in all operations.
The next most important potential hazards relate to transportation.
and installation of the Ioaded propulsion system. Such operations can
undoubtedly be made safer than in similar transportation of the chemical
on the nations highways.
Residual hazards during flight in the shuttle Payload Bay from a
propulsion system which ;)as 'been loaded, stored, transported and installed
appear low provided that external hazards to the propulsion system from
other systems also in the cargo bay are minimized.
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Even with the flight equipment suggested, including dump capability
for both LF2 and N204 and double walled tanks for LF 2 (leak-tight shroud
for N204), some residual hazards exist for both LF2 and N20 4 . The overall
rationale for acceptance of these risks is that:
1) The risk likelihood for N204 initiated accidents is
comparable to and lower than for other payloads,
especially the OMS Kits.
2) The chance of occurrence can be made remote.
The suggested approach.to safety development of using development
experience as a basis for assurance is somewhat novel in its systematiza-
tion but has many well established precedents. For example, development
and flight experience of the Titan II missile became part of the safety
justification for the highly successful NASA Gemini flights.
4.12.2.7 Feasibility Investigation
For the use of the propellant combination LF 2/N2H4
 for Shuttle-
launched craft containing up to 300 .0 pounds of LF21 it appears that hardware,
facilities and procedures can be developed to attain maximum probability of
reasonable personnel safety, provided that proper emphasis is placed on
safety and the procedures.
 listed in the report or their equivalent are
-implemented.
ii __..'
These recommendations are numerous and include (1) use of appropri-
ate propellant handling procedures as described in Reference 1, (2) accept-
ance of the (over 70) appropriate criteria and assumptions described in
Task 1, and acceptance of the conclusions and recommendations of the 11
tasks (see the summary in Task 9). It is acknowledged , -hat these may not
be the only set,of criteria but they are believed to be an appropriate SEt.
Some of the key points are:
.1) Isolation of the oxidizers to their tanks while in
transit.
4-145
2) Design consistent with the best available knowledge,
especially as to design and welding. An all welded
propellant containment assembly is recommended and
double wall construction may also be used.
3) A development program which is conducted without unre-
solved technical difficulties, so as to provide
assurance of safety.
4) A safety development program which is instituted con-
currently with the hardware development.
5) Appropriate propellant loading facilities are provided
and dedicated through siting. Leak detection should
be automated at the launch site.
6) Appropriate processing and procedures are instituted
at the launch site and during flight.
7) Appropriate staffing and training are implemented,.
including a propellant safety crew from arrival of
spacecraft on the pad until launch.
8) Appropriate accommodations are made in the Orbiter,
especially as to hazards from other systems. LN2
cooling of LF2 should be provided until liftoff.
Propellant stratus instrumentation should be provided.
9) A dump system is to be considered if external hazards
to the LF2 or N204 tanks from other systems in the
cargo bay are possible.
In Tasks 1 and 2, the study produced clear conclusions that (1) autri-
matic leak detectic:,'at the pad is desirable, and (2) propellant should not
be loaded into the spacecraft at the pad, but should be loaOcd remotely in
a less valuable facility by to minimum number 'of well protected operating
personnel.
Installation of the spacecraft into the Shuttle is to be accomplished
using the payload Changeout FaLllity.
It would appear_ that the TUS/TUG could have been installed previously
so that only she less complex spacecraft-to-IUS/TUG interface would need to
be connected at that time.
 E3.
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APPENDIX I
JPL BASELINE SPACE-STORABLE PROPULSION SYSTEM APPROACH
1. SUMMARY
The JPL space-storable advanced development program utilizes the
propellant combination liquid fluorine and hydrazine and is planned for
flexibility. The baseline choice far a propulsion system type has been
selected and, funding permitting, will be brought to fruition by the end
of FY'79. In order to minimize cost and risk, it was decided to work
on a "blow-down" pressurized propulsion system for its first applications.
Then, if necessary, the advanced development of those components required
to change to an externally pressure regulated system would begin in early
FY 1 75 in order to permit a technology demonstration of the regulated pro-
pulsion system by the end of FY 1 82. This would require development of a
fluorine vapor compatible pneumatic regulator valve.
2. PROPULSION SYSTE%i ELEMENTS
^.
	
	 For purposes of discussion, the propulsion system is divided into
four assemblies, which are: oxidizer feed, fuel feed, thrust chamber, and
structure/thermal control. For the case of the externally regulated system,
the feed assemblies are further subdivided into a pressurant subassembly and
a liquid subassembly.
3. BLOWDOWN SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The blowdown system is illustrated in Figure 1. The feed assemblies
consist of titanium propellant tanks, liquid isolation valves, propellant
and pressurant fill valves, type 304 stainless steel lines, and Bobbin Seal
mechanical joints. While the same basic components are required for both
the oxidizer and fuel feed assemblies, the properties of the oxidizer
require different internal material choices for those portions of the valves
that are in contact with the propellant. The fuel feed assembly will use
current Mariner/Viking technology or their equivalents. The oxidizer feed
assembly will use essentially the same isolation valve, except that
material substitutions will be made to ensue compatibility. The isolation
valve will be located close to the propellant tank to minimize the surface
area in contact with the LF 2. The feed assemblies will be welded; however,
they will contain one or two mechanical joint(s) per assembly. The joints
L
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are referred to as Bobbin Seals. These joints were developed by the Air
Force and were used successfully on dPL's Feasibility Demonstration Module.
As previously noted, both propellant tanks will be fabricated from titanium
6AL-4V. In a flight configuration, each tank would have a propellant	 3
management device (PMD) utilizing surface tension as the mechanism of
propellant acquisition. A cooling coil containing flow LN would be
incorporated into the oxidizer PMD in order to maintain the proper LF2
during ground-hold conditions. In the ground-test configurations, PMD's
would not be included since their function cannot be verified in a one-g a
environment. The oxidizer tank would contain a Liz cooling coil. This
concept was used successfully during the Feasibility Demonstration Program.
The oxidizer fill valve would, in all probability, be ranotely actuated
with the actuation device on the ground--half of the valve in order to i
minimize the inert mass of the propulsion system, The pressurant fill
valve (which could also be the propellant fill valve) and burst/relief
valve would also be derived from their earth-storable counterparts and
therefore made compatible with LF2.
The thrust chamber assembly consists of the engine, propellant
shutoff valves, and gimbal trechanism. At this point in time, the baseline
engine consists of a carbonaceous liner surrounded by a carbon-felt insu-
i
lating.material. A thin metal shell contains the carbon felt and ties the
injector to the joint on the expansion nozzle which extends to an area
ratio of 60:1. Th4 injector, fabricated from nickel, is a like-doublet
type, with the outer ring being fuel-only 'for liner protection. The
chamber operates at a pressure of 100 Asia. The shuttle RCS engine valve
will be used for fuel shut-off valve A modification of this valve, to
make it LF2 compatible, will be utilized on the oxidizer side. In all
probability, the engine will be gimballed from the head-end through an
angle of + 120 .
The thermal control/structure assembly has two primary functions.
The first is to tie the propulsion system together and to the spacecraft
and the second is to thermally isolate the oxidizer tank from the remainder
of the spacecraft. This will be accomplished by use of low thermal con-
ductivity struts and radiation shields, which are state-of-the-art. In
flight, the heat that does leak into the LF2 tank will be radiated away.
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Dropellant Container l
The propellantcontainer will be a key element in the safety of the
system. The JPL design concepts for fluo , -ine propulsion include some
which are strongly held by the cognizant engineering groups. Features of
note in the pressure vessel include: (References 18-20 apply)
1. Caution with respect to We current trend towards "leak
before burst" design, as they feel that experience has
shown that this is difficult to actuary achieve. They
prefer a "safe life approach"* which the failure mode could
be burst. Adequate margins are maintained based on fracture
mechanics' analysis. Designs would be based on.
2. Design of the pressure vessels to withstand external.
automspheric pressure without buckling.
3. Their material of choice is presently 6A1-4V Titanium,
pending further investigations currently in progress.
5. MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY
This section covers the material compatibility aspects of the
r	 Space Storable Propulsion Module (SSPM) oxidizer feed system components
relative to the Space Shuttle during initial handling operations and
prelaune h conditions.
One of the major program goals for the SSPM is to provide a blow
down system (Figure 1) which will utilize the oxidizer, Liquid Fluorine.
(LF2), for a mission duration of up to five (5) years. The necessity of
absolute materials of construction compatibility of the finished components
and system for LF2 service cannot be over emphasized in order to meet the
mission and long life requirements.
It is axiomatic that if the component and system materials exhibit
inertness to the LF2 environment for the planetary mission requirements,
then incompatibilities should not be experienced during all fli.ght.events
or conditions such as ground operations, installation, take off,.etc. that
lead up to launching of the SSPM spacecraft from the bay of the Space
Shuttl e.
As described in the safety : standards.and design criteria of References 1--3
page A-16.
A--6
r	
5.1 Feed System Somponents
The feed system components identified by function in Table is
provide for the containment within the propulsion system of the Liquid
Fluorine oxidizer from the initial propellant loading operation to the
spacecraft launch. The primary and/or critical materials of construction
are listed for each component. These materials were initially screened.
by checking their compatibility from known experience and as reported in
the literature, references 1-17. The next step involved actual testing
of the most critical items to verify the suitability of candidate materials
for the application, and to ensure that the overall requirements will be
met.
Finally, a candidate all metal shutoff valve was designed for this
application, fabricated, and tested with LF 2 . The testing demonstrated
the ability of the valve to meet the design goals.
5.2 Description--Oxidizer Propellant
This section describes the general characteristics of FIuorine and
.._^'
	
the type of data which is available on which to base the acceptability of
specific materials of construction. Liquid and gaseous fluorine have been
produced and handled in industrial processes for many years. Experience
including the handling, transportation, and disposal of tonnage quantities
of fluorine has clearly demonstrated that it can be handled over prolonged
periods and in large quantities.
Fluorine is one of the most reactive oxidizing agents known, and
can react with practically all organic and inorganic substances. The few
exceptions include inert gases, some metal fluorides, and a few uncontaminated
fluorinated organic compounds. It exhibits excellent thermal stability
and resistance to catalytic breakdown.
y
Many common materials of construction are compatible for use in a
liquid fluorine (LF 2 ) environment in the temperature range of -306°F to
3630F. At these cryogenic temperatures chemical reactions in general
tend to take pl ace slowly, thus corrosive attack by the liquid fluorine
is generated at a slower rate. Another factor responsible for the low rate
i	 of attack by LF on the common . metals is that thin protective films of2
fluoride compounds form on metal surfaces and act as barriers to further
react-i`on. The effectiveness of the protective film formed on the metals
A-7
by LF2 is based on the solubility of the various metal fluorides present that
form in the film in LF2.
To summarize, the use and satisfactory performance of fluorine is
achievable and predictable through perfection. It demands the highest
standards in system design, maintenance, cleanliness elimination of con-
taminants such as moisture, and operational techniques.
5.3 Compatibility Criteria and Available Data
The choice of metals for use in the SSPM system is primarily
based upon the mechnical property requirements for the given application;
this includes material strength and shock resistance at Vie cryogenic
temperature. Other parameters considered include rate of corrosion
resistance, ignition temperature of the metal in LF 2 , fluoride film reten-
tion, and impact sensitivity. Specific aspects of detail design, fabrica-
tion and assembly practices were also considered.
The Material compatibility data used is based upon practical
information accumulated under:
1. NASA general research and advanced development programs.
2.. USAF development programs.
3. NASA-OAST Advanced Technology Programs directly related
to the Space Storable Propulsion Module development.
This also includes the SSPM breadboard system feasibility
demonstration test program.
.5.4 Summary--Materials Evaluation
5.4.1 Aluminum
5.4.1.1 Discussion
Both Aluminum alloys 2219-T87.and 6061--T6 have been tested in LF2.
The results from prolonged corrosion (static) exposure tests lasting over
one year, and stressed specimens were satisfactory. A tenacious fluoride
film was produced with a thickness in the range of 86A. There were no
deleterious effects as a result of the testing.
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w	 5.4.1.2 Application
The material is proposed for the burst disc application with LF2
because of its inherent characteristic of repeatability (less susceptible
to effects of work hardening thus narrowing the operating range band). The
main consideration deals with an overpressure condition in the LF2 system
causing disc rupture and possible ignition of the aluminum alloy.
The advantage of this material is that the melting point is below
its ignition point with fluorine gas or about 1100°F. A series of mechanical
properties tests were conducted to verify tensile strengths in LF 2 1 In some
of these tests, the specimens were fractured in the propellant with no
evidence of adverse effects. Based upon these results, the aluminum alloy
	
r
is considered acceptable for the application.
C. Data Sources and/or Summaries 	 {
References: 2-Section 3.8, 4-Chapter 3, 7-Section VII, 3, 8 through 17.
5.4.2 Corrosion Resistant Steel
._,	 5.4.1.3 Data Sources and/or Summaries
Several alloys of Corrosion Resistant Steels (ORES) type materials
have an extensive background of testing with LF 2 . They are used successfully
in test systems handling fluorinated oxidizers including LF 2 , and CRES type
304 is one of the more commonly used norms.
Results from immersion tests (static and stressed samples) revealed
minimal rates of corrosion. CRES steels exhibit good resistance to attack
by hydrogen fluoride; the stable fluoride films formed of about 6X are
similar to those formed on Monel (a material generally used in systems
employing hydrogen fluoride). During mechanical properties and ignition
tests, there were no detrimental performances.
5.4.2.2 Application
a
During dynamic operation with fluorine flow, the propellant feed
lines are subjected to a variety of conditions, such as. varying flow and
fluid velocities, turbulence, and increases in fluid friction adjacent
to the walls. Another critical condition can occur during the engine
-°	 shutdown when the propellant shutoff valve is closed. Relatively high
'	 transient pressures and shocks are imposed locally near the shutoff valve
for several milliseconds duration.
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5.4.3.3 Data Sources and/or Summaries
References: 14, 2 through 4, 15, 17.
5.4.4 Titanium
5.4.4.1 Discussion
Sys
	
	
The use of CRES 304 provides a suitable material that will maintain
a uniform protective -Fluoride film against erosion or other attack under
these severe flow conditions, and a material that will meet the needs of the
application.
y	 5.4.2.3 Data sources and/or summaries. References 2-section 3.8, 4-Chapter 3,
7-Section VII, 3 through 13 and 15 through 17.
5.4.3 Inconel/Beryllium Copper
5.4.3.1 Discussion
Comments from Section 2a are applicable to this material combination
although these alloys are different types.
5.4.3.2 Application
Under NASA contract NAS7-733, a bipropellant all metal shutoff valve
was developed for use on the SSPM system. Extensive testing with LF 2 at
the component level and on the SSPM feasibility demonstration model demon-
strated the ability of the valve to meet the design goals and material
suitability and compatibility.
Propellant tanks made of Titanium alloy have been widely used on
both manned and unmanned type spacecraft. The material offers advantages
of: high strength to weight ratio, compatibility, low rates of corrosion,
and well understood fabrication processes.
System studies and analyses of the SSPM were performed relative to
the LF2 propellant tank materials that included considering both ferrous 	 j
and non-ferrous metals. These studies established that Titanium was the
preferred metal for the application.
Titanium, and in particular the Alloy 6AL -411, has demonstrated
excellent compatibility in contact with LF 2 . Titanium 6AL--4V samples have
been subjected to long term static exposure testing with LF 2 . After sixteen
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months exposure definitive information has been extracted from the test
program regarding compatibility. Gross properties, such as mechanical
properties, were not significantly affected. The most significant changes
were in the form of microscopic pitting on the specimen surfaces. There
was no evidence of embrittlement.
The material is also being investigated to determine fracture
toughness. Numerous tests have been conducted (by J PQ using standard
stress crack corrosion procedures with parent metal and heat affected zone
(due to welding) samples in a highly stressed condition. Twenty-four (24)
hour and one thousand (1000) hour duration tests were conducted with i.F2
exposure at 300 psig. The most important result is that there was no
evidence of stress crack corrosion growth as a result of this testing.
5.4.4.2 Application
There is some indication in the literature that Titanium may be
sensitive to impact conditions. Typ?^a1 tests involved the impact of
various shapes of strikers on impact plates beneath the liquid surface.
An arbitrary value of 72 ft-lb energy is used as the criteria for evaluation.
T	 The results reported are conflicting and inconclusive.
The primary conclusion, resulting from a critical review of the
SSPM flight operational functions and comparison with available data on
reactivity, is that impact is only a secondary prerequisite for the design
of the SSPM prpellant tank. Specifically the impact source would result
from shutoff valve operation during engine firing (section D2b); since -these
effects for the most part would be damped out locally, the effect on the
tank would be minimal.
The use of Titanium alloy is considered feasible for the SSPM
propellant tank based upon compatibility and other data generated to date.
5.4.4.3 Data Sources and/or Summaries
References 8 4, 7, 15, 9 through 14, 16, and 17.
5.4.5 Composite Metals
5.4.5.1 Discussion
Comments from section 2 and 4 are applicable to this material
combination.
r'
A-11
-'	 5.4.5.2 Application
The component is considered feasible and is proposed but must be
thoroughly tested for this SSPM application.
5.4.5.3 Data Sources and/or Summaries
i
4
Component Material
1. Propellant Tank, LF 2 Titanium 6AL-4V
Heat Treated
2. Propellant Management Device Titanium 6AL--4V
(PMD) and cooling coil Heat Treated
3. Propellant Tank, LF2 , Titanium 6AL.-4V
Outlet cover and seal Heat Treated
4. Propellant Feed Lines CRiS 304L
5. Transition joint tank outlet to Titanium 6AL-4V
feed line Heat Treated To
CRES 304L
6. Isolation Valve Seat Inconal 718
Poppet
(may he gold-plated)
Beryllium Copper
Alloy 172, Temper H
7. Fill Valve Seat Inconel 718
be
Poppet
(may	 gold-plated)
Beryllium Copper
Alloy 172, Temper H
8. Burst Disc Aluminum 2219--T87 or
6061-T6
9, Transducer, Pressure Inconel 71.8
Sensing Element
1 ^ f
Tabl e I
Feed System components and materials of construction subjected to Fluorine
(either liquid or vapor) exposure while the Space Storable Propulsion
Module (SSPM) is stored in the bay of the Space Shuttle Spacecraft.
6. PERSONNEL PROTECTION FOR FLUORINE
Present fabrics offer only fair protection to fluorine contact.
Therefore, it is essential that all operations possible be remotely
controlled and, only under controlled emergency conditions should any
personnel work on or near a pressurized fluorine system.
Body Clothing
Suits presently used by AFRPL*.and'JPL use a teflon coated material
(Armalon) developed by Dupont that uses fiber glass as a base fabric. They
also produce their "Nomex" material with teflon coating (TXOT01). JPL
has not Nun any tests on this Nomex material. These materials are expensive
and difficlut to fabricate into garments. Also, as the seams of any
garment made of this fabric are not presently armored (sealed), the possibility
of the needle holes permitting gaseous fluorine to penetrate the suit
presents a problem. Some easing of this problem can be accomplished by the
use of teflon coated thread. Garments should be of a one ,iiece "draped"
design with no pockets, cuffs, folds or any area where fluorine can be
trapped. No'buttons should be used. "Velcro" tape or stainless steel.
snaps with at least a three to four inch overlap offers the best protection.
It must be kept in mind that any garment design must be of the instant
removal type.
Hand and Foot Protection
Gloves should be of neoprene and be of the "shake off" design and
be "Clean - Clean Clean!" A neoprene boot with an over, boot of Armalon
offers the best foot protection.
Head and Face Protection
ri hood of Armalon worn over a neoprene mask, either in an air
line or cylinder type self contained breathing unit, is a must. Gas masks
and cartridge respirators offer no protection from fluorine.
General Comments
Any protective equipment, to offer fair protection must be
absolutely Clean.
*
Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory, Edwards Air Force Base, California.
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Emergency safety showers and eye wash fountains must be readily
available It must be emphasized that the best protection from fluorine
is a remotely controlled operation.
It is also suggested that reference be made to the JANNAF Report --
Liquid Propellant Handling, Storage and Transportation - Volume III,
Chapter 7 Fluorine and Fluorine-oxygen mixtures.
j:
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APPENDIX 2
GLOSSARY OF TERMS PART I NASA SAFETY DEFINITIONS*
Accident/Incident -- An unplanned event which! results 'in personnel fatality
or injury, damage to or loss of STS, environment, public property or pri-
vate property or could result in an unsafe situation or operational mode.
An accident refers to a major event whereas an incident is a minor event or
episode that could lead to an accident.
Caution --- Notification of an impending unsafe condition. Corrective
measures are required immediately.
Certificate of Compliance — A formal documented fbuy--off of the safety
assessment effort.
Critical Functions — Functions required for personnel and vehicle safety.
EVA — Activities carried out by a suited crewman in a space environment and
outside of the spacecraft.
Failsafe -- The ability to sustain a failure without causing an accident/
incident.
Flicjht Crew — Any personnel on board the Space Shuttle engaged in flying
'.	 the Space Shuttle and/or managing resources on board (e.g., Commander,
y	 Pilot, Mission Specialist).
Flignt_Personnel — All personnel carried on the Space Shuttle vehicle.
Free-flying Automated Spacecraft -- A payload which is deployed and separated
from the Orbiter.
Habitable Module --Any module in which a man may enter and perform activities
in a shirt-sleeve environment.
Hazard Analysis -- The determination of potential sources of danger and
recommended resolutions in a timely manner for those conditions found in
either the hardware/software systems, the man-machine relationship or man-
environment relationship or combinations thereof which could cause loss of
personal capability., damage to or loss of system or loss of life or injury
to the public or to the environment.
Intact Abort — An abort of the mission wherein the crew, payload and the
vehicle are returned to the launch site.
From "Safety Policy and requirements for payloads using the national space
transportation system" prepared by: Payload Safety Steering Group NASA
Headquarters July 1974 (Revised October 1974).
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Interface'— Any contact between two or more independently developed
elements of the flight or ground s ystems including hardware, electrical
'conne^.tions, EMI, thermal radiat'on, man, etc.
IUS — An Interim !Upper Stage to be available at Shuttle IOC. Same as "Tug"
but with lesser capability (viz. payload deployment capability only).
Multiple Payloads — More than one separate payload carried in the Payload
Bay.
Payload -- Any equipment or material carried by the Space Shuttle in the
Payload Bay or cabin that is not considered part of the basic Space
Transportation System. It, therefore, includes items such as Free-flying
Automated Spacecraft, individual experiments, PSE, etc.
Payload Safety-critical Data --That payload-originated data which is neces-
sary for the safe, well-being of the STS.
PSE (Payload Support Equipment) — The flight equipment needed to support
the payload such as caution and warning, data recording, controlled func-
tions, instrumentation, etc.
Residual Hazards --Hazards which cannot be eliminated or controlled by
automatic or manual backup operations and/or safety-monitoring provisions or
other equipment.
Safety_— Freedom from chance of injury or loss of personnel, equipment or
property.
Safety-critical hardware — That equipment which may affect the safety of
the Space Shuttle flight personnel, the Space Shuttle system, the Orbiter,
payload, the general public and public/private property.
Space Shuttle — These elements of the Space Transportation System consist-
ing of the Orbiter, the external tank and the solid rocket boosters.
Space Transportation System (STS) --The Space Shuttle vehicle including the
Orbiter, and solid rocket booster, the external tank, flight personnel and
"carriers" such as IUS, Tug and Spacelab.
Tug. -- An unmanned, high-energy, propulsive stage used to extend the
operating regime of the Space Shuttle from low Earth orbit to geosynchronous
orbit and beyond. -It may consist of one or more individual stages and is
carried into low Earth orbit by the Space Shuttle.
Warning - -An indication that the safe limit has been exceeded and emergency
procedures are to be initiated.
A-lg
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PART 2
ADDITIONAL SAFETY DEFINITIONS FOR THIS STUDY
e Requirements are a breakdown of an overall objective into a subset of
detailed objectives appropriate to the particular vehicle system for
which they are written. Examples: The SIC shall survive a crash landing
without hazard to the crew.
0 Criteria are technical statements which express the conditions one seeks
to achieve in order to meet a requirement. Example: The SIC structure
may permanently deform under a crash landing but no SIC subsystem hard-
ware shall separate from its attachments.
a Specifications are translations of criteria into explicity, usually
quantitative, statements suitable for detailed design, operations and
test procedures. A criterion may translate into several specification
elements. Examples: The SIC static design load factors for crash land-
ing are "X", "Y", "Z" and the design shock load at the tug interface is
a triangular pulse of "A" milliseconds having a peak load factor of "B"
9.
2 Crew Safety is the condition that results from proper design and test of
ground and flight systems operated by qualified personnel using validated
procedures.
a Hazards are events or conditions that could cause death or serious injury
to ground and/or flight personnel and/or the public or severe damage to
hardware, property, and the environment through either direct or indirect
means.
Orbiter/payload interfaces are points (or areas where physical, environ-
mental or functional relationships exist between the orbiter and payload.
Note that the environmental interface is frequently not mentioned, but
in practice generally not neglected: Examples: FR, radiated heat (RTG),
ionizing radiation, etc.
r Systems compatibility is the condition that exists when interface design
features satisfy the requirements of bath of the interfacing systems
and preclude environmental disturbances from one system to the other.
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PART 3
PROPULSION DEFINITIONS
FUEL	 --A reducing agent which when reacted with an oxidizer will
burn and produce heat. Fuels usually contain hydrogen and/or
carbon.
OXIDIZER ---An oxidizing agent is any substance which when reacted with
fuel will burn and produce heat. Oxidizers usually contain
oxygen, and/or the halogens such as fluorine, chlorine, Etc.
PROPELLANTS — Substances which store chemical potential energy. When
burned in a combustion chamber the chemical energy is con-
verted into thermal energy. The thermal energy is then
converted into kinetic energy to create thrust. The term
includes the s0stances before, during and after expulsion.
CRYOGENIC -- Liquid propellants whose vapor pressure is more than one
atmosphere at 20°C. Examples include LF2 5 LOZ , LN2 , LPG,
etc.
EARTH STOR--- Generally refers to liquids whose V.P. < I atm at 20%
ABLE	 which boil at temperatures > 20°C at one atm, e.g., water,
N20  NZHV MM11.
SPACE STOR- — Generally refers to liquids which can be maintained liquid
ABLE	 under reasonable pressure at temperatures achieveable in
space with proper thermal radiation protection. Liquid
hydrogen (LH2) and liquid helium (LHe) are excluded, by
definition because of the extremely low storage temperature.
HYP.ERGOLIC — Propellant combinations are those which react and ignite
spontaneously under usual conditions, e.g., F 2/N2H4 and
N204 MMH.
PROPULSION DEFINITIONS
TRACTABILITY — The"state of being docile, i.e., a properly passivated
system is -tractable to LF2
TOXIC
	
— Noxious or destructive to life or health
i
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PART 4
STUDY DEFINITIONS
Propellant Loading or
Propellant Servicing — The operation of loading the propulsion
system fluids including fuel, oxidizer
and pressurant gas.
Installation of the payload stack into
the shuttle cargo bay.
— Installation of the loaded or unloaded
propulsion system into the stack con-
sisting of payload spacecraft, spacecraft
propulsion and IVS/Tug. This may occur
before or after installation of the IVS/
Tug.
Payload Installation
Mating Buildup
Integration, or Assembl
Propulsion S sy tem)
i
Payload
	
— The STS oribiter payload as defined in
MSC 07700, comprising up to approximately
85,000 lb and generally contained in the
cargo bay.
Mariner Spacecraft	 — A Mariner class spacecraft without its
propulsion system.
Cargo	 -- Same as Payload.
Payload "Stack"
	
— This consists of the Mariner Spacecraft,
spacecraft propulsion and IUS/Tug
assembly.
IUS Tu or
"Undefined Nonrecoverable Tu " — An Interim upper stage or Tug which
or Shuttle Upper Stage (SUS) 	 would probably be used in a non-recover-
able mode.
Credible Event	 — This, by definition for this study, an
event having a probability estimated
to be greater than 10-3 occurances per
launch.
Possible Event --- This is by definition for this study an
event having a probability estimated to
be greater than 10- 6 but less than 10-3
occurrences per launch..
Incredible Event	 — This is by definition for this study an
event estimated to have a probability of
loss than 10-6 occurances per launch.
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, NOTE:
APPENDIX 3
PART 1. TENTATIVE TANK PASSIVATION PROCEDURE
The following passivation procedure for the propulsion system is
a very important process as it determines the integrity of the passivation
coating. Faulty passivation could result in propellant tank damage,
overpressurization or leakage.
Pending verification during development, the following steps appear
indicated:(I)
1. At the factory afterressure and leak check and
visual examination: Lpassivat'ion assumed in acceptance test)
1.1 clean the hardware
1.2 passivate with nitrogen and gaseous fluorine(2)
1.3 evacuate the tank and fill with pure dry
nitrogen to 15 psi
1.4 seal the tank
1.5 label the tank as passivated and containing
metallic fluoride internal coatin g
1.6 incorporate into the propulsion system
1.7 ship
2. At the launch site prior to use:	 1
2.1 repassivto with nitrogen and gaseous	 {
fluorine M' (as part of receiving inspection)
a
2.2 If necessary, , go through a sequence to verify
passivation and repassivate
1. All operations except attachment of fittings shall be accomp-
lished remotely and all lines shall be purged before disconnect.
2. Thermocouples may be used to determine if excess contaminants
were present.
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2.3 (first unit or pathfinder tank only)
verify adequacy of propellant loading proce-
dure in the explosive safe facility using a
procedure which creates conditions equivalent
to the actual loading-use actual LF2
2.4 off-load LF2
2.5 move propulsion system through sequence up
to loading
2.6 re-passivate (incidental to loading)*
2.7 load propellant
3. After loading
3.1 monitor propellant status through pressure
and temperature monitors
3.2 thermal condition with LN2
3.3 store in "propulsion garage" until needed
a
i
i
i
s'
`j
i
ii
i
•r
a
j
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i
Steps 2. 1, 2.2 and 2.6 may be replaced by step 2.F only.
This procedure was kept as general as possible (and is tentative).
5
Y
i
j
r
1
9
b
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PART 2. ASSUMED LF 2/N2H4 PROPULSION SEQUENCE
Location
emble propulsion including cleaning	 Factory
sivate and record temperatures 	 Remote Site
ly safety warning tags
p with dry N2 blanket at 30 psi	 Launch site
e N2 sample check for H2O
8. Leak check in loading location	 Loading location
9. Cryogenic LN2 leak check cycle
10. Passivate in loading location (remote)
11. Check for leaks while passivating
12. Do not remove GF, (pure)
13. Begin chill of tank with LN 2(controlled rate)
14. Slowly begin to add F2
(controlled rate)
15. Monitoring temperatures for vapors
16. Complete loading (weigh F2)
17. Purge lines, burn or aspirate effluent
18. Cap off lines
19. Dispose of excess propellant. Recycle
or react in charcoal barrels 	 A
20. Transport and install if not already
installed
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iAPPENDIX 6
1. SUMMATION OF KSC INSPECTIONS OCTOBER 10 & 11, 1974
ESA 60A
An inspection assessment of the explosive safe area ESA 60A (in
company of Mr. Warren Dunn of JPQ was made. This area, shown in
Figure 4-6, has been used for loading bi-propellants in Mariner 9
and was considered suitable for loading of earth storables. It is 'remote
from other complexes, the nearest installation is a parabolic antenna
dish located 1,000 yards away. It is far from populated areas and has the
advantage ghat JPL and other personnel are familiar with it. Access to
the OPF and/or shuttle launch pad is by way of surface streets. One
route would be across the Banana River on the NASA causeway, and past the
Headquarters Building. This route crosses one set of railroad tracks.
If movement were made at night with proper security, low personnel risk
would be incurred. The ESA 60 facility appeared amenable to improvements
which might be desired to handle fluorine. The associated Sterilization
and Assembly Building (No. 54445) does not have a propellant facility
drain, in any case, may not be used for this program.
SAEF
Alternative facilities are Iocated closer to the Headquarters
complex in the SAEF 1* and SAEF 2 buildings.
These sites are less suitable than the ESA 60 because of their
proximity to administrative buildings, although transportation distance
would be considerably reduced.
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB)
Inspection of the Vehicle Assembly Building and its neighbor, the
Mission Control Center building, and location considerations of the OPF as
currently conceived revealed that this is basically an assembly plant with
the possibility of two Orbiters located in the OPF at the same time.
SAEF 1 was formerly called Pyrotechnic Installation Building, PIS."
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Several hundred employees are expected to be in the VAB area and the
number could range above 2,000. When our inspection was in progress, a
group of approximately 30 tourists was in the Low Bay Area of the VAB.
It would appear that the cost of clearing the VAB for operations 	 f
involving transport of the Orbiter with the loaded propulsion in place
could be very significant. Presently (past policy) pyrotechnics but not
propellants are installed in this building but only after the Friday,
day shift has left. Stage rollout occurs by early Monday, and personnel
are not allowed in the building before the vehicle is clear of this
building. It is planned to assemble the Shuttle SNB in this area and
perhaps small amounts of liquid propellants may be handled here.
3
f
1
The opinion of several personnel of the KSC was that the safety
office would never allow hyperbolic propellant loading in the VAB. Caution
in this building is such that pickup trucks are closely regulated and are
not allowed to remain in the building overnight.
Consideration of passing a loaded propulsion system through the
j	 VAB would require development of a detailed contingency plan.
	
]7I
Considerations of a credible level appear primarily damage due to
	 A
accidental manipulation or propagation of damage from other systems.
2. KSC SAFETY OFFICE POSITION
The main concerns of the KSC safety office are: (1) maintaining
normal operating conditions in the propellant handling process, expecially
with fluorine, and (2) close control during filling and shutoff to pre-
clude discharge of-vapors which could result in accidents.
The KSC safety office recognizes the additional risk inherent
J
during flow processes and emphasizes the need for filling in a properly
equipped remote facility. The facility used must, in their opinion, be
"dedicated" to fluorine by planning and scheduling although other propel-
lants may also be loaded there. This dedication should be such that it
precludes encroachment of other facilities into the area.
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lLoading of propellants at the pad is considered excessively
hazardous and a last resort if other techniques are not used.
They prefer a closed sealed system, rather than one that can be
dumped.
If a system is certified, it will be accepted for launch-by KSC.
This would include analysis of worst case conditions.
s	 '
The system must be such that no pressure buildup occurs during
normal holding periods.
The preference for a closed system stems from the conclusion that
there is risk in fluid transfer and even detanking operations could go
wrong, creating the problems that one would be trying to eliminate.
It would be preferable to have tankage and lines that would with-
stand a 14.7 psia overpressure.
Hazardous operations will have safety office surveillance.
FIuorine handling 'is expected to require rigor of operations
approaching those for nuclear activities.
Release of FZ, gas at the pad would be expected 'to cause con-
siderable damage to equipment at the pad.
;rj
APPENDIX 7
SYSTEM COMPARISONS — RISK MANAGEMENT
Because it is more familiar, N 204 will be used as a space shuttle
propellant in the OMS and RCS, and will be carried in the shuttle bay in
the OMS kits. Propellants for the OMS and RCS will be loaded directly
Into-the propellant tanks while the Shuttle is on the pad. The quantities
of propellant were shown in Figure A-2. The recommended processing of
the spacecraft propulsion is considered to be safer than the OMS kit
loading process. The toxic hazard from OMS/RCS N 204
 is greater than for
spacecraft LF2 or N204 due to the higher quantities involved. The dis-
persion properties of N 204 may be worse than for LF 2 as it tends to stay
near the ground.
The comparison of the OMS/RCS system to planetary spacecraft
propulsion is shown in Taole A7-1. A comparison of the spacecraft pro-
pulsion with ..ther new systems and past systems as shown in Figure 2.4-2,
can only lead to the conclusion that the hazards of the N 204 spacecraft
propulsion system as described in this report should be much less than
other Shuttle Orbiter systems and that they are less than experienced in
past practice. Risk m-
LF2
 systems are shown
3
Table A7-1- Risk Management Considerations
Planetary Orbiter
Spacecraft
LE2 	'204
Other N204 Practice
Titan III
Core	 OMS Kits
1. Typical weight, lb,
oxidizer only 1,000 11000 200,000
'	 propellant,tatal 1,500 1,500 300,000
2.	 Emergency exposure 15 30 30
limit, EEL,
1'^? min, ppm
3.	 Toxic potential 67 33 6,670
weight/EEL, ratio
4.	 Explosive equivalent 0.02 0.05 0.05
with amine Fuel, est.
TNT/l b*
5.	 Explosive No Genti al - 30 75 15,000
wt. x explosive
equivalent weight x (>75)
*See Table R7-2.
N204/AeroZine -50 0.05
Table A7-2. Explosive Equivalent Factors
Explosive Equivalent
	 Reference
Factor Test	 Reference
NASA, Hydrogen Safety Manual,
1968 TMX-52454,X70-12988
NASA, Ftydrogen Safety Manual,
1968 TMX.-52454,X70-12988
NASA, Hydrogen Safety Manual,
1968 TMX-52454,X70-12988
Research on Hazard
Classification of New Liquid
Rocket Propellants, AFSSD
TR-61-40 Oct., 1961
Draft Shuttle Payload Ground
Operations Safety Handbook
Estimated by Similarity to
Aerazine-5C and N, "
Estimated by Simi'
F2/H2 and C1F3/N21
A-39
0.05
0.60
0.05-0.10
<0.05
(say 0.02)
F2/H 2
02/H2
CIF3/N2H4
N204/'1'2H4
N204/MMH
F2/N2H4
0.005
Less severe than
N204/N2H4
0.10
APPENDIX 8
LAUNCH SITE HAZARD ANALYSES
APPENDIX 8
LAUNCH SITE HAZARD ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix contains the Option 3 Ground Processing Hazard
Analysis. This appendix is part of the basis for Tasks 1 and 2.
This hazard analysis considers only Option 3, the selected
processing option. Other options, except Option 4 were found to be less
desirable from a safety standpoint than this option. Option 4 is very
similar to Option 3. A final processing sequence selection may be made
at a later date when more data about the Payload Changeout Facility (PCF)
is known. For the purpose of this study it suffices to have determined
that mating of the spacecraft with the IIIS/Tug should occur in the PCF
not in Vie Oribiter Processing Facility (OPF).
the purpose of the hazard analysis was to determine the hazards
and necessary controls so as to be able to better compare personnel safety,
shuttle safety, effect on timelines, effect on turnaround and relaunch and
to provide a basis for other Tasks of the study.
The description of Option 3 is contained in Section 4.1.3.1
Processing Sequence alternatives. All of the assumptions for this Hazard
ITEM/ PRIrl4RY MAJOR CAUSES	 L1v_V0P!')0D OF H'ZARD EFFECTS IN "PRESENT"
TASK NO. OPERATIONS HAZARDS OF HAZARDS	 1'ZiVn CAUSES
SPUTTL-c SYSTEM AND FACILITIES
{1} (2) (3) (4)	 (5)	 ' (6)
Project Personnel
ITEM
—
Load LF2/Hydrazi,r into "Fuzz-leak" in the LF2 Sy^i r	 leak at a mcCha ni- Credible
(
' ) Task 1-2 5ecaose personnel	 can smell	 the gas'
TASK NO. the propulsion module inside a building,	 i.e.,	 tine cal	 joint. before it is hazardous to them and
—F-Z in the Propellant Lab system is leaking sufficient gas Events of this k`nd tecarse they will	 be trained to
(ESA-60), to cause i lot of small gas m	 leak out of a valve are associated wit-, receanize the hazard .	' irie person-
bubbles t'1 occur if a soap film bellows. ter^porary conrections nel	 p robably w, .n't be ha-med,	 The
1-3 Transport loaded SIC is put on the outside of the part used in transferric ,; TLV for F2 gas is O.1PPM for
propulsion module to leaking No	 gas.	 To reach the s	 leak at an propellants. 8 hours exposure.	 Emergency expo-
storage area and store TLV (O. W514) for LF	 in the room, inadequate weld, sure limits are:	 3
for a week or more, it would t6 a from	 hr, to TRW CTS has experienced Reference (NO2)
several hours.	 The concentration s	 corrosion resulting many such lea ys without
F2	 N2041-4 Take propulsion module of gas is much greater near the in a small	 leak. serious	 incident,
out of storage and leak, the propulsion module or 10 min.	 - 15PP14	 3OPPM	 !
transport to tha SIC SIC.	 A small cloud of gas could 30 min. - IOPPM	 20PPM
Sterilization and Assy. be formed outside the leak, and 60 min. -	 SPPM	 IOPPM
Bldg. in area (ESF 60) would prohatly be detected by the
and mate loaded propul- human nusa	 before the leak One of the major reaction products
sion module to the becomes hazardous to personnel. of fluorine gas with moisture in
remainder of the SIC. It is possitle that the Fuzz leak HF and its TLV is 3PPM.	 Laboratory
Then perform minor could dev?lop into an inter- measurements indicate that there is
checkouts. mediate teal, but it is not almost no reaction under conditions.;
necessarily probable, simulating a LF 2 spill	 into moist
1-5 Encapsulate electronics air.	 The emergency exposure limits
with shroud after The odor of F2 gas is detectable of hydrogen fluoride gas (HF) are:
checkout and prepare at 0.011 to 0.014 PPM,	 All
SIC for transport to individuals should be able to 10 min. - 2OPPM
SAEF #1 or to the detect 0.13F PPM immediately. 30 min. - IOPPM
Payload Changeout 60 min. -	 8PPM
Facility at the pad, A Fuzz-leak is	 <.01CC/SEC at
1 atmosphere. KSC Personnel
No impact because of the size of
the leak, i
General Public
No impact because of the size of
the leak.
Equipment
Electrical control circuits can be
damaged by F2 vapors at concentra-
tions of less than ,l ppM.(4) Hhen
the SIC loaded with LF2 is in a
Bldg., there is a chance that
electrical control (computers) will
be damaged, but this is dependent
on location of equipment, design of
equ i pment, desi gn of venti %ti^n
system, length of time the leak
has existed, when leak was detected,.;
and the preventative measures taken.
Facilities
No impact, unless the system is
allowed to leak for a long period
of time so that the concentration
build up possibly causing a fire,
but Phre likely causing corrosion
of equipment and facilities.
Timelines
No impact an the Shuttle System
Orbiter turnaround timeline.
E
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OPTION 3 GROUND PROCESSING HAZARD ANALYSIS
PRESENT"
CILITIES
"PRESErJT"
	
w
RISK
	
"PRESENT SAFETY CONTROLS
CATEGORIES
	
AND ASSUMPTIONS
(7)	 (g)
HAZARD EFFECTS C'.
"MODIFIED" SHUTTLE S?STE"
AND FACILITIES (9)
RIS.'.
CAT	 GO°Y FJ7^
""DDIFIED"
S
	
00)
'NEEDED
	
SAFETY
CONTROLS & ASSUMPTIONS
(11)
Project Personne
	 a Assume that an effective LF2 leak Project Personnel Project 1,	 Personnel should go to a remote cc
the gas detec tor is nct available in theIV unless system	 tor Jo significant effects
Personnel trol	 location after passivation
hemand has been in star,facility, TV
accomplish loading operation.
d to age.	 If leak	 s Assume the present Propellant Lab is 2.	 Assure that when a S/C loaded witl
erson- occurs in stor-	 used to load the propulsion module. LF2 is placed in a storage facili!
d.	 The age facility	 The present storage facilities at AFETR that the facility is ventilated ar
r where no person-	 are used to store the loaded module. remote.	 (See Note 1) from persons
y expo- nel	 are generall	 Assume the EAS-60 facilities are used, 3.	 Assure that a fluorine detection i
around, the risk
	 to mate the S/C to the propulsion is available and operational befoi
^NO2} may be a level	 module.	 Assume Bldg	 (S&A, 60A) is used entering a closed facility contaii
II,	 to check out loaded S/C. 	 See Section a 5/C with LF2 .	 Provide a means i
(	 ) far description o€ these sample the air an the storage
facilities, facility before entrance is made
s There is no propellant drain in the personnel or scape suit.
Sterilization and Assembly buildingi 4.	 Assure that the public nor other j
in ESA-60, unauthorized personnel are allowei
roducts
a Isolation of electrical 	 equipment from around t iie storage facility.
re in
bbratory hazardous areas is not provided in the 5.	 When the loaded S/C is not in a
there is sterilization and Assy. 	 Bldg. storage facility, assure that a:
nditions s It is assumed that the S/C will 	 not portable detector and protective .;
'moist have a gas purging shroud on the pro- clothing are available before
e limits pulsion module while the 5/C is being entering an area where the loaded:
F) are: checked out. 5/C is.
Electrical equipment in the ESA do not 6. 	 Assure that all	 areas in a facili'
conform to OSHA requirements for oper- that contain a loaded S/C have a
ating electrical equipment in hazardous ventilation system that is com-, 	 -
atmospheres. patible with F2 vapor and HF vapo
and that it is	 isolated from othel
KSC Personnel
	
• See Section (	 ) for other safety KSC Personnel KSC areas where personnel work or may
re of controls that are assumed. No effects
Personnel be, such as cleaning closets. 	 (S
VI
e Present controls allow personnel	 to IV Note 2)	 (optional).
work around a loaded system without 7.	 Assure that all electrical contro
General.Public
	
special	 clothing after the propellant General	 Public General circuits are isolated from the sill
.e of is loaded. No effects
Public
when F2 vapors or HF vapors appea,
TV
r Assumed that the general public is IV 8,	 Install a compatible floor coveri
not allayed in the area where the in the building such as stainless
Equipment:
	
loading occurs. Equipment Equipment steel sheet.
can be
III	 a In general	
the sterilization Assembly No effects IY g,	 Load propellant Task 1-?. only 
;antra-
II possible
	
Bldg.	 (ESA 60) is not designed to under favorable weather anu win d
When
-n 
a
rocess leaks of F	 or HF, nor are
unless elec-
	 -	
p	 2 conditions.
.n
tropics are
	
they designed to protect equipment
^s)	 will protected .
from this leak.
i
ndent
sign of
ti en
aak
stetted,
s taken.
Facilities
llo effectsis IV
0 od j
ition Timelines
"ire, Timelines
).Sion IV
No effects
'em
i
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EFFECTS g	
-
SHUTTLE S5TE"
=ACIkIT[E5 ( g )
RI`-'
CATEGOP?	 F
,
""OIIIFIEC"
SYSTE"	 !IC)
" NEEDED  SAFETY
CONTROLS & ASSUMPTIONS
1	 (11)
RE14ARKS
(12)
al Project 1.	 Personnel should go to a remote con- Note 1:	 Remote from personnel activities approxicately
2ffecrs Personnel trol
	
location after passivation to 1000 ft, for 1600 lb, of fluorine and 1500 feet for
accomplisF loading operation. 300 lb. of fluorine.
IV
2.	 Assure that when a SIC loaded with Note 2:	 It is desirable to be able to remotely control 	 the
LF 2 is placed in a storage facility, ventilation in the facility to ventilate minor
that the facility is ventilated and leaks and contain larger leaks, 	 This requirement
remote.	 (See Note 1) from personnel. could be waived.
3.	 Assure that a fluorine detection unit Note 3:	 Task 1-2 is considered to be the most likely
is available and operational before occasion for leakage. 	 Credible is a conversative
entering a closed facility containing rating of the likelihood since the lines will have
a S/C with LF2 .	 Provide a means to been leak checked and passivated.
sample the air in the storage
Note 4:	 It is reported.
facility before entrance is made by
personnel or scape suit. Note 5:	 Leaks up to this level are common at rocket test
4.	 Assure that the public nor other
sites and may he normally tolerated if the TLV
unauthorized personnel are allowed is not exceeded.
	
Unnecessary personnel are
around the storage facility. evacuated.
	
At KSC scape suits are recommended for
loading operations as each one may be done w i th a
S.	 When the loaded S/C is not in a new setup,
storage facility, assure that a
Task 1-2 is where the large difference in TLVs
portable detector and protective between N204 and LF2 is really noted since con-
clothing are available before
tinuing work can be accomplished with small 	 leaks.
entering an area where the loaded
S/C is. Good practice dictates catching and impounding
6.	 Assure that all areas in a facility
liquids used to neutralize spills of fluorine.
Leakage into the air, while undesireable
havethat contain a loaded 5/C  a dissipates over a wide area and is apparently not
ventilation system that is
a problem.	 Loading should be accomplished when
patible with F2 vapor and HF vapor the wind will blow vapors toward the ocean, and
KSC
and that it is isolated from other
away from facilities.
Personnel
Per
areas where personnel work or may
be, such as cleaning closets.
	 (See
;V Note 2)	 (optional).
General 7.	
Assure that all electrical
	 control
Public circuits are isolated from the air
when F2 vapors or HF vapors appear.
IV
8.	 Install a compatible floor covering
Equipment in the building such as stainless
steel sheet.
IY g,	 Load propellant Task 1-7. only
under favorable weather and wind
conditions,
EMW
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OPTION 3 GROUND.
Fi'U
ITEI:1 PRIMARY MAJOR ,„A"'SE5 LIKELIHOOD -IF r'.:?DE=rEt?	 I	 " rr -"-^• r`'Srl'*
TASK 10. OPERATIONS HAZARDS OF HA'.ARDS HAZA,L CAUSES 5	 _ ;"5 7 Etx A:	 FACIL M LE F.'.5+:
(1) (2) (3) f41 15} [6) C^7=6GRiES	 7:
ITEM
Same as for hazard "One inch a uiva€ent leak of Inadvertdnt valve
	
^ Improbable Project "ersongel Proiect Personn--
li	 uid fluorine.'	 The IITASK  110. "Fuzz Leak" operation If personnel ;.re in the area and are not
1-2 liquid may be under very
o rupture of
	 sup-ground
clothed in protective suits, they may be I	 PossihTr
law pressure (_14 PSIA) or
Port piping
severely injured.	 Even if clothed in
1-4
very 	 high pressure at time protective suits there is the possibility
1-5 of the leak depending on o rupture of LF, tank Events of this kind of injury.	 A fire will may immediately
the cause of the leak.
a rupture o€ S/C piping are associated with
fallow the spill; therefore thereis a
When under Tow pressure, failures of ground danger of injury due to fire, 	 her
the leak will be like hot o puncture of anyone of equipment due to unprove., personnel	 in the buildings may also be
water flowing out of a the above items, designs or user inexperi- injured because of the circulation of
tank.	 The liquid will be
evaporating rapidly as itP	 9
o external
	 'hazards such as ence, factors	 that will
toxic vapors.
Y
leaks, as LF2 i5 a cryogenic fire, explosion, shock,
vib,	 etc,
be diminished by pre-
cautions.	 See columns 8, KSC Personne l 	 (AF also) Y,SC Pe rsonnel
--	 qqq
III	 -	 nas	 will-
Almost an
	 materials they	
s the
LF 3
 comas in contact with
11	 and 12. KSC personnel	 located near the building
will burn rapidly,
	 If LF2 or transporter whore the leak occurs
borely	 diffu5
contacts water or moisture, would be susceptible to injury.	 KSC before reaching
an explosion may occur, personnel the potentially near the
KSC nersonnel.
i
hydrogen fluoride gas may transporter when moving tale loaded 5/C. II	 -	 p0551hle	 1,
be generated.	 There also If a leak occurs in a building and a '.'	 are a
may be other dangerous com- significant amount of LFz spills, the close	 to	 the :,
bustled byproducts,
	 The present ventilation systems will prob-
Fspilled L	 will	 cause ably pass the toxic gas to the outside
a very hig^i concentra- of the buildin g s.
tion of Fx gas near the
spill.	 The dispersion of
cloud depends an where
the spill occurs and the If the leak occurs while in the trans-
environmental	 conditions.
,
the
porter, Y.SC personnel will 	 be Subjected
According to the ground to the hazard if the cover is removed.
rules of this study, as much Even if the cover isn't moved, it may be
as 3000 pounds of LF 2 could dampaged and the gas would escape any-
be leaked in a relatively way.	 If the leak occurred in the ground l
small amount of time. support system, the hazard to KSC
personnel would be much greater.
Gener a l Pub lic renere l 	nublie
T ,ie general	 public may be subjected to III	 -	 ohs	 will
the F_ or 4F gas hazard due to the same oro!sably	 diffu5
problem listed for KSC personnel, 	 The before reaching
HF is a Byproduct of controlling the LF the	 ^-u;rliC.
spill.	 If the leak occurs 	 in the ground r-It	 -	 oossi	 le it
support systen, the hazard to the public tourist,	 dre bel
,could be ouch greater. prn , .„ed throu9
Equipment r.e	 irneral	 area
Extensive damage to electronic a^,:.ipment ,.ere	 fire	 I . :k' .'
in the facility where the 1 p ;.	 occurs occurs.
Eguipment
and possibly equipm pn, 	 ;n other facil-
ities	 if the gal	 in the outside atmos- lI
phere is	 dr,fted	 into a	 facility, III-	 possible,
per,c;ng on	 the
Fartiities amount of equip
Extensive damage to any facility where "'`	 =iar:aged.	 1
1 ?ak occurs, because of a fire and cor-
rosive nature of I-	 gas and HF and LF-. FaC11	 ties	 j
T imeli ne:
li	
jj
';a significant effect because 	 the shuttle
operations can be carried an w700t.c any j
Of the facilitiRs	 found in the operations
of :oncern. Ti,eline
OF
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R
U1
f.1w
i
.:
s 	 A
OUND PROCESSING HAZARD ANALYSIS
" pP_SE!X' 4 	 EFFECTS
PI SF: "PP SC.'i"' s:rm CONTROLS `!;ODMES'' _1 'TTLE ^Y UM F	 3	 ",q,JGIF;ED' ":rfLi;e'L"	 5A.ETY
T:GORIES vA'ID	 sSU PTi41i5	 (!3)
TfACILI,tES S'rs1E'f C('' T f3L5	 8 ASSUMPTIONS
(1
(71(7)
(9)
f 14i (11)
,jest Personnel •	 Assumed that project personnel would
be allowed to work around a S/C
Project Personnel
If leak occurs during transporta-
F'r_o-ject
 Personne l
II I
Personnel should load from a remote
location
II
I	 Possible filled with LP, without protective tion and personnel	 are not properl5 II,	 I, Residual Other controls from Item 7clothing after the propulsion module
is	 filled, but not during filling.
suited, personnel may he severely
Assure that all project personnel
	 ininjured.
the same roam with a S/C loaded with
a	 The Sterilization and Assembly Bldg. liquid F Z are outfitted in a LFZ
of ESAGD does oat have a propellant compatible scapesuit.
drain.
a	 Fire p rotection personnel are avail-
o Assure that an adequate detection
system is always operating, so that
able La fight fires.	 They have a leak will be detected as soon as it
suits, but not the kind that protect occurs.
Personnel from LFZ. KSC Pe rsonnel KSC Personnel o Assure chat the roam containing the
- gas VIM a	 The present gas detection system is personnel would proLa6ly receive III LF	 loaded S/C is properly z	 p	 perly isolated
bably diffuse not Sufficient, minor injury because of the safe from other rooms in the facility.
ore reaching a	 Assumed that the vent system in the distance they are ke pt away from This includes the airconditioning
.personnel. propellant room is not isolated from the hazard,	 if the recorcmended system and the ventilation system.
possible if the other rooms in the buildings and
controls are imp lemented.	 There ie o Assure tha t all air vented to the Impractical	 -
 Accept r' , '	 in reP	 P
sannel	 are also assumed that the ventilation a nnssibiljty of injury depending outside of the building is properlyP	 P	 Y
se to the leak
ea
system will not be shut down once a on	 _.ie safe distance established decontaminated before release to
major leak occurs. and the environmental conditions. the atmosphere.
a Assure that the facility propellant Cover floor with stainless stee
drain system is always compatible
with LFZ.
o Assure that if a ieak occurs in the
piping of the LF T
 supply system out-
side a building, that the flow of
LFz can be shut down immediately.
a Provide an enclosed system to con-
tain the LF Z
 spilled from service
I ystem.
o Provide a means to safely detank the
:/C of LF Z .	 Assure detanking system
eral	 Public General Public is always adequately cleaned and
Passivated.	 Second truck trailer
-	 g as will No effects	 because the public is or charcoal burner.
bably diffuse
ore reaching
oat allowed in the area,
o Assure that all personnel working
public. (Cont.)
around the tF Z
 service system are
properly suited.
- possible if
rests	 are been o Assure that the LFZ service truck is
tensed through adequately isolated from all outside
general area
Equirr=ert E Equipment
hazards that may cause a 1" equiv-
alent leak to o^-cur.
re the leak -. ui	 ent
ors, a	 same as for "Fuzz Leak" hazard. The general electrical equipment r	 I 'I o Keep all unauthorized personnel a
-ln^ a	 Assumed that there are no weans to in the building probably won't safe distance from the LFz system as
stop the flo g of LF, or control	 the be damaged, except for the equal_ Facilities all	 times,	 including during trans-
possfble, de spill	 once it occurs, extent to merit in the immediate vicinity of III
portation.
ling on	 the apply water s pray which burns up tie the spill. 11	 - Possible, a	 Bldg.	 vent system must be designed
m	 Pt of equip- fluorine, but produces HF which is depends on how so that the vapors from an outside
damaged. toxic. Facilities large the re- spill	 are rot drafted into the build-
s	 The Cape is a wild life reserve an,; Possible extensive amount of local
sulting spill
	
is
haw well it is
ing.
lities most of the facilities are near this damage to the facility.	 The
contained, and
a	 The general public must be kept one
reserve.	 The citrus crops are nut facility damage may be minimized how well the are, mile or greater from any point where
very near the facilities by providing a well designed can- is rendered safe
the loaded LF Z systems exists.
trol system.
s	 Provide a means to capture the sp ill-
Timeline Ti meline
ing liquid to prevent the propagation
No significant effect tV
of the hazard.
line
— - •	 Require that a LFz dedicated facility
be used to handle and process the
LF,	 system.
a	 Place a shield around the S/C so that
spewing LF2
 will be deflected if a
leak occurs while the system is under
pressure
a	 Install a fire extinguishing water
fog system,
o	 Load protranspart only under
favorable weather and wind.
R-43
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fill
r	 raR.MAF..^
(1Fl
aject Personnel ProjcL Personnel Personnel should load from a remote
leak occurs during transporta- 13I
iI ---_ loc a
 tic"
an and personnel are not property 11,	 I,	 Residual r Other controls from Item 1
ited, personnel may be severely Assure that all	 project personnel	 injured. the same room with a SIC loaded with
liquid F, are outfitted in a LF,
compatible scapesuit.
o Assure that an adequate detection
system is always operating, so that
a leak will be detected as soon as it
occurs.
C Personnel KSC Personnel o Assure that the room containing the
rsonnel would p robably receive III LF, loade	
r is properly isolated
nor injury because of the safe from othr	 'Ms	 in the facility.
stance they are kept array from This inciu..	 the airconditioning
e hazard, if the recommended system and the ventilation system.
ntrols are implemented.	 There is o Assure that all air vented to the Impractical - Accept risk in remote area such as ESA-60
possibility of injury depending outside of the building is properly
the safe distance established decontaminated before release to
d the environmental	 conditions. the atmosphere.
o Assure that the facility propellant Cover floor with stainless steel 	 install drain to pit outside.
drain system is always compatible
with LFz.
o Assure that if a leak occurs in the
Piping of the LF, supply system out-
side a building, that the flaw of
LF, can be shut down immediately.
o Provide an enclosed system to con-
tain the LF, spilled from service
system.
o Provide a means to safely detank the
VC of LFz.	 Assure detanking system
ner- 1	 Public
is always adequately cleaned and
passivated.	 Second truck trailer
effects, because the oublit is or charcoal burner.
t allowed in the area,
o Assure that all personnel working
(Cont.)
around the LF, service system are
properly suited.
o Assure that the LFz servic+r track is
adequately isolated from all outside
hazards that may cause a I" equiv-
u_.ipment equipment alent leak to occur.
e general electrical equipment '	 1	 I o Keep all unauthorized personnel a
the building probably won't safe distance from the LF, system as
damaged, except for the equip- Facilities all	 times,	 including during trans-
nt in the immediate vicinity of III portation.
e spill. II	 - Possible, 0	 Bldg. vent system must be designed
depends on how so that the vapors from an outside
cilities large the re- spill	 are not drafted into the bdild-
spill	 is ing.
ssible extensive amount of local
mage to the facility.	 The
haw weell l it is
how
pubv	 The general lic must be kept one
cility damage may be minimized
contained, and
arehsw	 well
mile or greater from an	 point wherey
providing a well designed con- Is rendereedd
the loaded LF, systems exists.
DI
	
system. @
	 Provide a means to capture the Spill-
meline Timeline
ing liquid to prevent the propagation
of the hazard.
significant effect ]y
Require that a LF, dedicated facility
be used to handle and process the
LF; system.
n 	 Place a shield around the SIC so that
spewing Lr; will	 be deflected if a
leak occurs while the system is under
pressure
o	 Install a fire extinguishing water
fog system.
o	 L oad
fvoable t^reather and wind.avorable	
only underweather Y^r	 'emsYTrlr
^r
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OPTIC
ITEM PRIMARY MAJOR CAUSES LIKELIHOOD OF	 I
u	
E^'=
TASK NO. OPERATIOYS HAZARDS OF HAZARDS HAZARD CAUSES LE SYSTL•"I	 F
(1) (2) (3) (4) 15) (f+
ITEM Same as for hazard explosive rupture of S/C r Tank overpressurized Improbable
	
^Pro_ct Personnel
3 "fuzz leak" when containing full
	 load If the explosive rupturetank when filled with 	 liquid
fluorine.TASK NO. of LFz. personnel working in the
1-2 •	 If this hazard occurs in • Tank ruptured from ex- Improbable
severely injured or kille
1-3 a building,	 LFz will	 be ternal	 hazard.
incident occurs during tr
1-4 thrown all over the room
personnel may be sever,.'y
1_5 and possibly blow out
• Leak progresses into Improbable baseu on killed,
the walls of the facil- major rupture.
!
experience
ities.	 The pressure in • LFp being 0 deed into Improbable if proper KSC Personnel
the tank at rupture could the tarn contacts a con- passivation procedure Same as for 1" Eauiv.	 1
be several	 hundred pound's taminant and explodes.
I
'If the hazard occurred More hazardous to KS':
during transportation, Events of this kind are trans por,.ration.
the cover of the trans- associated with improper
porter would be blown or unproven design or
off and a large amour: negligence
of F2 gas	 released,	 in
addition to a lane fire
being created.
General	 Public
Same as	 for 1" equiv.	 leak
{dous to KSC personnel	 !^ri
tion.
Equipment
Same as for 1" equiv.	 ^k
damage to all electrc,
!
the area._
I
acilitY
Exte:.sive damage to fan li
porter where hazard occ.irs
FOLDOUT FRULF
OPTI
I T E .11! PRIMARY ftAJOR CAUSES LIKELIHOOD OF
TAS K NO. OPERATIONS HAZARDS OF HAZARDS HAZARD CAUSES S--iTLE SYSTVI AND F
ITEM Same as for hazard Explosive rupture of SIC P Tank overpressurized Improbable jroj^ct Personnel
tank when filled with liquid3F_ "fuzz leak" when containing full	 load If the explosive rupture 0
fluorine.TASK NO. of LF2- personnel working in the
1-2 v	 If this hazard occurs in e Tdnk raptured from ex- ImprobWc ^everely injured or killk
1-3 a building, LF 2 will	 be ternal hazard. incident occurs during tri
1-4 thrown all over the room personnel may be severelyll
1-5 and possibly blow out
a Leak progresses into Improbable baseu un killed.
the walls of the facil- major rupture, experience
ities.	 The pressure in @ LF2 being nlaced into Improbabl e if proper KSC Personnel
the tank at rupture could the tark contacts a con- passivation procedure Same as	 for 1 '	 eo. uiv.	 leak
be several hundred pounds taminant and explodes.
'if the hazard occurred More 1^aza--dous	 to KSC Pers
during transportation, Events of this kind are transpor^-.ation.
the cover of the trans- associatel with improper
porter would be blown or unproven desigr or
of F2 gas released. in
addition	 to a large fire
being created.
General Public
Same as for I" equiv.	 leak
Equipmen
same as	
far 
I" equiv.	 leak
damage to all electronic E
the area,
Exter,sive damage to fatili
_tporter where hazard occum
FOLDOUT F&AAq
i	 I	 I	 I	 1
OPTION 3 GROUND PROCESSING HAZARD ANALYSIS
!+-'';RD EFFECTS TI "PP,ESENT" "PRESENT" HAZARD EFFECTS ON ;.,	 C.TEVDR}'
!"	 FLiE SYSTEM AND FACILITIES RISK "PRESEN " SAFETY CONTROLS W'..IED:' SHUTTLE SYSTEM "40U1F:EC"	 I
(6) CATEGORIES (7) AriO ASSUMPTIONS (R)
A'41 FACILITIES SYS1Fti:	 I	 CO'i(9) (10)
t Personnel Project Personnel Same as for above hazards. Project Personnel Project Personnel o Same as fa
I 1 - duringexplosive rupture occurs indoors, s	 Assumed personnel are alloed in the Possible severe injury Loading.") 3
nel working in the area may be area where a loaded SIC exists, to personnel if incident occurs transportation & o Conduct to
ly injured or killed.
	 Also, if
at occurs durin
	 transg	 ortation a	 It must- be assured that proper cool-
during transportation. non-filling oper- under favai
be down or' the system is provided and
ations in build-
o Assure onlnel may	 severely injured or
that a maximum of 3 hours ^Yill be  ings. used for i
' required to provide adequate cooling IV - in build- that no -Fd
rsonnel KSC Personnel
if cool-down cana!iility is lost.
	 If
KSC Personnel
ing during LFz
loading9
KSC genera
it can be demonstrated that the LF Z night.
s	 for 1"	 equiv.
	 leak. III	 -	 gas will can be safely dum7ed in the 3 hour Same as for 1" equiv.	 leak, except KSC Personnel Assure per
azardous to KSC personnel during Probably diffuse time c;an, dumping will	 suffice. during transportation,	 Depending
o
i
the area
ortation, before reaching a	 At the present tine the public is on environmental	 conditions a	 loll
III w
is located
KSC personnel.
allowed to tour various areas of concentration of gas may be im-
II	 - nossible if the Cape.
posed on KSC personnel o Buildings
personnel are to resistant:
close to the leak.
I	 Public General	 Public General Public General Public
Saine as far KSC
IIIi for 1" equiv.	 leak.	 More hazar- nO ly possible small amount of
KSC personnel during transporta-
personnel. injury  depending on environmental
i
III conditions, particularly if in-
1I	 possible cident occurs durin g transoorta-
Lion.
!nt EAuioment Equipment Equipment
1
for 1" equiv.
	 leak.	 Extensive II Extensive damage to all electronic9 1I l
to all electronic equipment in I possible de- equipment in the facility where
!a `
vending on amount incident actors.
of equipment in
the area.
;Y Fa c".	 i 1 i ty Facility Fac i lily
ive damage to futility or trans- II  Same as for " p resent" safety con-	 l
II, Residual
where hazard occurs. di lions.
APPENDIX B
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REMARKS
(12)
Project Personnel o Same as for above hazards.
	 (Remote  IThe chance of this hazard occurring is small because the -tank
I - during
Loading.) is not under pressure during trans portation.	 If coolinq
capacity is lost, there are 20 hours allowed before the pres-
occurs	 transportation & Conduct loadingo	 operations remotely
sure in the tank increases to the point where the safety
non-filling oper- under favorable weather conditions. factor is lowered below _2:0.
ations in build-
o Assure only safe back-road routes are
ings.
used for transporting the S/C.
	 Assure
IV - in build- that no facility is used that is near
ing during LFz KSC general personnel. 	 Transpurt at
loading night.
k, except
	 KSC Personnel
'Pending o Assure personnel are not allowed in
a	 loar	 III the area where the LF 2 loaded S/C
^
3e 
im- is located.	 Except as necessary
o Buildings are designed to be explosion
resistant e.g,, ESA 60.
Ge leral	 Public
of	 III
)nmental
if	 in-
^vorta-
ug ipmen t
ectronic	 Ii
where
Facility
ty can-	
II, Residual
f1- •1.1
OPTION i
M PRIMARY MAJOR Cl.!1SES LIXELIHOuD O F i^=D Er FE "	 ', "PRESENT
 110. Oi'L ATi0ta5 HAZ;:RDS OF HAZARDS HAZARD CAUSES "._^	 S _% 7	 ','^	 ^. 5':L;TIE'
F
(2) (3) ,4}
M Same as for hazard Large spil of LF	 from the o Outside hazards to the The char ge of this hazard
"fuzz leak." tanker such as an acciden occurring is im probable A major s p ill	 outside	 the facility	 .couldservice system outside a
fa cility.
	 The spill will during transit, or ex- ( 1x]0-'	 to	 lxlo-'), present a severe hazard to personnel
TASK NO• come from the LF2 tanker plosion or fire from some outside and inside the facility because
1-2 and could be up to 5,000 external source. Events of this type are neither are isolated from the hazard.
1-3
1 -4
lb. of liquid F 2 .	 This
o	 f thFa	 ure o	 e tankeril
uncommon.	 LF? transport therefore, there may be injury or death,`
1-5
hazard could occur during
filling operations at KSC, systemcausing major
is routinely accomplished
]CCunder	 rules on the
during transit of the truck, rupture in the tanker. nations highways. KSC Pers onnel
during above ground storage Failure of LF -, service
of the tanker at KSC, or piping• if the spill occurs on route to ESA 60,
possibly during detanking some KSC personnel 	 located at the various
operations of the SIC. 	 Rel- test stands on the back roads may be	 .
ative to the facilities severely injured because the office facil
being used in the opera- ities are not isolated from the outside.
tions of concern, the spill atmosphere.	 Also possible injury to
might occur only outside the other office personnel	 in other areas
propellant lab in ESA 60. depending on the size of the spill and
Large amounts of lJF will be the environmental	 conditions.
released if the LF 2 is a
burned up with water spray. General Public
Because of the remoteness of the hazard:
from where the public would be, there is
little chance that the public ^=I d be
critically injured.	 The incidence of
injury would mor4 or less depend an the
existing environmental	 conditions.
Equipment
Possible extensive damage to all
electronic equipment located in the
facility where	 this spill occurs. 	
l
Facilities
Possible damage to the facility because
of fire and the corrosive action of the
LF2 , HF, and F2 gas.
Iimelines
NO effect on timeline as it is
assumed that the shuttle can be
rescheduled for a backup payload.
"OLDOUT ^
OjUdNAL PA
W u^
1
I
CATSGORIES
Project Persc
V would	 I
lel
cause
ird,
death.
KSC Personnei
jA 60,
	
II
`various	 I possible
be
-e faciI -
itside
to
,eas
I and
General €ublic
iazard	 Ili
sere is
Id be
of
)n the
Eguioment
II possible (ie-
le	 pending on the
amount and cost
lof equipment.
Facilities
II possible, de-
pending on the
cost of repair
of the facility
and surroundinc
area.
Timelines
IV
III possible de-
oending on the
demand for the
facility being
used.
,cause)f the
ON 3 GROUND PROCESSING HAZARD ANALYSIS
_FFiCT^
UTTLE
t',	 :?TIOi15	
tF)	 I	
:^ FACILITIES
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o Same as for above hazards.
	 Project Personnel
	 Project Peronnel
o Assumed that the facility vent,•:tion Possible injury to personnel inside III
systems utilize outside air tha4 is
	 a facility because of toxic gas be
	 II possible
not filtered.	 being drafted into the facility fro
o Assumed that the LF2 tanker truck will outside air.
not be routed past major office areas.
Assumed that back roads will be used.
o Assumed that the oxidizer tanker is
	 KSC Personnel	 K$C Personnel
located on the opposite side of the 	
No significant effect For personnel fIIbuilding from the fuel tanker,	
will be relocated during loading
assumed no snecial provisions are
	 operations, and LF is to be trans-
'.aken to protect the local wild life
	 ported in the evenings when a mini-
or to protect the vegetation at KSC.
	 mal number of personnel are around.
o Assumed LF2
 tanker is brou ght on the
base during office hours and S/C is
filled durin g office hours.
o Assumed that second shift personnel
will be working at some facilities
	
General Public	 General Public
at the Cape.	
Genending on the environment and
size of spill, there it little
i[I
chance of injury to KS-, visitors.
LgUipment
	 Luipment
Possible extensive damage to	 III
electronic equipment in areas of 	 II possible de-
ESA 60 facility that uses outside
	 pending on the
air to ventilate or for air-	 ranner in which
conditioning, and if the equipment the electronic
is not hermetically sealed. equipment is p ro-
tected inside the
facility and in
vans parked out-
side the facility
Facilities
	 IFacilities
III	 III
FTimelines	
iimelines
* And is separated at lease 100
	 I^,,,,, as far present system. 	
1V possiblefeet from ti:
	 Ie building, and
away from the assembly building. 
	
I
COLS b A'SUMPTIONS(11)
o Same as for above hazards.
o The LF2 will only be loaned at a
remote dedicated facility.
o The LF2 truck will be escorted at KS
by security, and road blocks wii' '^e
provided.
o The LF2 truck will be brought in	 t
KSC area only at night after off
hours.
o Filling operations will occur it	 e
late evening after office hours.
o Assure that no personnc' are working
second-shift in areas that are po-
tentially hazardous due to the
environmental co,editions.
o Require that personnel performing
loading operations from the service
truck, wear a protective scape suit.
u Assumed that air inside the facility
it not protected from hazardous
gases outside the facility.
o Assure that all personnel outsid<
facility are properly protected
during loading operations.
n The general public will not be e,	 r
within i mile when the LF 2 truck
the base.
o Assumed that LF2 tanker is routed in
manner such that major damage will n
occur to other KSC facilities (e.g.,
VAB, launch stand, PCF, etc.) as a
result of the hazard occurrence.
WLDO
_1--
	 .^_
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LE SYSTEM
ITIES
":SEE "Y SAFEIV
":?ROLS b ASSUMPTIX6 t£.°IARKS
^P?oject Peronnel o	 Same as for above hazards. This	 hazard is basic to the use of LF2. 	 Operation of
ers q nnel	 inside
LF2 transporters is routine, however, the value of
III
f toxic gas be II possible
o	 The LF;: will only be loaded at a facilities, and of the mission, and personnel	 considera-
he facility fro- remote dedicated facility.
tions led to specific consideration of this hazard.
	 This
class of personnel hazard is routinely accepted at toxic
o	 The LF2 truck will be escorted at KSC test sites, and in industrial locations.
by security, and road blocks will 	 be
provided.
KSC Personnel
o	 The LF2 truck will be bruuyht into the
t for personnel III KSC area only at night after office
ring loading hours.
5	 to be trans-
gs when a mini- o	 Filling operations will	 occur in the
nel	 are around. late evening after office hours.
o	 Assure that no personnel are working
second-shift in areas that are po-
tentially hazardous due to the
environmental conditions.
General Public
lironmer` and o	 Require that personnel performing
is	 little
III loading operations from the service
CSC visitors, truck, wear a protective scape suit.
o	 Assumed that air inside the facility
is not protected from hazardous
gases outside the facility.
guipment o	 Assura that all personnel outside a
usage to III facility are properly protected
An areas of II possible de- during loading operations.
I
uses outside Pending on the
'or air- rinner in which o	 The general	 public will	 not be allowed
the equi pment the electronic within 1 mile when the LF; truck is on
;ealed. equipment is pro- the base.
tected inside the
faci l ity and in o	 Assumed that LF, tanker is routed in e.
vans parked out- manner such that major damage will not
side	 the facility occur to other KSC facilities	 (e.g.,
VAB,	 launch stand, PCF,	 etc.) as a
(fFacilities result of the hazard occurrence.
IIIt
i ii iel i nes
stem. IV
III	 possible
A-45
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TASK N0.	 f	 OPERA!IGNS	 FWZARDS	 I	 OF aaZA3.+	 I
LIKELIHOOD ?F
!PZA'J tA,.ES
	
i	 _	 _^	 -?EM is;^
ITEM "FUZZ leak in S/C LF .. Tank" o	 Mishandling Credible
	 (ASSUMED)	 " PROJECT PERSONNEL.
^n	
cover of ththe environmentalSee item	 for further de-'9 This Wizard is assumed
TASK NO. scription of the "fuzz leak" o	 Leakage of propellant credible due to is removed in the PCF,	 if the syst
1-18 Install	 S/C in PCF containment system. excessive movement.
	 It	 ;
not been adequately purged, person
fixture could result from droppinc handling the S/C may be gased when
This operation consist the loaded system. environmental enclosure is removed
of the fullorring sub- longer the loaded S/C remains	 in
operations: enclosure,	 the greater the ri
•	 Transport propellent
I
loaded S/C in the "S/C
Transporter" to the
launch pad.	 The S/C
is transported to the
launch pad in the verti K5C Personnel
cal position with an No effect	 ecause of the size ci 	 t
environmental enclosure
around the S/C. General	 Public
No effect because of the size	 t
•	 The S/C and its
environmental enclosure Equipment
is then hoisted by an Possible damage to the electrori-
overhead crane and the PCF.	 Amount of damage depends
positioned over the PCF. well	 the system is Purged before
Personnel then use guy- the enclosure and the cost of elec
lines to guide S/C and equipment in the PCF.	 Microelect
enclosure as they are central circuits can he damaged wi
being lowered into the concentration of F 2 of less than	 .
PCF.
Faci 1
•	 The S/C environmental No significant effect on the facil
nclasure is then remov because of the size of the leak.
d from the S/C and the
CF.
The S/C is then mated
o the PCF handling Timelines
fixture. Because there is a leak the corre
action will be to remove the S/C
the facility and this will 	 cause
delay in the schedules.	 The leak
then he repaired, and then the to
`
M^
will	 then be reinstalled.
FOLDOUT FRANQ^ I
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SAFE
r	
F	 ^. °PR E.30i" S AFETY C^',TR^Li ^L'IF'TEn"'5 TITTLE	 SYSTE.'	
J
i	 s ASSU'4 p
	i
LATEGOP,fES	 ^ T A'1U kSWt DTXIS	 i8^ t	 +:'^	 FACILITIES	 f9}	 'Ffl{'''	 i Il)
cover	 the S/Cof
PROJECT P_ERSONNEI
III
•	 Assumed that the S/C is ccatinousl y PROJECT oFrSONNEL	 iPROJECT PERSONNEL •	 No personnel except autho
orotected by an environmental enclosure No Effect	 TV personnel are allowed around
if the system has II	 possible
is
from many external hazards S/C.
-ged,	 personnel if the environ-
s Based when the mental enclosure Assume project personnel are the or•l y •	 Project personnel working,
is removed.
	 The is not adenuately ones allowed in the area during handlin loaded S/C must wear appropr
•emains in the purged and person of the S/C. suits.
the risk. nel	 can't qet
away.	 Also •	 Assume project personnel are not wear- •	 An F^	 detector must h	 a
depends on the ing scape suits. -useable beu— the transpor
amount of gas mental	 :	 r can he removed.
leaked. •	 Minimize the time that the S/C remains ' mustdetect-	 be capable of
in the enclosure. dete—ing F,,	 and HF vapors.
KSC Personnel F.0 Personnel	 iKSC Personnel 1.Oppm concentration.
re	 size of the	 leak. IV •	 Assumed that the Cargo Bav doors of Flo Effect	 IY
the Orbiter are closed while handling •	 A means must be provided
General	 Public S/C in PCF and that doors to the Orbiter General	 Public
	 General	 Public
I
F	 vapor concentration insi
re	 size of the	 leak. IV are opened ,just before p lacing the S/C Ao	 feEfct	 IV environmental cover hefore t
in	 the Orbitnr. I moved.	 The vapor concentrat
E^cui^rrent
'Equipment checked after purging in the
electronic EGSE	 in ITI •	 Repair of the loaded S/C is not Feuiorient
	
I	 III (TBD PPM)	 is detected the `_'
rage depends on how II	 possible allowed on the pad.	 The S/C must he Possible damane to electronic con-	 11 possible removed from the PCF and tra
led before removing depending on taken back to a safe area before a re pair trol	 circuits if "fuzz leak" occurs 	 if S/C with "Fuzz a safe area; then the S/C I.S.
:ost of electronic adequacy of purge can be made. in the PCF after the environmental 	 leak" remains in repaired.	 )i+^
Microelectronic and cost of e q uip enclosure is removed and the S/C 	 the PCF for an
damaged with ment in the PCF. o	 The spacecraft should be stabilized remains in the PCF too long .	 excessive amount •	 The Fz	 vapor concept
less	 than .Ippm, in tht PCF prior to connection of the of timt after cover must be measured he 	 e
PCF and orbiter. leak occurs. the S/C to the PCF.Facili ty
'ac'	 'L
	 Fa	 1111:
in	 the facility IV No significant effect on the	 IV •	 If excessive concentr,-	 n
the leak. facili ty because of the size of the vapors are detected befors na
' leak. S/C must be transported tack
area and repaired.
•	 Provide adequate assurance
the corrective Timelines Timeliness	 Timeline;
above p rocedures are adherred
have O.C.	 assure that qpf-
e the S/C from III Sam— a as 	 "present" hazard
III-	 same
pertgrmed.)
ill	 cause a small II	 possible effects.
The
	 leak will depending on the as for "present" Continuously monitor t— i s
hen the loaded S/C difficulty of hazard effects. detector to assur= "fuzz leak
d. stooping the leak I exist.	 If leak occurs wh;l,
The orbiter remove the S/C from the 7t
launch would be area and repair the S/C.
in a	 hold posi-
tion	 until	 this
problem is cor-
rected.
iYSiE1f
!PRO,IECi PERSONNEL
iKSC Personnel
IVI
General Public
IV
!Equipment
!	 III
II possih.le
if S/C with "Fuzz
leak" remains in
the PCF for an
excessive amount
of time after
leak occurs.
Facility
V
Ironic con-
eak" occurs
lironmental
the S/C
onu.
the
size of the
ETimelines
zard	 IIIII - same
as for "present"
hazard effects.
i
I
Hazards coEnparable to N204,
To insure timeline recovery a backup
,)ropulsion system would be desireable.
L _ I	 iowww
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• No personnel except authorized Project
personnel are allowed around the loaded
S/C.
• Project personnel working around
loaded S/C must wear appropriate scape
suits.
An F7 detector must be available and
useable before the transport, environ-
mental cover can he removed. The
detector must be capable of reliably
detecting F,
-
and  14F vapors at less than
l.Oppm concentration.
v A means must be provided to detect the
F 2 vapor concentration inside the
environmental cover hefore the cover is
moved. The vapor concentration must be
checked after purg ing in the PCF. If
(Tf1R PPM) is detected the S/C must he
removed from the PCF and transported to
a safe area; then the S/C is to be
repaired.
• The Fz vapor concentration in the
cover must be measured before hoisting
the S/C to the PCF.
a If excessive concentration of F2
vapors are detected before hoisting, the
S/C must be transported back to a safe
area and repaired.
Provide adeq uate assurance that the
above procedures are adherred to (e.a..
have Q.C. assure that operations are
performed.)
a Co — inuously monitor tanks with
detector to assure "fuzz leak" doesn't
exist. If leak occurs while in the PCF
remove the S/C from the PCF to a safe
area and repair the S/C.
PEMARKS
i1?1
A-4G
OPTI
I1EIII PRIMARY ,,AJOR CW)HES LIKEL:"C-30 U •-r LARD E} F E0S L. "!'!.FE_SEN7
TASK XD. OPERATIY6 HAZARDS OF HAZARDS HAZARD	 C:'.SE5 ""Lc SYSTEM AND F;^'L'.TIE`.
(1)	
1
(2) '3) _ ' d ), (5) (6)
ITEM "One inch equivalent leak". External	 hazards	 (e.q. Improbable PROJECT PERSONNEL
—66 T e grope	 ant tan	
"I
mechanical damage) for An event of this type Possible major injury or death depending
TASK Same as for Item 5. probably be at about "o" other causes and their would be associated on the action taken by personnel	 in the
T T$ Install	 SC in PCF PSIG unless cool Gown capab- ch—tces of occurance. with a severe impact area.
fixture. ility has been lost which is to the tank and should
not very probable. be precluded by the
procedures established.
Assume that the leak occurs
after the environmental
shroud is removed because
the most probable cause of
the leak is external damage
Once spill	 starts,a fire h,SC Personnel
will probably result and Depending on the envi M Mental cqndi , 	m
continually be fed by the the F. gas and HF gas eminating froi 	 e
following LF2 .	 .	 The burning 'Facility may cause 	 injury tc
corrosive and toxic gas will personnel aL the launch pad.
be also evaporatin g while
leaking.	 In a very short
time probably 2-3 seconds
an asphyxiating environment
will	 exist.	 If the hydra-
zine tank springs a leak as General	 Public
a result of the fire, a Same as for KSC personnel	 if the public
major fire will
	 result. is tourinq any of the KSC faciTities
Typically 1,000 pounds of near the luanch pad.
L F2	 could be leaked in a
relatively short period of
time.
_gujp ent
May damage exposed electrical eluiiment
in the area.	 Also the shuttle cargo
bay door may be damaged due to the fire
in	 the	 ;CF.
acili.'
Possible damage to the PCF because
of the fire and free Fz and HF gas.
Timelines
Major impact on the tineline because of
the possible destruction of the PCF and
possible major damage to cargo bay dc,rs
Also major impact because of the
requirement for all non-project persc^me
leave the pad while these operations are
on.
)OU`}	 ORIGINAL PAGE IS
GF POOR QUALITY
r.
pending
in the
nditions'
rom the
to
public
ies
ii pment
rgo
e fire
tse of
:F and
doors.
,rsonnel
ins are
PROJECT PERSONNEL @ Assur<ke there is not a water spray
II	 system available in the PCF.
I possible
dependina on the • Assume there is no propellant drain
difficulty of	 in the PCF.
escaping after
leak occurs or	 • Assumed that detanking capabilit y is
the delay that
	 not available in the PCF.
personnel may
take before
	 • Assume the PCF is not designed to he
escaping.	 fire resistant.
€ POJECT PFRSONNEL
rP nTia- o`n-'ly
 —minor injury to
persnnneT if they are properly
suited.
KSC Personnc.
II
r	 Assume the shut-.le orbiter bay doors
are closer' while mating the S/C to the
KSC Personnel
No effect	 ce only operating
KSC Personnel
IV
1 possible,	 den- PCF fixture, personnel will be there.
ending on the
environmental a	 Assumed that the S/C is in an
conditions.	 A environmental	 enclosure durin g all
fog exists,
	 the op erations of Task 1-18 except when
F, gas may be heinq maters to the PCF fixture.
more hazardous.
t	 Assv,e,scane suits are available but ,eneral Public
General Public not normally worn durinq Tusk T-18. o e
	 ec	 or all nas eminating
from the spill will
	 he contained.
General
	
Public
IlI
IV
II	 p ossible, o	 Assume that a portable dry chemical
depending on the fire extinnuisher
	 is availatle.
environmental
conditions. a	 Assume that an escape route is
available to the PCF.
Equipment Eauiamen.t Equipment
1I @	 Assume that the spilled LF•,	 cannot FFo—e-TTFEl: for all e qui pment if IV
possible be drainer' out of the PCF.	 It is assumed properly isolated from the hazard,
becr;use of ooten- that in general, the PCF is not designed
tial damage to snecificasly, to handle payloads loaded
the shuttle with orrnnllent.
beralJSe of fire
i,i	 the "CF if Assumed that the p ressure vessel	 is
the PCF cannot encloser'vith an environmental enclosure.
be moved away
fast enough to a	 Assumed that only necessary project
protect the personnel are allowed not the stand and
shuttle cargo pad during the handlinn o-F a loaded S/C_
b 2 v doors from
damege. Assumed that the PCF can he moved away
from the Shuttle if a fire occur_ in the
PCF.
!acilities
Facilities Facilities III
II - maximum tlinor damage due to stray nas and
assured damage Lf, not contained by the hazard
potential	 to the control	 system.
PCF TimelinesTimelines ------
Timelines Ther—^T be some impact on the
II 3T timeline because the S/C will 1•e
probably g reater severely damaned and will have to
then 3 day delay . he removed from the facility.
Also the PCF will have to be
refurbished before it can he used
anain.
, PTION 3 GROUND PROCESSING HAZARD ANALYSIS
..PP,-5E1, :
	
PIS,;	 -5C1;7 SA FETY C00KT 'L$
	
CATEGJRI	 -	 %:'EU ASSI.VSPTIONS {8^
=3 EFFEL _ i1,:
5NOTTLE SYSTEM
FASILITIES	 .
"'^GORv
Ilt,1F:ED"
SYSTE" rl(
"31:FCEil' SAFET'i
CONTF5L. 8 ASSUMPTIONS
;113
o Protection from impacts
o Assume that a LFa compatible
ventilation system is available in the
PCF to vent out vapor from a F;, spill.
o Provide a detanking capability for
LFz while initially mated to the PCF
handling fixture.
o Assume that electronic equipment
is isolated from the environment
where Fz or HF gas may exist.
o Assume that cargo bay doors of
orbiter are closed during this
operation.
o Assume that the PCF can be remove
away from the orbiter in case of a
spill.
o Assume that the PCF is basically
designed with fire resistant materials
on the interior surfaces.
o Assume that project personnel wear.
the LF, compatible scape suits while
handling the S/C.
o Allow only project personnel on t^
stand during Task 1-18 operation.
o Assume that detection and alarm a ?
available to detect and sound an ale.
upon initial indication of a leak.
o Assume that a portable day chemical
(SODA ASH) fire extinguishing syste'i
is available.
o Do not allow the pouring of large
quantities of water on the LFz spill.
If water is used, only use a fine we'.
spray. Large amounts of water may
cause explosion.
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1Pi ;11) (12)
PROJECT PERSONNEL o	 Protection from impacts ( 1 )	 The shuttle orbiter is considered under the category of
Jury to equipment and not facilities.II1
)roperly o	 Assume that a LFZ compatible
ventilation system is available in the (2)	 The worst case category for the timeline is a category II.
PCF to vent out vapor from a F Z spill.
(3)	 Oxidizer ventilation systems were considered for the PCF,
o	 Provide a detanking capability for however since the major hazard is during crane operation,
LF, while initially mated to the PCF when the S/C is outdoors, this complication seems excessive.
handling fixture.
o	 Assume that electronic equipment
is isolated from the environment
KSC Personnel where F, or HF gas may exist.
)erating IV
o	 Assume that cargo bay doors of
orbiter are closed during this
operation.
o	 Assume that the PCF can be removed
away from the orbiter in case of a
spill.
aminating
o	 Assume that the PCF is basically
General	 Public designed with fire resistant materials
contained. IV on the interior surfaces.
t
o	 Assume that project personnel wear
the LF., compatible scape suits while
handling the S/C.
Equipment o	 Allots only project personnel on 	 the
invent if
the hazard,
IV stand during Task 1-18 operation.
o	 Assume that detection and alarm are
available to detect and sound an alarm
upon initial
	 indication of a	 leak.
o	 Assume that a portable day chemical
(SODA ASH)
	 fire extinguishing system
is	 available.
o	 Do not allow the pouring of large
quantities of water on the LF, spill.
If water is used, only use a fine water
spray.	 Large amounts of water may
cause explosion.
Facilities
ay aas and III
e hazard
imelines
ct on the
C will he
11 have to
ility.
to be
an he used
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ITEM
TASK NO.
(1)
ITEM
7
TASK NO,
1-14
OPERATIONS
,2)
"Install S/C into the
Orbiter and mate to
the IUS/TUG."
This task consists of
the following sub-
operations:
• The Orbiter cargo
bay doors are opener'
(T -35 hrs.).
• The S/C is raised to
the right height
(see Figure	 ) in
the PCF payload
handling fixture.
• The S/C is then in-
serted into the
cargo bay of the
Orbiter by travers-
ing the S/C horizon-
tally through the
PCF to the Orbiter.
• The S/C is then
lowered and mated to
the IUS/TUG.
4 Connect LN2 coup-
ling. Install
P,TG (T -27 hrs.).
a Cl ,)se cargo bay
doors (T -22 hrs.).
a Payload readiness
test (T -15 hrs.).
• Clear pad (T -10 hrs)
* Servicing of Orbiter
and IUS with propel-
lents (T ­5 hrs.).
• Open pad (T -6 hrs.).
a Service Cisi:ornect.
• Retract Payload
Changeout Facility
(T ­2 hrs.).
• Clear pad (T ­1 hrs
• Countdown
• Liftoff (T -O)
PRIMARY
HAZARDS
!3)
"Fuzz leak in the S/C tank"
The description of hazard
is the same as for Item S.
MAJOR LAUSES
OF HAZARDS
(4)
see Item 5 for causes of
the hazard.
LIKELIr+CJJ (;
HAZARD CAUSES
(5)
Credible (or
improbable). This
hazard is assumed
credible to ensure pre-
cautions will be man-
dated. It would appear
much le gs likely than
Item 5 which involves
a crane operation.
LrFc4=5 .
(STEM
(6;
Project Personnel
Because the leak is scoi,, J
, e
detect by smell before it be
ardous to personnel. It is
the S/C will be in the PCF o
only for a short period of 
leE is detected, see note
KSC Personnel
No effect because of the	 .
leak.
reneral Public
No effect because of the 
leak.
Equipment
Same as for Item S. See 
Facility
No significant effect on u;e
because of the size of the 1
Timeline
Same as for Item 5. The imp
timeline is greater for 1"[TI
there are more operations
performed to remove the
facility from the Orbitei
occurs.
Facilities
Same as for Item (6)
Timeline
Major impact an the time':
possib'.• damage to the PC'
Orbiter.
M1lso a 1-sser impact on ti
;sere
	
a hold of the Orbit
^r • .00 long.
UT FRAM4 /
Pmall, personnel will
: •e it becomes haz-
It is assumed that
--he PCF or the Orbiter
period of time if this
see note !D.
IV
i of the size of the
a of the size of the
See note (`5)
Ffect on the facility
ize of the leak.
5. fhe impact on the
ter for Item 7 because
aerations that must be
3ve the SIC to a safe
a Orbiter if a leak
KSC Personnel
1V
General Public
IV
Equipment
III
II-Po!sible, de-
pendirq on the
ventilation rate
and the time it
takes to remove
the SIC.
Facility
TV
Timeline
III
II-Possible, same
as for Item 5.
'"tGJ31'	 j
=)EO";.FY4OG'IFi£D"	 1 S
r:STc.°. 
110 )
-	
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Project Personnel • It is assumed that	 t
IV
dump capability for
being traversed acro
Orbiter cargo bay.
• Same safety controls'
• Assume that an effec
F 2 detector will aut
F2 vapors from the L
KSC Personnel
occurs.	 Also assume
IV required to operate
• Assume that the Orbi
be adequately purged
5eneral
	 Public are allc-wed to enter
IV occurs.
Equipment
III
I1-Possible, same
as for Item 5.
F;zilities
III
(6)
Facilities
Same as for Item 6
Facilities
II -
maximum assume(
damage potent-
ia l
 *.o the PCF.
iFeline Timeline
Timeline
_—FF
;he timeline because of
:o the PCF and the
fact on the timeline if
of the Orbiter at the pad
Poss i ble sinnificant imnact on the
timeline due to the need to
refurbish the PCF and the Orbiter.
Also an :mnact if there is a "hold
for the Orbiter. The SIC LF tank
would p rohably have to be cooled
down anain before launch to orovide
greater assurance during orbit that
won't be an aver pressurization of
the SIC LF
k' LDO U ten ly E
^H-tr1.G_ .. _
OPTION 3 GROUND PROCESSING HAZARD ANALYSIS
r	 -ECTS 'J i
"K ^	 ii" SHUTTLE SYSTEM
;+'4D FACILITIES (4
Project Personnel
• It is assumed that there is no dump 	 No effect
capability for SIC propellents while
traversing the S/C across the PCF
into the Orbiter cargo bay.
a Assume the same safety controls for
the PCF, personnel	 and equipment are
the same as for Item 5. CC Personnel
• An adequate mechanical 	 Fp leak
No efttct
detector is not available.
• ssume there is sufficient time for
-iersonnel	 to put on "scape suits" General	 Public
before the atmosphere becomes haz-
`In effect
ardous.
s Assume there is a Fz leak detector
available in the cargo bay after the Suipment
cargo bay doors are closed. Same as for Item 5.
Facility
No effect
Timeline
Same as for Item S.
-:1D FAC11I T I :S	 I	 P.ISK	 '! RESPIT" SAFETY CON IRX
CATEGORIES (7)
	
AND ASSI.WTIONS (61
Facility
IV
Timeline
III
II-Same as for
Item 5.
REMARKS
(12)
1 10
	 IOS/TEIG was installed in the Orbiter cargo bay in the
 OPF prior to transporting the orbiter to the laun--h pad.
2Q  Assumed the nropjlsion module in the S/C does not have an
enclosure d:.-irg `nese operations.
It is assumed that if a "fuzz leak" is noted at any time
prior to launch, the S/C will be removed from the Orbiter
or PCF and taken to a safe location for repair.
® It is assumed that all electronic equipment exposed to the
possible F2 vapors in the Orbiter cargo bay are hermetically
sealed.
Q Assumed that it is very unlikely tnat a "fuzz leak" will
progress into a "une inch equiv. leak" in the time span
considered and the operations considered for Item No. 7.
„r -Y SAFEIY
WN- RCLS 8 ASSUMPTIONS
(11)
• It is assumed that there is not a
dump capability for the S/C while
being traversed across the PCF to the
Orbiter cargo bay.
• Same safety controls as in Item 5.
• Assume that an effective and reliable
F 2 detector will automatically detect
F2 vapors from the LF2 tank if a leak
occurs. Also assume that a man is not
required to operate the detector.
• Assume that the Orbiter cargo bay may
be adequately purged before personnel
are allowed to enter after a leak
occurs.
Is
1
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Project Personnel
IV
KSC Personnel
IV
General
	 Public
IV
Equipment
III
II-Possible, same
as for Item 5.
Facility
IV
Timeline
III
lI-Same as	 for
Item 5.
j F:_ilities
III
f
I
t Timeli ne
act on the
II)
to I
B
	 Orbiter. i
is	 a "hold
U tank
e cooled
to nrnvide
orbit that j
ization of !
A-48
foLDcO sr I-RA.ME )
ITEM	
i
TASK I.O.	 OPERATIG85
(2)
PRIMARY
HAZARDS
(3)
MAJOR CAUS=_
OF HAZARD,
(4)
KELIHOOD OF	
_C	 _
H.AZAdp CAUSES
(5)
ITEM Sage as
	
for Item 7 "One-inch equivalent leak • External hazards that can 'mprohable
Project Personnel.
8 from the S/C tank when under cause damage to the S/C If leak occurs be
very low pressure." tank. bay doors there i
TASK NO•
See Item	 5	 for additional oOther hazards identified
severe injury to
death.	 An asphyx1-19
description of the hazard. by a hazard analysis of FZ gas will occur
the CDR 5/C design,
	 final seconds) after th
operations concepts,
a fire will also
final	 Orbiter design and
IUS/TUG design. KSC Personnel
*The IUS/TUG becomes a major Same as for ITEM
hazard to the S/C LF2 tank additional	 danger
after the 1US/TUG is
occurs after the
serviced with propellants
closed and the	 T'l
li
I and tanks are pressurized. are serviced.
•	 The chance of an LF
leak occurring after
being	 installed in the
Orbiter and mated to
the IUS/TUG is much general Public
less than the chance ol Same as for ITUI
the incident occurring HF hazard.
before the mating of
the S/C to the IUS/TUG.
The chance of the spill
occurring during this
phase appears to be Eoui meat
directly proportional ea	 occurs in
to the S/C hydrazine carg o bay doors a
tank or the high pres- the same as fo g	It
sure vessels on the
III/TUG exploding and If the
	
leak occ .	 s
causing damage to the the cargo bay door
LF	 tank, or any bat- IUS/TUG and the o
teries ex p loding. results will	 proha
z It should also be the sense that a 1
considered that if an will	 probably occu
extensive hold occurs,!
I Ii the LF2 tank may over-
' I pressurize due to loss
I
of cooldown.
t{
i
OPTION 3 GROUND PROCESSING HAZARD ANALYSIS
'PR'_,:EN7"	
!7PiARD EFFECTS O
mODIFIED" SHUTTLE
I	 RISK	 I	 E S 1.'	 LT" MIT.:	
SYSTEM
D FACI
N
L1T7ES	
.7	 L*-? T I ONS	 AN" FACILITIESIEJEGORIE S 1 9) TEX[	 ,	 Ii c,
eject Personnel ) Project Personnel •	 Assumed that project personnel are not Project Personnel 	 Proje ct Personnel • 	 Sane
Iileak occurs before closing of the cargo ^.,earinc scape suits during handling of Possible injury only if scaDe	 III
doors there is a possibility of 1	 possible the S/t in the PCF or when installing the suit is not adequate.
•	 see n
, ere injury to personnel	 and possibly RTG on the S/C in the Orbiter carno ha.v.
•	 Pro 
ith.
	
An asphyxiating environment of
•	 Assumed that there is no means to providedgas will occur almost immediately
	
(2-3
I	 after the leak occurs.	 Also.onds) control the leak once it occurs except
transve
'ire will also probably occur.
that if the leak occurs before the and - ! 1
Orbiter cargo bay doors are closed
Personnel KSC Personnel the PCF may be rolled ou l,	 ,-' the way to KSC Personnel	
KSC Personnel
I V
•	 1*	 S
cluarnp
	 CapMinimize damage tc the Orhiter.
ie as for ITEM (6).	 There	 is an 11 orovided
Jitional danger to ' Dersonnel	 if leak possible •	 It is assumed that no emergenc
.
v dump IUS/TLIG
-urs after the carg o bay doors are capability is provided.
)sed and the IUS/TUG and the Orbiter •	 1-	 s
serviced. •	 See note 6.	 I wil.	 "r
•	 it	 is
l if
be prot
it oc
•
	 ^
feral	 Public General	 Public
General	 Public(-,-neral	 Public
will
LF2	 LU;!Ip
ie as for ITEM (6) because of the F 2 and III Sane as for item (6) because of
bay 
the 
doo
ite
hazard, 11	 possible, the F 2	and HF hazard.
dependinn on the •	 See
environmental
conditions. •	 Assu
ti mome nt Equipment Eauipment	 Enui
is	 avail
Orbiter
e,k occurs in the PCF before the 11	 if leak same as for item F before the pay- the !J')
rgo bay doors are open, the effects are occurs in PCF. load bav doors are onen. 	 After	 1 1	 11 possible
! same as for Item 6, Col.	 6 "EQUIP." I	 if	 lea!: the cargo bay doors are closed and	 depending on the
occurs in the a leak occurs, there will	 be some	 effectiveness of
the leak occurs in the cargo hay after Orbiter. damane to the Orbiter and the 	 the shroud
tha*	 I	 and the? cargo bay doors are closed and the nayload stack, to the extent	 system
3/TUG and the orbitor are serviced the the mission will	 have to be	 length of time
cancelled and the Orbiter will ha4 it takes to
J
cults will probably be catastrophic, 	 in
? sense that a large fire and explosion to he refurbished.	 It is Drobable !: ventilate or
11	 probably occur in the cargo bay. that the LFz will not be contained ; purge the cargo
when the spill	 occurs.	 This will	 ibay.
create a toxic and very corrosive
atmosphere in the Orbiter cargo
bay.
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E SYSTEM	 I	 :SJDIF:ci' '	
_& 55UMPTIONS	 I	 REV1ARKS
	
, g)	 I	 -rE•^ (10 1  I	 (11)	 1	 (12)
if scaoe
Project Personne ls Same safety controls as for item 6.
III
v see note 4.
l) It is assumed that "project personnel" will leave the p,d
and not return before the Orbiter, IUS/TUG is serviced.
Enuipment
!fnre the pay
	 III
en. After 1, II possible
re closed ands deoendino on the
will be some 'I effectiveness of
and the
	 4 the shroud
extent that 'system and the
to be
	 • length of time
iter will ha4 it takes to
t is probable'; ventilate or
be contained ! purge the cargo
This will ;bay.
ry corrosive
iter cargo
1
because of
")It is assumed that there is cool down capability before
and after the payload bay doors are closed. With 20 hour
leeway before loss-of-cool -down would be the cause of a
.Hazard.
I(3) The Orbiter is considered part of the equipment category.
i
1(4) It is assumed that a rapid means of escape is provided for
the Orbiter crew if a major hazard occurs in the Orbiter cargo
bay.
^(5) The worst case category for the timeiine is a category II.
(6) The availability and use of a standard fire protection
system is not sufficient to control the hazard or lower the
hazard .:ategory after Orbiter and IUS/TUG propellents are
^loaded.
'7) It is assumed that there is not a leak of fuel on the
existence of fuel vapors around the /C at the time the LF
laak hazard occurs.
(8) It is assumed that personnel will not Le allowed to erter
he cargo bay after the cargo bay doors are closed; therefore
he availability of a portable fire extinguishing system will
ne of no h?la to control the hazard.
KSC Personnel
IV
General Public
IV
a Propellant dump capability is not
Provided during the time the S/C is
transversed into the orbitor cargo bay
and mated to the ]US/TUG.
• It is assumed that on "automatic"
dump capability for the LF tank is
provided while the S/C is mated to the
IUS/TUG in the orbitor cargo bay.
• It is assumed that the shroud system
will provide some degree of containment.
a It is assumed that the !US/TUG will
be protected from a low pressure spill
if it occurs by the shroud.
• Assume that the Orbiter cargo bay
will be adequately ventilated into an
LF2 compatible system before the cargo
bay doors can be opened for repair of
the items.
• See note 8.
• Assume that an extinguishing system
is available to put out fire in the
Orbiter and the PCF that resulted from
the LF2 leak.
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APPENDIX 9
FLIGHT HAZARD ANALYSIS
1.	 INTRODUCTION
This appendix contains the Mariner/Oxidizer/Shuttle Orbiter primary
and secondary Hazard Analysis for Tasks 5 and 6, and from part of the basis
for those tasks.
The general approach used in this task was to (l) define the mis-
sion operational sequence, (2) define system characteristics, (3) perform
the hazard analysis and postulate corrective actions and hardware, and
(4) compare alternative system options in view of the hazard analysis.
This hazard analysis is based on the foundational data and mission
operations described in Section 4.5.1, Task 6. That section should be
read before this appendix.
The "hazard analysis" format used is very similar to the hazard
analysis described in Section 4.1 of this report, although in this task
^.^	 two slightly different hazard analysis formats were used. The first format
was used to analyze the "primary hazards" that exist or may exist, when
launching the Mariner spacecraft and the IUS/TUG when using LF 2 and N204
during normal mission operations (includes Orbiter abort operations) and
the abnormal operations that may occur during an unplanned extended mis-
sion and other conditions.
The second type of hazard analysis format was used to analyze
secondary hazards that exist or may exist during off-load of the oxidizer
during launch, orbital, and abort conditions. From the primary and
secondary hazard analyses the information needed to answer the Task 6 is
derived.
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Same as for nneration I,
Mission Phase 1, extent
nossibl y a little less
likelv to occur,
items, 1, 3, 5
Same as for Operation I,
Ilission Phase 1, except
nossibly a little less
likely to occur.
r
r
_T
OPE RAT IGtI;'
	 I	 {A,IOR CAUSES nF HAZAkr)S
	 LIY.ELIHOOD OF HAZARDMISSION	 OPERATIONS	 PRIMARY HAZARDS	 (d}	 CAUSESP	 (5}HASE(1)
	 (2)	 (3)
FLIG
HAZARD EFFECTS ON SHUTTLE
ORBITER
(6)
1. Normal	 vibration and Incredible
shock to the navload ORBITER
and hi gh acceleration (Current Effects)forces.
2. Undetected leak which Improbable
0 Minor corrosion to orbiter.
o Possible reaction 	 Pith moisture in ca
occurred durinq nround
one rations. bay, air or purge gas which will Meld
Tmnrohable
corrosive HF gas.
	 This gas will	 cause
3.	 External
	 hazards to the very little corrosion because of the
navload:	 ruoturino of of the leak.
pressure vessels,
	 fire,
hazards to P/L from tu g F (Delayed Effects)
orbiter.
o Monitor corrosion to orbiter.
4.	 Ca p illary Lea,	 through Improbable o The extent of corrosion depends on
the tank and shell for corrective	 action taken	 (e.g., was
an y
 of several causes the payload deployed or was the
internal to the LF2 propellant dumped.
system.
?.	 nver oressurization of irprcbdble
LF, tank and from He tank
]TER PERSONNEL
i Current Effects)
Vo impact on cr-!e+ during the boost Dhase
For all	 the c rein is in the crew cabin
ahic;i is isolated from the pa- load bay
the airlock.
(Delayed Effect)
Yo impact on the crew during later Dhas
of Ltie mission unless a man is required
center Vie pay load bay during an erergen
(Unlikely event).	 See	 for additionaII
effects.
I , Normal Operations
	 1' Fuzz Leak from the outer
1) Liftoff of orbiter to
	
shell (the shell contain
SRM Separation (T-0 to
	
liquid from the Drimary
t = 2.03 min)
	
tank) of the LF2
 tank.
2) Intermediate leak throun
the orimar y tank wall
and the outer leak-oro-
tection shell.
A secondary hazard is
destruction of the orbi-
ter dump
 system because
LF is incompatible with
th2  dump s ystem. (Refer
to Level II Analysis)
Burn throunh or leakinn
F. gas from an inade-
gUate LF2 dump
 system
when the LF is dumped.
(Refer to LRevel ]I
Analysis)
ORIGINAL PAGE
OF POOR QUALT
ORBITER
(Current Effects)
Same as for Operation I, Missi.
Phase 1, except tie corrosion and
chance of fire is greater. Also
fire hazard wuuld tee greater if t
are fuel vapors in the cargo bay a
the same time. The chance of a hi t
order explosion is low because the
F vaoor is hyoergolic wit`: the po^
t9otial fuel vapors.
(Dtta ed Effects1
See secondary hazard analysis.•
ORBITER PERS(,',14EL
Current Effects
Yo impact on the crew during !ii SS
Phase 1.
(Delaved Effects)
Possible injury to personnel lat^r
on in the mission I', personnel we
required to enter the car go bay du
to an emergency; e.g., for sorv,
reason the oayload cannot be deplo
automaticall y but must b? Oeployed
manually.
ILIGHT PRIMARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK S AND 6
SHUTTLE/1AR1NER BASELINE SYSTEM I	 SHUTTLE/MARINER PERFERRED SYSTEM
.E RISK CATEGORIES '	 SAFETY CONTROLS AND ASSUHPTIONS
,	
`
HAZARD EFFECTS 011 SHUTTLE
	
RISK CATEGORY SAFETY CONTROLS & ASSUMPTIONS
(7) I ORBITER	 (10) (11)(B)
o S/C design is that assumed in Fioure OkOITER
o Same controls a^ in Column 8.
n
ca
o The oases in the orbiter cargo bay are Current Effects) IV
[II continuously vented dur.nn boost o The comolete S/C is covered with a It
operations. No effect on the orbiter if an shroud which iso:ates possible gases
n
th
o Prior to boost, the cargo bay is purged effective shroud is designed. from the orbiter. Sh
-e inie
 cargo
wi th Fl 	 Gas.
o The shuttle crew area is isolatad from (Delayed Effects) lt.ay the carno bay area durinn buost via zn lie effect on the orbiter if an IV duill	 cause
of the ,ize
airlock. effective shroud is designee
o The LF
	 tank has a fluorine compatible2droundsheli	 it to contain any "fuzz n
leaks"	 or	 intermediate leaks." a
o The time the orbiter i% exnoseu to a
II1 fuzz leak will	 be small.	 If a fuzz
ds on leak occurs, the shuttle should
'ea 
s continue to orbit then oroceed to the
he orbital	 leak nrocedure (TBD). ORBITER PERSONNEL
o The S/C mission may or may not be Current Effects IV
:ancelled.
No impact on orbiter nersonnel.
Same reason as for the base lino
design,
IV
(Delayed Effects)
No effect on orbiter IVpat phase. personnel 
cabin
load ba y by
ter phas es
r
re quired to !
i emergency.
ldditional
I
!{
III Same as for nneration I, 4ission Phase ORBITER Same as for O peration I, <lission Phase
1. (Current Effects) I above.
lission
[1	 possible
	 if
there is
	 fuel If an	 intermediate leak occurs, the
Normally there is no effect on the V	 -	 II	 pcssr The shroud is desi gned to be resistant
ion and
a
vapor or esent in shuttle orbiter should continue to Orbiter but if the comp lete shroud ble, because of to F 2 .corrosion.
Also the the carno bay. orbit.	 The	 mission should he fails to relieve internal 
pressures cast of damage The shroud is designed to prevent
,er if there
The
cancelled.	 The orbital leak Wrote- n t he event the LF 2 tank leak to orbiter. a high concentration of F,	 va pors	 'r.:
'go bay at dure (dumn or deolov) should he insti- occurs, a leak through the shroud escaping into the carno b y.
of a hinh L•ted, may occur and allow Was to leak
a use t hehe Assumed the normal orbiter hynernolicor h
into the Orbiter cargo ba y which The shroud must also be vented to tie
ba y to Ah the dumn s ystem is nand for	 nn the could cause corrosion. I	 outside of the orbiter cargobuild	 inside the(Oelaved Effects) prevent p ressure	 uoLF2.
shroud.
See secondary
The earliest time possible to onen If the leak occurred during this II Assumed that an LF 2 com^acible dume is
talc.	 hazard analysis the. carno bay doors is T = 2 minutes.
nhase (Boost) and was allowed to
provided.
continue, the shroud may he over
pressurized and cause damage to the Qr e the leak is detected, the LF2 may
orbiter but not completely disable be dumped.
IV it. Personnel not allowed in the cargo space
ORBITER PERSMJJEL in any phase of flight when there is a
'lissionrig
(Current	 Bets leak in the LF2 tank.
'lo impact to orbiter nersonnel 	 for IV Assumed that instruments are ahnard that
the y are not allowed in the area I	 detect a leaking F2 tank.
e1	 later lI	 or I nos^ihle :hen the gas va
por ma y exist.
snel	 were	
{
bay due (Delayed Effects)
some
^e deployed ^
lie srgniiint effect if the III
ieployed
s roud prevents the gas from
eiten ng into the cargo bay. i
Th+ LF 2 will	 be dumped.
FOLDO,J, k
5 ARID b
APPENDIX 9
PAGE I OF 9
SHUTTLE/MARINER PERFERRED SYSTEM
EFFECTS 011 SHUTTLE 
	
RISK CATEGORY	 SAFETY CONTROLS & ASSUMPTIONS REMARKSIORBITER	 (10)	 (11) (12)
I o The effects on the TUG or S/C is evaluated only if it can
Effects) IV o Same controls as in Column 8. cause DrODanation of damage.
t on the orbiter if o The comDlete S/C is covered with a o It is assumed that the SHUTTLE/MAP.INER S/C and the IUS/TUG arean
e shroud is designed. shroud which	
isolates possible gases the onl y payload items in the caran ba y d1irin g the 11arinerfrom the orbiter. Shuttle "fission.
Effects)
t on the orbiter if an IV
o It is assumed that the OMS kit will not be in the car go bs.y
durino the 'Iariner Shuttle "ission.
shroud is designed
o The earliest time the cargo bav doors can be open is +2 min.
This is due mainly to the time req, for reconfiguration
(approx.	 4 min.) after MECO.
PERSONNEL
Trf—e —ct S7 IV
on	 orbiter personnel.
'ion as
	 for the base line
Effects)
on orbiter lU
ORBITER Same as for Operation I, H ission Phase
t
orrent Effects) I above.
;here is no effect on the IV	 -	 [I	 F• ,)ssi The shroud is desi gned to be resistant
It if the complete shroud ble, becaus3 of to	 F2 . corrosion.
,elieve internal	 p ressures cost of damage
tatthe LF 2 tank	 leak to orbiter. The shroud is designed to prevent
leak through the shroud a high concentration of F 	 va pors fro-
and allow nas
	 to leak	 I escaping into the cargo b2ay.
Jrbiter cargo bav which the shroud must also be vented to the A oassivated line renuires nassivation on g round and is a
-e corrosion. I outside of tie orbiter cargo bay to minor hazard involvinn a GF 	 bottle, etc.2Delaved Effects) orevent pressure build un inside the
.k occurred during this 11
shroud.
Ist) and was allowed to Assumed that an LF 2
 compatible dumn it
the shroud ma y be over nrovided.
!d and cause damage to the
it not Completely disable Once the leak is detected, the LF	 may2be dumped.
Personnel not allowed in the cer,ospace
;BITER PERSONNEL in any phase of flight when there is a
ir—rWn—t--E`ffe—ct—sF leak in the LF2
 tank.
to orbiter nersonnel for IV	 ! Assumed that instruments are aboard that
of allowed in the area detect a leaking F 2
 tank.
as vapor may exist.
Delayed Effects)
cant effect if the ISI
vents the gas from
nto the cargo bay
11	 be dumped.
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I' •2.n7 m ,i,	 is ' • d.: - thA orl •ar, tank ..I1 amt
^1n) th• nut!' Faak• a ra : n tit On
shell.
Secnndory hA'udt rwlAtnd
to dlrDingLr, tnrounh an
Li	 cor^at161h Arr.'s sv5t,w
Anil A nm LF	 c^-^Atihlrdamn sett—. 2
 See eft-re-
t1eR 1, ' ! I Ss ie, 7Lte 1
for tle IlnlLign of d4no
naaards.
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tion.
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i, mission phau: 1.
Saart as for n p- ratlen 1
'
t ltsldn Phase 1.
1-arc'aa61e
1--hahle
Al (eternaf haya•r.
the n.,ylnad.
e Oarwgr to [h. pay-
load dun to rrir,nn
of payload and use•
of handltnn apva rn-
tus. The tank Ay S'
punctured or drrte!
when the payload it
handled remotely,
Projected and
erplo Sive hazard
frW other pasture
vessels or the 5r',
195/TUG, or the
orbiter,
a E.plpSive hezar;
from sources ewer
thanpressure
y es SeIS. Such at
fuel tells, batter
tes t '"""" offuel1.0dller r.il-
ture, etc.
e Fire eternal of tr,
tank, Couldbe
Caused by tma 11 1eaY
:qni ing :ha tee' it
coating Or Igniting
SGre fuel vapor that
e,ISt9 in the area.
e E.terna) corrosive
fluids causing
e
. tat"( corrosion
f the cane Andlar
thermal coating,
'he tikeltd for the
o•ef	
MO
art,, and baseline
syste is as foilars:
?eteTine - tiprobable
preferred - Ire redibie
(due to the outer
shroud enclgsl rig the
ca-plate 5!C)-
7aseline - leyrohable
(%St ­0 dr tM[
they! is M" Char
Ore SSure .else : that
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'referred - lecr.dlbl•
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MARINER/OXIDIZER/SHUTTLE/OR]31TER PR
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!91
,t Lffectsl
Pas%thl• COrrotlt' -, orbiter In tan
cargo bay. Due	 '^_r orn:5urc
th CQr'4" An da':'e is or"" -:Iy 1•'.x
Loan	 at 
11 
in ' '• 7+' rat, nn.
LASt chAacn of r" t'7i of nnlsturn
n tna 'alga ha, e- trto + t le<Aui-•
Of the al[I Lade. ^ Dr"::urn In Rh,
targn pay ks 3o- :. • in g Chia pha5 . of
t1! nsSSlOr1.
Crest's a fire r • ], sl tL,ere
1 •, a fuel lees a: -•	 eve of
the f 2 leak, Al:'.	 Iq^stlr.n Shur'•
is neeArd, 10, t'- r2 It hyp,lrgnl,u
with host fuels.
(Relayed Effects)
See Open. 1, Mkt:': • 1 for effect.
of dump hazards.
PISe, CATfrvlpt a SARTY (1 1t pr1L., s AW"tn!i!"I
11g1
Sara} As tnr nn •ra+1^^	 t:"]^
Tor Ortit.r h-I, .nvlrnmvin[(sbv a5 soar! wn rl MAr,w,t)
Assured tkit t he rVA t4l"
[rr.ial7 g le r1[R	 f2 .	 '; .^
11	 nosslhl^	 If	 a nrhl;xr n.	 nwt	 all,r.n,i.;1fern occur •. nr
,r, h„ d^rinn An e.nrnt hnR Is a fu'1 s/r	 lf.,,f.y,! tin •
moor hatA •d at ^	 .^;It lwdr ry • n s durinq M4gpthe saw E ire the
Fve pg r earn rd S!G wr'rrina ^I11 h^. csnco
eels t5. nrofGl Sn.,k nnsrrduax111
at ed (duihn or • !wnlnr S1[).
thn Ltlw nrhlter will snot^
Orb, t,
it or I yns.rule '
A) I Earl lest Cornin g of	 I Intermediate lent throurn thh
the as rqo bad	 'S — nary tank wall and the out"
to dep 
lay-le"	
:he leak p rotection Shell.	 The nature
S,C and 1'JSM-t ; . to We of th- interedlate leak Changes
orbit, with Clare;
	 the	 lon g er the mission,
the higher thepasture In the tan
This mission phase .11 and the greater distribution of th
consist 0f ire roll ow- Lrz ante it leaves the tank.
	 At
MI ele^enis: low pressure it will arfect only
local	 iter's, but at hiAhor pres-
2 Mission	 injection	 is sures,	 the gas o* li quid will	 be
at	 {..
	 9
• 5 vin,), rare localized and travel	 further
OM$ fine] after 9ECO distances Sucn as water Cui,nq
from a garden hose e.cept there
e Earl!est e.ening of will be a great deal	 J dispursivn
cdrSo bay doors can due to 'a'— and zero 'g" cold,-
be [• r 22 nin. ), 11ons.	 The r. hence a' a fire and
the magnitude of a fire will
a M!sslon Irjectian to Increase as the pressure of the
APlUE (reaches 011 Strean increases.
	 Also as	 the
a pogee at T r 15,9 pressure of the Oat Stream
APCgee kick increases,
	 the Concentration of
is In the' 
r"
iF	 liqud or gas per unit area at
orbit (50 . 101 mILE vol ume	 pertases.
Orbl !).
The primary hazard could lead to
a APMQ 70 CTRCULAR- la rger haze rtls as kSul[ ^! ter
L 2ATT0M idtn orbit). darage eras Led by the primary
hazard,
a Circularization to
Predeployr.	 nt Acti.
vat Ion and Checkout
I f -	 Itors,	 the.
opening of cargo bay
doors.
a 0.ctira t'or.	 to pay-
load d7 10y-rnt
IT -
	 It	 hrs AO n,	 ,
(Cone. )
MITER PEPSO'VIEL{nu Frrent-l%reds
I. ac M the	 . durin7 toil	
II Onsslhte or 1
P	
•re	 snnnndtnn on th.
'Rase of the hiss te- Possllle (n lury reaUinn rat! OF
to personnel late • ac in the	 tSdn	 F with FVd 534IT'
IF PerSan net [	 :,,aired LO en 	 2
thn uroa hay I!v LO an ererggncr-
1Unlikely)
(onlayed Effects)
	 II ar I nnsinl-
5eeO'er, [, ills ti 0n '7hase I for ef-to It
	 of durp "atsrd-
nr]•:rr
(curve • : effects)
• The effects duw ' . : the edrly part of
the mission phase +S not As great as
In the Lat,!,r prlsel be'aUS. the pres-
lure
	
in e we tank with IntreaSe
to tl me. Also, it the leak occurs
during the early ;'ASeS Of ttre mission
thew! IS Mrer t' -P t0 tAY! rnrrective
, CtIon to protr' : he orbiter,
a ;ossible e.tri3O .e dara ge to Lire
orbiter IS thro.c- corMSIOn or fire.
When Cargo bay c 'rs are Open antl
when the payloa: 's being devloyed
the leak may Ca. • w corrosion to the
e.ternel Surfaces of the orbiter and
erp05rd optic.l a'd other viewing
surfaces.
If a leak Occur% the correct i ve action
should be to rr!,e the payload from
the arbiter befrr the Planned time.
If the prOP![la • : were dur^Ped,
e.tenslve dar.-f To the orbiter may
result. See Le.el 11 hazard analyels
On the hazards .v using the baseline
dumpsystin.
! Possible react':^ with Other
_tertAIs and fuels on the 51[ and tug
"US`fi q J-9" • s'arts to occur which
i	 ay cause the c•'7t ter t.nk to
it	 'uptuM which .:,Id cause extensive
Imedia to dare:e to the orbiter,
11.
t r,ssible
e The 04,10.d system helm
deolct'd in Ftqure (TOO
• Thebaseline System Onl
partlaT shro-:d (coae-
eletLrAAICS OMY).
[ There Is to lyste'm cn t
that could [On two, dl! f
control the corr.", .
a No Fff dtttctd rs for det
eenelrtrations in the c
a Anothershuttle launch
,,,tltJ'Ind to altar an
orbiter.
e Tot$ Is a nnnven d•' -I
System.
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.
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AA to r •I AL 51F cant	 t1 ,. to t\n to g" nt thh [arvro Pi 1v
w t S rw the If I was ntmr: nurin g that Boat • , in-
.r	 1.i Slf. "r-	 ,m .111 b^. cantA lfn,	 ihn
riwlar.d f1I•r[:1
orbital	 leak nror,rluI +III nw Initl-
at!•i (deem, or Nnlny SIf )•	 Thw Lw nn. r.	 1, Mission Phs•.	 I. II(	 or	 11	 po,-
shuttl. nrblt.r will wntlnu" ^ °In i•mnnl ,t. lnAr'	 rnr ann,f •, ^ .,r	 1.
oMlt. AI	 Inru rratkon.
ng nl TEA DEASFi'M!L
[Cu"rren[^Eifet`ts]
go impact.
IV
pn;.^Llc
Oefaycd Ltre:tsj IY
impact
f 1h 1. nr	 I
Inn m thn
on *atn of
h f,A 511[15
I	 ens :f hl•
A	 Pro Day load S y aem Alsinn IS thil Orbiter f	 The payl Ad system design it coat
NQTe t l)T	 The effects of the leak of cowcern on the 5/C
,ep ic red in Figure (,on) depicted	 In Fiqure	 (raft).
Is Bat considered on this hat 10 Analysis tun.
(Current Effects]
e	 The beseSine system only has A There should be no Current effects rY d	 The preferred design Vies a full
partial Shroud (covers the for the shroud Should contain the shroud which contains the iraki nu
electronics only). Ifakinq vapors.	 40TE (1), gas because it covers the on dlzer
system also.
e	 There is no system on the orbiter (Delayed Effects)
that could control an F • fire or No direct effect on orb Fter during Ik
•	 The preferred shit"' cotta tot a
11rcontrol the corrosion o] the LF 2 • ca ray phases of this miss Tan beuutr sYst ells designed o1,	 I:	 rent
of capability to off-load the Propel
system far renting o/f the pressure
,n F 7 detectors for detecting cf ng gas Iant either by dumping, venting or on the oxidizer t-k when tht care.
ible
on
	 in the cargo bay, deploying the pay)cad. bay doors are open only.
A
	 Am they
 thutLit launch can be T.,Inq later phases of the MISSIOo lit
a	 The shroud ho-
	 eit of the ouislde
lost i tuled to rescue an dI,,bl.n -part:c ularly If et extended mist ion of the arbiter em	 'S also desireJ
orbiter,
occurs, and alter the dump lin, Is to certain F^ wpori so tote don't
e	 This IS a honvented Willie,
disconnected. the risk to the orbiter leak Into the cargo bay.
systee.
increases, but due to the troll
amunt of t1mA! the payload is nor- •	 If leak occurs and it detected by
Ile in this mission phase, probably the leak detection  system. the
little damage would occur to the propellant Can be durwd throuah the
orbiter from the primary hazard.
F 2
 dump system or versed overboard
Damage may occur AS a result of a
once the doors are o pe^•
secondary hazard which would be the
Have Capability to control
" gas venting from the oxidizer
direction of oxidizer tank renttank LS the pressure in the took
cause
increases.	 The gds Could Cause from the orbiter once the payload
corrosion of etterna] is released from the orbiter and
t"e c^biter,
act Iva ca d.
VOLD0 nt
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MARINER/Sy
OPERATIONS
^1)
MISSION
PHASE
(2)
PRIMARY
HAZARDS
(3)
'tAJ)R CAUSES
OF HAZARDS
(4i
ELIHOOD OF
:;I.ZARD CAUSES
(5;
I
3A
{Con t.} Mission injection to )	 Internediate leak	 (continued). A)	 External hazard.
deployment. (cont,)
(cont.)
•	 Failure to discon- Baseline - Improbabla
nett all appropri-
ate lines and
connections to the
orbiter before
deployment of the
payload into its
orbit,
	
(e.g.,	 the
dump line may be
inadequately
disconnected. Preferred - Improbable
•	 Interference with Baseline - Improbable
fixed objects and
structures when
moving the payload. Preferred - Improbable
Thermal	 shock to Baseline - Improbable
orbiter before the
orbiter can
separate from the
payload.
•	 Inadvertent vent-
ir j of the oxidizer
tank when the
cargo bay doors ar,
open and closed.
• Payload deployment
•	 Damage to tank Baseline	 -	 Incredible
to S/C/TUG checkout from ordnance
release, and tug devices. Preferred - Incredible
activation.
(+ = 11
	 hrs 60 min.) •	 Damage to tank from Baseline -
	
Improbable
personnel during
• S/C/TUG activation IVA dnd emergency
to orbiter- conditior	 IVA Preferred - Incredibly
separation and tug may be required to because of shroud •	 f'u
initial	 burn deploy the payload. protection. ter;•in
(+ = 11	 hrs
100 min.).	 The •	 Damage to the tank Baseline - Improbable
orbiter-separates from mechanisms
about 100'	 and a used to take off
line-of-sight view thermal
	 coating. Preferred - Improbable
of the orbiter is
maintained,
.	 Inadequate heat Baseline - Improbable
transfer throuqh No	 imrr?i
the thermal coating because a
causinq early remotely
rapid oressure
rise. Preferred - improba,ie
LD0	 e^
Ji
f,.
1RINER/SHUTTLE: /ORBITER PRIMARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK 5 ANC
LEVEL 1 ANALYSIS
D :	 , :-TS	 i.i	 "po.SEA?
S V STER A !;D FAC1LMEc
(6)
LSEI+_
RISK
CATEGORI=_
"PRESE"+I"	 SW	 TY CUIOROL'.-
A'.] b-SOMPTIOI(S	 (8)
:FFECTS 0`t
^]Ii iEil"	 SHUTTLE SYSTEM'
A%5 FACILITIES	 ^^ l
RISK
CATEGOF
!10)
LO
Orbiter Personnel
(Current Effects) in the
%o effect IY •	 Protrrt
cor .	 i
(Delayed Effects)
'ossible toxic and corrosive gas II[
,iazard in cargo bay and could cause II	 possibl
damage to 1VA suit and injury to
personnel
	 if IVA was attempted.	 Also 1
some hazard to personnel and equipment
during any EVA performed.	 Also
possible injury to personnel	 in
orbiter if hazard propagates to a
larger hazard when an extended mission
occurs or for some other reason for
causing the oxidizer tank to over
pressurize.
II
Orbiter (cont.)
T	 possi`
(Delayed Effects)
•	 Possible-crash landing and early
termination of the mission.
IV
_	
Orbiter Personnel
(Current Effects)
No immediate impact on personnel
because all operations are performee TI
remotely, I	 Dossible
;delayed Effects)
r'a^0	 ^ac.
ND 6
PAGE 3 Of 9
RISK	 SAFETY
CATEGORY	 CONTROLS R ASSUMPTIONS
	 REMARKSST "' 
• Toxic gas detection system required
in the cargo hay.
Iy	 • Protect optical surfaces from E2
corrosion.
gas	 111
A cause	 II possibl
•y to
`ed. Also
J equipment
klso
I in
i to a
Jed mission
ison for
i over
FOLDOUT 2	 12
A- i4
4	 —
SSION PHASE ( 2) PRVIARY HAZARDS ( 3) 'iA	 , P, CAUsEs nF iiFLPkiis
(q}
LIKELIHOOD OF
	 WD
CAUSES
HAZARD EFFECTS O N
(6)
Rdump
ployment of the pay- Explosive ru p ture of the a Same as for intermediate See operation 3A.
ad from the orbiter oxidizer tank due to hiah leak durina operation 3A. ORBITER
ter an unplanned internal tank pressures. Baseline Sys tam:	 because rCurrent Effects)
ssion extension. o 'Mainl y,
 because of heatino The orbiter may b" sev
sumed
there is no ventand if
that the F of the tank dueto the theleak before burst disabled if this bazar
 system has begn extended time withnut (see
	 Fia. TBD) failure major leak occurs	 (tan:
disconnected. coolent. mode doesn't work as 0ere will be significa
intended, there is d low the propogation of the
chance the tank will ruo- TUG and other parts of
tare if the p ressure rise orbiter.
is nivp ) sufficiert time.
The chance of a major loa
or ru pture will de pend on
the time available to r•- (Othp.r Effects
move the tank thermal
—
coating and subject it to Because of the nature o
space temperatures and effects no other effeC
cool down so that the
o ressure can be safely
containers.
Perferred Svstem:	 The
chance of t is tank ruo-
turinn is "incredible"
beca. •s? of the lea - efor
burst
	 4esign n1tilosonhy
and the use of a vent
s ystem as indicated in
Fi gure	 {	 }
r
E
'OI.D0M	 ^
FLIGHT PRIMARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK 5 AND 6
CTS ON SHUTTLE ORBITER
(6)
RISK CATEGORIES
(7)
SAFETY COWROLS & ASSUIPTIMS
(B)
HA7.ARO EFFECTS ON S.mUTTLE ORBITER 	 ISK CATEGORY	 SAFETY C0117RO
(9)	 (10)
ORBITER ORBITER
I
]V a See Figure
Current Fffects) ]I possible perferre
fects) o Ste Fi gure (	 ) for descri p tion of
 If hazard occurs,
	
it will be a low
may he severely damaged and
baseline system.
order ^unture and because of the o Same as fur
3A above.
this hazard occurs.	 If a o Same as Col.	 (B) of operation 3A above. shroud desi gn the F	 should be
?ci ?nt
occurs	 (tank just splits open} detained for a suffamount of o Vent
significant damage due to o No vent system,
time to off-load the oronellant
leakto	 	 ',
Lio
to n
n of the hazard to the IUSJ
ha
through the vent system,
ar Parts of the S/C
	 to the o Tank desi gned to leak before burst. (nelaved Fffects) III,	 Ii	 oossiblE o The vent must
electrically
Possible corrosion to external sur- be opener	 ',
faces of the orbiter due to leaking pressure-..
of oases through the shroud or
cts 
__
rossible explosion resultinn in o The durr^P	 ^^
leaks through the shroud.	 Could
the nature of the current cause corrosion of o ptical surface , n The shroud i
Pther effects are considered.
ORBITER PERSONNEL
Current effects 1il,il	 PossibleP
'.one because of shroud.
,Delayer) Effects)
If EVA or IVA reouirrtd, damages to
snace suits ma y result.	 41%a cor-
rosion of ontical surfaces may
cause in,jury of astronauts ( corro-
sion of s pace suit helmet view
,art).
f
ri
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LE ORBITER	 RISK CATEGORY	 i SAFETY CONTROLS & ASSIMPTI( i"IS (11)
(10)	 !I
IV	 o See Figure (	 ) for description of
II possible	 perferred system.
o Same as for Col. (11) of operation
3A above.
o Vent system provided or tank designed
to leak before burst.
III, II F^ssibl o The vent must be desiqned to be
electrically oper,ed or to automatically
be opened due to high internal tank
oressures.
o The dung line is disconnected.
o The shroud is vented.
I,II possible
will be a low
'Ruse of the
should be
li pnt amount of
orenellant
tem.
external sur-
du^ to lPakinv
shroud or
?sultinn in
^oud. Could
rtieal surfaces
!d, dama g es to
It. U so cor-
• fac-!s may
>rnauts {corro-
!lmet V1e4V
t-) W- M, i  n A^, -:; 6
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HAZARDS (3)
PRIMARY
	 I	 SECO'1DARY
f2) Ex p losive Reaction i
the off-load system.
:i^,1QN
PERATIONS	 PHASE
(1)	 (2)
Normal
Mission
MAJOR CAUSES OF
HAZAR D S )
 (SEC(Y IDAP.Y)
• Contaminated of f -
load system.
• Incomnatihle
materials of off-
load system.
• "oisture in the
off-load system.
• Inadeq uate joints
in the nioina.
• Inadequate design
of the off load
system.
• Contaminated off-
load system.
• Incomoatible mater
ials of off-load
system,
* Water vapor in off
load system.
a Fuel va p ors in off.
load system
1)	 Unscheduled S/C
off-
1)	 Interme- 1)	 LF	 and F	 nas and
otgier oostihle toxicPropellant
load during mission
diate leak
throulh the byproducts escanina
Phase	 1. primary oxi from the off-load
The only mode for dizer tank system into the
off-loading during :4all	 and th( orbiter cargo bay
this mission phase outer leak or other portions
is	 to dump propel- protection of the orbiter such
lant through the shell. as	 the main engine
orbiter dump system
2) Other space,
primary haz
ards that
required of
loadin g of
oroneIIant.
FLIGHT SE
c,rr
HAZARD EFFLCTS O7 S4VTTLi.
LIKELIHOnO OF HAZARD ORBITER	 tr
CArJSES9ate:2 (6)
51
Baselin e
	Preferred
ORBITER
(Curren
-
 t T(fects)
• Possible extensive corrosion,
and low order ex p losions if t
occurs in the main engine spa
there are fuel	 vapors in the
also,	 the effects of	 Lire ha;a,.
significantly gri!dter.
(Delayed Effects)
,Additional damaq- to orbiter
additional	 time	 for corrosion
RiLS or continue to orbit .+il
i=aplemented.	 The risk of dam
,iropagation	 is	 less	 for the	 l
parts of the mission because
hazardous propellant has b^.en
loaded.	 'feed to perform sc,d
determine if it is better
to orbit or RTLS.
ORBITER PERS(Y INEL
Current EffecE7
• r,o immediate effect on orti
sonnel	 up to SRM separacion'
• The effects will	 probably be e
ienced immediately after	 SRM
(Delayed Effects)
If the orbiter cannot be brou
back to earth safely as a res
of the damage incurred, the li
of the crew are endangered,	 e
ially if they cannot continue
orbit and space rescue cannot
performed.	 Also any leaks in
the cargo bay area presents	 t
possibility of corrosion
EVA 6 IVA suits.
Baseline
	 Preferret ORBITER
11"Wred=	 ImpxImp- (Current Effects)
improbable
	 Incredible Possible major damage to engi
and can be the cause of major	 1
sions b fires in the en g ine spare.
„ (Delayed Effects)
8ecause of the extent of dama.
	 •.r
„ Phase	 1, the orbiter probably won'
be able tc enter into Phase 2.
ORBITER PEqSO',4NEL
( Current Effects)
It is very possible the o rbiter w
be damaged to the point that the c
would not survive because of inabi
to re-enter safely.
(Delayed Effects)
Same as orbiter delayed effect,
FOLDOUT
r^fr^Is
ORIBITER PERSONNEL
( Current
	
fects
'io effects
(Delayed Effects)
Any residual F gas or HF gas in
carno bay ray 9i a hazard to the
suits of astnrauts during IVA
when the carno hav doors are
closed or when thev are first
opened. Also hazardous vapors
may still exist after nayload is
(deoloy-td R doors are close,.
IV
II
(dama ge to the
TVA suit)
ORBITER
(Current Effects)
If an explosion is ex perienced it
Nill probably only be a low order
ex
p
losion and it is very likely
the off-load system will contain
:he LF . Although seae
	
feakaa_
nay ocLr and cause Some ^orrosive
damage.
(Delayed Effects)
Same as orbiter delaved efft.is
for secondary hazard 'IO. (1) above.
ORBITER PERSONNIEL
( Current E fects
'io effect up to SR 11 separation.
(Delayed Effects)
5 robably no injury to personnel
)ecause of orbiter alert capability,
I a Same controls as above. III, II possible
(cost of damage)
III
IV
IV
FFCON`DARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK: 5 AND 6
sear:- -i^aa^•ars-T.r-err. _. _	 ^s..rsa - - -	 - .. _..^I	 -	 :.,.^ra	 •': sra^e ^tmr:^.s7 r -,.r
SHUTTLE /HARI'IER BASELI'IE SYSTEM	 +	 SHUTTLEMARIilER PERFE DRFD SYSTil
SAFETY CD'ITROLS 141n ASSINPTIMS (R)	 HAZARD FFFFCTS n •i ,W! -TLE OR:ITF P 	RISK	 SAFETY WITROLS A ASSU'iPTLONS
CATEGORY
( g )	 (10)	 (11)
III, IT poss-
ible but not
likely.
IV
I or II possible
e The base line desi gn is as is denicted iri
Fi gure ( ). OMS kit hyoeroolic dumn.
a 'lo vent system is provided for the
oxidizer tank.
a The normal orbiter hvnernolic dum p s ys-
tem is used. The LF, would off-load
throu gh the IIJS/Tun then through the
orbiter dump nixin g which gasses
through the en gine xnace.
nRBITFP
(Current Effects)
Possible corrosion cnuioment in tl^
main eng i ne s pace and carno ha-
but not near the amount .."
•-Quid occur in the baseli:	 _inn.
Possible fire for smrll np rixi of
time, Will orobahl y qo out .ien
in ,, rnachino SR'l seoaratior , due to
tow pressure.
(Delayed Effects)
Possible additional corrosion during
later mission ohase5 b.t will be
minimal due to vacuum conditions and
low "g" forces. Also the LF 7 has
been off-loaded so ti., total 7nten-
ltial hazard is sirinifica-tly reduced
Put safety controls beloav into this snac K
e ;,sure that the cargo bay is free of
all FZ gas before IVA is alla,ed.
o Assure the off-load is prooerly passi-
vated and sealed before launch of
the orbiter. Assure all joints in
.ne off-load system are leak free
.,efore launch.
Q Route piping in the orbiter such that
there will be minimum damage 'f a
hazard occurs.
o Keep pressures in the off-load syst^.'
10,4.
o Minimize off-load time as much as
possible.
o Assure there are no pockets in the r,"_
load piping so that no LF will be
left in piping after off ?oading.
o Assure the off-load sys. is isolated
from all sources of fuel vapor hazards.
o Require an outer shell around the off-
load piping.
o Design off-load piping with a high -
safety factor, e.g. 3.0, when the
temperatures in the off-load piping
are at a ;,:aximum.
UTTLE	 I RISK CATEGORIES
(7)
i1, I possible
(loss of orbiter)
rosion, fire
ns if the leak
ine s pace. If
in the area
lie hazard a—,
iI	 (	 11
11, 1 Possible
Same as fir hazard (1) above.
v Assure the off-load i; properly passi-
;ated and scaled before launch of the
orbiter. Assure all joints in the off-
load systfm are leak free before launch.
• ?oute piping in the orbiter such that
-here will be minimum damage if a haza-1
ccurs.
r eep pressures in the off-load system•
low.
a Minimize off-load time as much as
possible.
a Assure threr are no pocket, in the of —
load piping so that no LF2 will be let,
in piping after off-loading.
• t.ssure the off-load system is isolatec
from all sources of fyel vapor hazard
4 ?eguire an outer shell around the off-
load piping.
a '- esign of f-load piping with a safety
factor of 3.0 when the temperatures it
'he off-load piping are at a maximum.
b ULDOLTT^ ^^ :2
QD 6
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SHUTTLE/'% R I fI E R PFRFERPFD SYSTW
'CTS 03 SH11TTLE 0R pITEP.
(g)
RISKI SAFETY CNITROLS 8 ASSLf1PTIMIS
CATE,0R( 10) 	( )
11
dote 1:
nRRITER
Fff"cts)ant
Ifi,	 II	 ces5- Put safety Controls below into this snace The hazards that are inherent in the S/C removal rvthod of off-
ible but nn' loadina the pronellant are anal yzed in the level	 I Hazard Analysis
rrosion enuinment in t ea likel y . noeration	 (TBn), 'iiSSior p hase	 (TRD).
s pace and cargo bey 9 Assure that the cargqo bay is free of
'to te 	 2:
r the amount that all	 F2 gas before	 IN is allo^.jed.
in	 the baseline dnsinn. o Assure the off-load is nrooerly passi- The liYeliho pd of the causes of hazards 	 is hinhl y denen(lent on
refor small nerial of
vated and sealed before l3un0 of the nabire of the system desi gn and the nrgtedure used on the
p robabl y no out	 v^n the orbiter.	 Assure all	 joints	 in nrodram.
SR'i seoaratior , due to the off-load system are leak free •late
	
3:
e
aged Effects} Iii
before launch.
To lower these risk Catenaries without using the perferred system,
o Route piping	 n the	 )rbiter such thatg major modification-, would hr! renuired to the present orbiter dump
ditional	 corrosion durinr there will be minimum damage if a system	 and much more stringent orocedures would have to he
on phases but will be hazard occurs. innlemented.
to vacuum conditions an
Also the LF	 hasces.
o Keep pressures in the off-load system
aded so the total2ooten- low.
is si gnificantly reduced o Minimize off-load time as much as
possible. COkCLUSTOV
,ITER PERSO'CIEL IV o Assure there are no pozkets	 in the off
irrentEffects) load piping so that no LF	 will	 be :f a bump system is used it mast be desi gned for flourine.
left in piping after off-loading.
o Assure the off-load Sys. 	 is	 'solated
la ed EffectsY	 ) from all	 sources of fuel	 vapor hazards.
it	 F7	aas or HF oas in
iav ee a hazard to the
it
(damage to the o Require an outer shell around the off-
troncits durinq IVA IVA suit) load piping.
Irmo hiv doors are o Design off-load piping with a high
then tl.ev are	 First safety factor, e.g. 	 3.C, when the
Iso haza rd-ms
	
va pors temperatures in the off-load piping
exist after payload iS are at a izaximum.
doors are closed.
ORBITER
rent Effects) III,	 II	 possible Same as	 for hazard (1) above.
sion	 is ex perienced it tcost of damage) •-	 Assure the off-load is properly passi-
ly only be a low order vated and scaled before launch of the
nd it is very likely orbiter.	 Assure all	 joints	 in the off.
d system will contain load system are leal	 free before launch.
lt,!ougs some !
	
e
nd cause some Lrrosivro v e Route piping in the orbiter such	 that
there will
	 be minimum damage
	 if a hazard
ayed Effects) III
occurs.
^ Keep pressures in the off-load system
iter dela yed affects low.
ry hdtdrd '(o.
	
(1)	 above. IV
a Minimize off-load time as much as
TER PERSO4NEL possible.
rent	 ffects @ Assure threr are no pockets
	 in the cfi -
o	 to 5114 separation• IV load piping so that no LF2 will	 be left
in piping after off-loading.
aged Effects) a Assure the off-load system is isolated
injury to oersonnel from all	 sources of fyel	 vapor hazards.
orbiter alert ca pability. @ Require an outer shell around the off-
load piping.
• Design off-load piping with a srety
factor of 3.0 when the temperatu res in
the o`f-load piping are at a maximum.
41
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OPERATIONS/
	
HAZARDS (3)
	 tAJOR CAUSES OF	 LI	
CAUSES
Y,ELIHODp OF HAZARD
	 c -.
MISSION	 OPERATIONS	 HAZARDS
	
HAZARD EFFECTS ON SHUTTLE OR. -4
PHASE (1)	 (2J	 I PRPIARY
	 SECONDARY	 (4)	 (5J	 (6)
1	 1) Unscheduled S/C
	
3) Hazardous LF and F2 • Exi	
ffects)
sts ouring	 • Always occurs when the
	 (Curre ORBITER
Normal	 Propellant off-load
	
aas and oth4 toxic,
	 normal off-
	 baseline or the nerfnt 
Mission:	 during Mission Phase
	
corrnsive and flamm-	 load operations.	 red off-load s ystem is
l	 able hvnroducts that
	 used. If system proo-	 Possible corrosion of external orbflow from the exit of
erl desi gned improbable	 urface or back work of F gas intthe nrop?ilant off-
	
Y	 	 2
load system,	 ximprobable = incredible.	
-gin en g ine space causing
corrosion. T
amount of damage will depend on th
amount of F 2 vapor back-washed in
the Shuttle Orbiter at various 10
"k.lso possible reaction with main
combustor products.
(Delayed Effects)
'lane unless all propellant can't
dumped before SR11 separation. The
should be no dama ge eo the orbiter
,ay because it is out gassing duri
,;ion Phase.
ORBITER PERSONNEL
(CurrentEffects)
"D effects on Orbiter Personn,'
(Delayed Effects)
',o effects on orbiter personnel of
SRM separation because the orbiter
i	
Has left all the dum ped LF behind
It is assumed that the car;" bav ,a
e venting gas from the bay a
is off-loaded.
2	 h1EC0 t0 earliest
	 Same as for 7) LF2 and Fp gas and
	 Same as for Mission
	 I14PROBABLE ORBITER
cargo bay doors
	 Mission
	 other toxic by-
	 Pna^r I.	 (Current Effects)
can be opened (T = Phase 1.
	 products escaping
	
Same as for Mission Phase I,22 min). Occurs
	 from the off-load
after first OMS
	 system into the
	
Secondary Hazard ;l).
burn,	 orbiter cargo bay
or other portions
of the orbiter such
as the main engine
	 (Delayed Effects'
space.
Generally the same as fc:
Phase I, Secondary Hazard (1
ORBITER PERSON_N_E.
(Current Effecte
No injury to personnel,
personnel not exposed to the
hazard. Also personnel will
he injured during this phase
to a damaged orbiter.
(Delayed Effect_,
Possible injury to personnel
they enter the cargo bay in
Suits and the suits are dama
by F2 vapors that are in the
I	
I	 I	 even after the cargo bay do
npr-,.
FOLDOUT FRA
	 /
FLIGHT SECONDARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK 5 AND 6
SHUTTLE/MARINFR 9ASELINE SYSTEM SHUTTLE/144'	 NER PERFERP.ED SYSTEM
HAZARD EFFECTS ON SHUTTLE ORBITER. RISK CATEGORIES SAFETY CONTROLS AND ASSUMPTIONS (A) HAZARD EFFECTS ON SHUTTLE ORBITER RISK CATEGORY	 SAFETY CONTROLS
{fi) (1) (9)	 (1(1)
ORBITER
(Current Effects)
• The outlet point of the off-load ORBITER(Current Effects)
I11
• Assure that the
system is the same as for the normal
system is loca
Possible corrosion of external orbiter shuttle propellant dump system. Possible corrosion to the orbiter, of F9 gas will
surface or back work of F	 gas into the2 • Do not dump during re-entry when
but less than the base-line system minilAized.
Hain engine space causing recirculation condition can exist. F!ump be cause of the optimum location of
the outlet of the off-load system. • Do not dump ducorrosion.	 The only during ascent or on orbit. recirculation c
amount of damage will depend on the
• Do not dump prior to liftoff. (Delayed Effects) IV Dump only Burinamount of F2
 vapor back-washed into
the Shuttle Orbiter at various locations. • Cargo bay vents are closed at liftoff. N o effects after SR1 se paration •	 Do	 not durrr.	 .	 i
Also possible reaction with main engine
• Cargo bay vents
combustor products. ORBITER PERSONNEL IV
(Current	 Effects
(Delayed' Effects) IV
`1n effects. IVlone unless all propellant can't be
(Delayed Effects)dumped before SRN separation.	 There
should be no damage to the orbiter car go %o effects after SRM separation.
bay because it is out gassing during this
nission Phase.
ORBITER PERSONNEL
(CurrentEffects)
No effects on Orbiter Personnel IV
(Delayed Effects)
io effects on orbiter personnel 	 after IV
iRM separation because the orbiter
ias	 left all the dumped LF	 behind.
It is assumed that the car^o bay will
)e venting gas from 0e bay after the i
.F2
	is off-loaded. i
(
ORBITER I NOTE 2:	 Assumed that there is no means ORBITER o	 Use piping with
(current Effects) 11 available to blow out toxic vapors in the (Current Effects) II payload umbilic.Cargo bay when in orbit. at the bulkhead
Same a3 for Mission Phase I, Same as for Oper.	 I, Mission space.
	 It woul
Secondary Hazard	 (1). Phase I, secondary hazard 1, all	 welded join
Possible continuing corrosion in
the Main engine space after MECO o	 Provide an F^ d
due to left-over F2 gas. bay so that it
(Delayed Effects) 1I (Delayed Effects)
de gas hazard e
detector in the
Generally the same as for Mission Possible continuing corrosion III so that incipie
Phase I, Secondary Hazard (1) of equipment in the Main detected.
engine space from F2 which leakec o	 There is no mean
into or back washed into the en q ine Main engine spa
space.
o	 Assure that the
ORBITER PERSONNEL ORBITER PERSONNEL o.	 F2 gas before.
(Current Effects) (Current Effects)
No injury to personnel, for No Effects IV
personnel not exposed to the
hazard.	 Also personnel will not
be injured during this phase due
to a damaged orbiter.
(Delayed Effects) (Delayed Effects)
Possible injury to personnel
	 if III, Same as for Oper.I, Mission Phase
	
1, 11
they enter the cargo bay in space II	 possible Secondary hazard 1. (damage to
suits and the suits are damaged (breathing toxic the	 IVA suit:
by F2 vapors that are in the bay vapor )
even after the cargo bay doors are
open.
r'DLDOUT ^
t^
ii'ASK S AND 6
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SHUTTLE
RO EFFECTS ON SHUTTLE ORBITER
(3)
/4ARINER PERFERRED
uISK CATEGORY
(10)
SYSTEM
111F'7Y CONTROLS A ASSUMPTID'IS 	 (Ili "ARKS
—
	
12)
ORBITER
{Currant Effects}
I11
• Assure that the outlet of the off-} pad t5traioht foret^ard desi gn problem.
system is located so that the back work
ible corrosion to the orbiter, of F	 qas will be eliminated or
less than the base-line s yster minimized.
Ise of the cotimum location of
wtlet of the off-load system. • Do not dump during re-entry when
recirculation condition can exist.
(relaved Effects) IV Dump only during asc.:nt or on orbit.
Ffects after SRM se p aration • Do not dump prior- to liftoff.
• Cargo bay vents are closed at liftoff.
ORBITER PERSONNEL IV
Current Fffects
Ffects. IV
(Delayed Effects)
Ffects after SR4 separation.
ORBITER o	 Use piping witli no joints from the NOTE 1:	 The only allowed off-load made during this phase is
(Current Effects) II payload ;imbilic:l	 to the connection *.n dump and not deploy the payload into orbit.
is	 for Oper.	 1, Mission
at the bulkhead in the main engine
space.	 It would be desirable to use
1, secondary hazard
	 1. all welded joints.
Ile continuing corrosion in
On engine space after MECC o	 Provide an F2 detector- in the cargo
left-over F2 gas. bay so that it will 	 be known if a
F2 gas hazard exists.
	 Provide a
(Delayed Effects) detector in the S/C shruud also,
fle continuing corrosion [lI so that incipient leaks may be
H pment in the Main detected.
! space from F2 which leaked o	 There is on means to purge the
'neit back washed into the e% Main engine space.
o	 Assure that the Cargo bay is free
ORBITER PERSONNEL of F2 gas before IVA is allowed.
(Current Effects)
'ects
(Delayed Effects)
s for Oper I, Mission Phase 1, II
ary hazard 1. (damage to
the IVA suit)
.C,
7^ ii
^I^iYJO VU^-'^3
A-57
MAJOR CAUSES	 LIKELIHOOD 01
Or HAZARDS
	 HAZARD CADS::,
(4	 1	 (5)
ame as for Oper.l, Same as for Oper. I,
Mission Phase (1), 	 Mission Phase (1),
secondary hazard	 Secondary Hazard (2)
2},	 above.
PASELINE	 IMPROBABLE X
CRFD15LE n IMPROBABLE
VERATION{1)
I
(Normal}
MISSION	 I
PHASE
(2)	 PRIMARY
Same as Mission Phase
	 Same as f
(2) above.	 Mission
chase (1)
HAZARDS (3)
SECONDARY
r 2) Explosive reaction
to the off-load
system.
FLIGHT SECOND
$HJIILE/MAR:'.	 I -L : :._ ^r.SSiLC
3) Hazardous LF2 and F2 o The LF2 or F2
	 The existence of F2
gas and other toxic	 gas always	 gas hazard always occurs
corrosive and	 exists during a
	 when the gas is dumped.
flammable products	 normal dump	 The chance of enveloping
that flaw from the	 operation. The	 the orbiter with toxic
exit of the pro-	 formation of the gas is small and depends
pellant off-load	 cloud around the on the orbital condition
system and due to	 orbiter depends	 and the design of the
vacuum condition	 on the condition exit nozzle and the
and zero "g" form a	 at the time of	 location of the nozzle.
cloud on or near the	 the dump. The	 (IMPROBABLE)
orbiter. Also toxic	 initial rebore
gas cloud presents a 	 of F2 will flow
hazard to the arbi-	 a large distance
ter in other orbits	 away frog.  the
when the dispersion	 orbiter, but the
is sufficient to	 direction of th,
lower the concen-	 gas cloud flow
tration to an	 depends on the
acceptable level.	 design of the
exit nozzle.
,ZARn EFFECTS ON RISK
SHUTTLE ORBITER CATEGORIES
(6) (7)
ORBITER
(Current Effects) I
Possible major damage to the engine
I
space due to low-order explosions.
Also major corrosion to the orbiter
cargo bay.
(Delayed Effects)
Continued corrosion of the Main engine I!
space and orbiter cargo bay due to F2
Left over in the areas due to the inci-.
dent.	 The effect on reentry capability
is not known at this time.
ORBITER PERSONNEL
(Current Effects) III,
Possible major injury to personnel bait
It
	
Possibi,
not likely because the incident happens
when the orbiter is going into orbit.
If orbit couldn't be achieved, AOA
would have to be attempted.
(Delayed Effects)
Possible damage to Space Suit and !	
possible Ion
wholo crew
injury or death to personne l in sui
if individual enters cargo bay when
high conczntration of toxic vapor
exists.	 Also possible death due to
failure to reenter atmosphere safely.
ORBITER
(Current Effects) III,
II	 possible
Sam e as for Oper.	 I, Mission Phase (1), depending on
Secondary Hazard (3). location and
design of exit,
nozzle.
(Delayed Effects) III
Possible injection of toxic vapor ir,
cargo bay causing corrosion of equip-
ment.	 Depends on the pressure in
cargo bay atmosphere, and location and
design of nozzle.
	 Also orbiter may
pass through the toxic and corrosive
3as cloud an another orbit.
ORBITER PERSONNEL
(Current Effects) III,
If toxic and corrosive F2 gas is
II	 possit'
infested into thecargo ba f . a hazard
to the personnel space su`,ts will exist
and there by prevent a possible chance
of injuring to personnel	 n the sv+!^..
(Delayed Effects)
Sams as for current effects.
u 5^7u
OOLDOUT ERA,	 ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
'AFETY CONTROLS	 HAZARD EFFECTS ON
h40 ASSUMPTIONS	 SHUTTLE ORBITER
(8)
	 1	
(9)
SAFETY
CTJROLS & ASSUMPTIONS 	 REMARKS
(11)	 (12)
'o Same as for Seconda ry Hazard (1)
above.
D Provide F2 vapor detection in the
cargo bay area before emergency
entry allowed.
o Design of off-load sys and S/C is
depicted in Figure (TOD).
o The resistance of the cargo bay
structural systems (shuttle structure)
are very sensitive to excessive over
pressure that may occur in the cargo
bay. Over pressures may cause exten-
sive damage to the structure of the
orbiter. Could possible prevent
reentry.
ORBITER
(Current Effects)
Same as for Secondary Hazard (2)
above.
(Delayed Effects)
Same as for Oper. I, Mission n—e
(1), secondary hazard I above.
i
ORDSTER PERSONNEL
(Current Effects)
NO effect
o Same as for Secondary Hazard (1)
and (2) above.
n Provide overpressure relief valve
for the orbiter cargo bay. The
normal vent system may be
adequate.
o Sane nozzle design and propellant 	 ORBITER
dump system used as for other orbiter (Current Effects)
propellants. 
o The Orbiter Personnel environmental	 Possible corrosion to the orbiter
central system is normally operating 	 but less than the bore-line dump
independently of the environment in system because of the optimum
the Cargo bay. There is an interface location of the outlet and an
with the cargo bay environment though; optimum design of the nozzle.
ddditional data is needed on the 	 (Delayed Effects)
designof the orbiter crew environ- 	
Same as the current effects except
!ental central system to see if there probably a lesser amount of
is a credible or improbable chance	
corrosion due to the time avail,hl
chat tonic v apor in the cargo bay 	
for dispersion of the F2 gat.
would be injected into the crew cabin,
ORBITER PERSONNEL
(Current Effects)
No effect
o Same as for Secondary Hazard (3)
i'i
	
Mission Phase (1) above.
o Design system so that there can be
no injestion of toxic vapor into '
orbiter cargo bay.
III
'Ilfr.
:OND.-M HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK 5 AND 6
SriLTTLLrMAK1NER PREFLkkdb SiSiLM
ine r2 will oe aumpea +nto essenn eiiy v	 gumC
will exist. The cargo bay atmosphere
=ssentially a vacuum. The orbiter wi71 be acce
part of the time due to the OMS engine burn. T
gas will be vented under pressure.
o• Assorted the dump occurred after the last ones h.
the earliest possible opening of the cargo bay -:
n Assumed the exit nozzle directs the F2 gas/liqui
angle away from the orbiter. °his means the orh;ter
system will probably have to compensate for the fort
created.
o -his hazard analysis does not consider the effects o
, as on the environment outside the shuttle and its e
the earth environment or its effect on other orbiti
rth^,r satellites) that may pass through the ^o y i-
,Delayed Effects)
for	 Nn effect
(Delayed Effects)
No effect
A-58
)LDOUT
in tr.,
Incy
i/C
bay
structure)
'ive over
he cargo
Ise exten-
r of the
!vent
Sarre as for Secondary Hazard (Z;
above.
(Delayed Effects)
Same as for Oper. I, Mission Phase 	 III
(1), secondary hazard I above.
?BITER PERSONNEL
,Current Effects)
No effect
o Provide overpressure relief valve
for the orbiter cargo bay. The
normal vent system may be
adequate.
llant
	 ORBITER
^r orbiter	
(Current Effects)
nmental
	
Possible corrosion to the orbiter
perating	 but less than the bore-line dump
ment in system because of the optimum
interface location of the outlet and orI  
though; optimum design of the nozzle.
the	 (Delayed Effects)
nifrthere Same as the current effects except
chance
	
probably a lesser amount of
o bay	 corrosion due to the time availahla
rew, cabir., ` " dispersion of the F2 gas.
o Same as for Secondary Hazard (') for
:II
	
Mission Phase (1) above.
o Design system so that there can be
no injestion of toxic vapor into the
orbiter cargo bay.
III
ANALYSIS FOR TASK 5 AND 6
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n
SHUTTLE/MARINER PREFERRED SYSTEM
HAZARD EFFECTS 0't RISK S,,iL ,
SHUTTLE ORBITER CATEGORY CONTROLS & ASSUMPTIONS REMARKS
(9} (10) (11) (12)
I	 (71 ORBITER + o	 Same as for Secondary Hazard (1) NOTE 1;	 The F2 will be dumped i nto essentially a vacuum zero "g"
(Current Effects) III I	
and	 (2)	 above. condition will exist.
	 The cargo bey atmosphere will be
(Delayed Effects)
No effect
essentially a vacuum. The orbiter will be accelerating
part of the time due to the OMS engine burn. The F2
gas will be vented under pressure.
o- Assumed the dump occurred after the last ones burn and before.
the earliest possible opening of the cargo bay doors.
o Assumed the exit nozzle d 4 -±cts the F2 gas/liquid at a 90°
angle away from the orbiter. This means the orbiter RCS
system will probably have to compensate for the force vector
created.
o This hazard analysis does not consider the effects of the F2
gas on the environment outside the shuttle and its effect on
the earth environment or its effect on other orbiting objects
(other satellites) that may pass through the toxic gas cloud.
ORBITER PERSONNEL
(Current Effects)
No effect
(Delayed Effects)
c4fect
A-58 FOLDOU1^' _
HAZARDS ( 3) )	 MAJOR CAUSES
OF HAZARDS
LIKELIHOOD OE
HAZARD CAUSES
1PRIMARY SECONDARY 1	 (4) (5)
Same 2) Hazardous LF2 and F2 Same as for Oper.	 I, Credible chance that
hazards gas flowing from Mission Phase (1), significant corrosive
as tar nozzle in conjunction secondary hazard nazard will exist for th
Mission with other fuels, arrd (3).	 Gas may enter external and internal
Phase I oxidizer vapors in the cargo bay by surfaces of the orbiter
the engine space end injection through due to injestion of F2
combustible by pro- the vent system. gas through the vent
ducts of the system of the cargo bay.
main engines.
HAZARD EFFECTS 0 14 RISK
SHUTTLE ORBIFER CATEGORIES
(6) (7)
ORBITER
(current Effects) III,
o Corrosion to external surfaces and I1	 Possible
possible injestion into the cargo bay
causing corrosion and potential fires.
o Also possible burn through of thenozzle I
causing local damage to the orbiter and
possible rebare of an extensive amount
of LF2 into the main engine space
which would cause an extensive a q -.
of damage.
o Reaction of other. hypergols with,
left in dump system when other
hypergols are dumped causing damage
to the orbiter.
(Delayed Effects)
o Possible crash landing if a nozzle burn i
through occurs.
	 If fuel vapor are
ignited, the damage will be very
extensive possible causing destruction
of the orbiter.	 The free liquid F2 sa
eat through other fuel and oxidizer
Sines.
ORBIT PERSONNEL
(Current and
Delayed Effects) I	 He;;isir
o Possible major injury or death if
major damage occurs to the main engine
spare.
M155ION
ERATION	 PHASE(1)
	
(2)
11	 Same as above
;rt
,rations
RTLS
f LiY L.'.iR
AHD ASSUMPTI
(8)
o The design of the off
thesame as that indi
,figure ( )
o The outlet point and
the same as for the n
._r golic dump
	
's
1	 3) From earliest open- Same as
(.^oraalj	 fng of cargo bay	 Mission
doors (T - 22 min)	 Phase i
to planned or un-
planned removal of
payload from the
cargo bay,
NOTE 1.
A) Deploy S/C off-load o Seeprimary
mode. See Primary	 hazard ( ) in
Hazard (TBD) in
	 Mission Phase ( )
Mission Phase ( ) of 	 of operat,,•,
Operation.	 and 11.
V,,,n propellant off- o Same as f:^
load mode.	 Mission Phase (1)
1) LFp and f^ gas
	
of operation I).
and other toxic	 Secondary ha...rd
by products
	 il)'
escaping from the
dump system into
the orbiter care_^
bay or the main
engine space.
When in the
acuum and zero
"g" condition the
F2 gas may stay
in the cargo bay
some time even
with the doors
open. It will
take time for the)
gas to diffuse.
FLIGHT SECONDARY HAZARD ANA n
SHUTTLE /MARINER BASELINE SYSTEM
See primary hazard	 See primary hazard ( ), ( ) in Mission	 See primary
analysis phas^ 3A. Phas, ( ) of Operation I and 11. hazard ( ), i )
in Mission Phasr
( ) of Operation
I and 11.
ORBITER
(Current Effects)	 .-
Sa,e as Mission Phase (1), Seconda,-,
Hazard (i) except that the damage to
the cargo bay may be slightly less due
to the doors being open thereby providing
a means for disoosal of toxic and
corrosive gas.	 .
(Delayed Effects)
Minor additional corrosion damage	 III,
the cargo bay and the main	 11 possible due
rgine space and possible corrosion 	 to crack landing
if outside of orbiter (may cause	 because of lack
etching of the astronaut view 	 of visibility
points). Lack of visibility may	 arv! failure of
cause problems during reentry. 	 automatic la p t;r-
ORBITER PERSONNEL	
system.
(Current Effects)
If personnel enter the area of the 	 111,
cargo bay when the toxic and
corrosive gas hazard exists, the
space suit may be damaged extens-
vely and their lives would be in
jeopardy. The toxic gas concen-
tration should be less during thi
phase than up to,t+22 minutes.
(Delayed Effects).
Injury may occur due to crash land-
ing due to inadequate visibility
during landing.
Efferts on per;onnelin cargy ba_
about the same as for current
effects.
.r°nary hazarc .
Phase f ) of Operation
that th,^e is no 1,. ,..
leaking tox,,, , -
• Assumed that automati
are provided in the o
safe landing can be
visibility occurs.
• Assumed there is no
purge the cargo t -: w
door are open
" 4 kw. J ORIGINAL' PAGE 12
OF POOR QUALI' y
tNALYSIS FOR TASK 5 AND 6
PAGE 0 OF 9
SHUTTLE/MARINER PREFERRED SYSTEM
CONTROLS HAZARD EFFECTS 011 RISK SAFETY
CONTROLS L ASSUMPTIONS
REMARKS
(12)WMPTICRS SHUTTLE ORBITER CATEGORIE`` (11)(e) (9) 00
the off ORBITER o Independent dump system used for the ROTE l:	 The location of the nozz;e and the nozzle's design may
-load system is
at indicated in F2 system. not be optimum from the corrosion to the orbiter point(Current Effects) ,III
I[ o See controls and assumptions
of view in the RTLS made "hers it is designed optimally
Pds5fble corrosion of extern:,'.
passible indicated in Operation 11 A and from the damage point of view for the dump of F2 during
at and nozzle design is
surfaces because of reentry air
depending on
exit and -.econdar	 hazard (1).y
the normal m15.ian phases.
the normal payload
f system. and vapor distribution patterns. nozzle „ Optimize the ;ocation of the exit
Poss€ble €njest€on of vapors into design. point and the nuzzle design for
cargo bay causing same corrosion. NOTE	 1. dumping during the normal mission
Possible local corrosion around during the RTLS about madr.;rd
nozzle depending on the nozzle
design.	 Corrosive damage to crew
stew ports (windows)
(Delayed Effects) Ill,
.ossible fire in the cargo bay as
11 possible
depending on
- the orbiter enters the atmosphere. the nozzles
-
:Jso possfble corrosion of cargo design and 
!,ay surfaces. its	 location.
ORBIT PERSONNEL
(Current Effects)
injury to personnel.
(Delayed Effects) Ill.
'ossihle toxic gas hazard	 in	 ;..^
1
1 11 PossW
cargo bay after Iandirg and
possible residual F2 is theS/C
oxidizer system and dump system
after landing.
See prix	 y hazard {	 },	 (	 )	 in 5aa primary Ssprimary hazard in i3ssior TOTE 1:	 During this mission phase. the payload propellant may De
!! issi^	 :hase O of Operation xission Phase {SA) of Operation 1 and 11 off-loaded ny removing the 5/C from the orbiter or b,
±nd
	 - phase (	 ) of dumping the propellant through the dump system.	 It is
Operation I assumed that the cargo bay doors	 ill be opened when
and 11. the propellant is off-loaded through the dump system.
ORBITER HOT[ 2:	 There is no means or dumping propellant when off loading
the bore line design S/C.
(Current Effects) III Same as for Operation 1, Mission Phase (1),
See	 hazard ( ), (	 ) in Mission Phase (	 1o	 primary
d	 l	 ),	 {)	 to Massi m en;stole corrosive damage to main Secondary Hazard (1).y arid
	
I1.of Operation I 
anon 1 and lI assumed engine space and orbiter cargo bay
means to purge the but to a lesser extent than that
es_ required for the bore line dump
system_
tokatic landing systems
the orbiter so that a
I be made if loss of (Delayed Effeci- :: o Same as above.
rs. Minor corrosion to Orbiter but n o Design of the dump system prevents
s no means available to corrosion of vier points in crew significant reduction in visibilit}
^ay	 .:en the cargo bay area.	 Due to the design of the of astronaut view ports.
dump system the gas either went in
o No personnel allowed in cargy bay area
-
on the windows or the
concentration will be so low that if corrosive and toxic gas level Is
-
visibility will not be impaired. too high.
ORBITER PERSONNEL n Shuttle has an effective F2 toxic r^s
detection system.
(Current Effects) iv,
Nu cffett for personnel not allowed if possihL
in cargo bay if hazard exists. 	 A
.1 is passible if persann?l enter
the area thinking the gas does not
rx.-t	 and it does.
Delayed Effects:
fur current effects except
lessbecause of lesser concen-
!ration of gas in the cargO h­y-
I € V	
iv '
--r— 'I
vi o
A-59
1•115SION
HAZARDS (3)
MAJOR CAUSES LIKELIHOOD OF HAZARD
OPERATION PHASE OF HAZARDS HAZARD CAUSES
1
SHUTT
(1) (2) PRIMARY SECONDARY (4) (5)
II The mission phases will Same NOTE 2:	 The main Same as for Oper. 	 I Same as for Oper.	 I, R
Abort Oper consist of launch to hazards as secondary hazards are: Mission Phase	 (1), Mission Phase	 (1), (Curren
ations MECO then landing. for 1)	 Explosive reactions secondary hazard secondary hazard (2),
A) RTLS SRM's are ejected be- Mission in the off-load (2) except as indicated below Same as for Oper.
fore MECO.	 MECO occurs Phase L
system. The chance of these secondary hazard
after the orbiter is hazards occurring are
heading back to the greater than for normal
launch base at flight because of extra
t = 561	 sec. or 9.35 forces being applied in
min.	 The last part of
other than nominal (Delayed
MECO consists of direction; the chance of
dumping the LOX and
a crack or leak occurring Due to extent da
LH2 in the external is greater. phase, the orbtie
tank.	 After MECO enter into later-
the tank is ejected
then the orbiter comes
in	 for a landing.	 In
these mission phases
the maximum attitude
achieved is approxi-
mately 55 nautical
miles.
NOTE	 1.
ORBITER
(Current and
Probable loss of
i
inability to pert
i
VOL-DOUT VM30
FLIGHT SECONDARY HAZARD ANALYSIS FOR TASK 5 AND 6
SHUTTLE/MARINER BASELINE SYSTEM	 ShUTTLL/MARINLR PREFERRLU SYSTLM
HAZARD EFFECTS ON
SHUTTLE ORBITER
(6)
RISK
CATEGORIES
(7)
SAFETY CONTROLS
AND ASSUMPTIONS
+	 (8)
HAZARD EFFECTS ON
SHUTTLE ORBITER
(9)
RISK
CATEGORY	 1	 CL'
(10}
ORBITER o See Figure (TBD) 	 for baseline design ORBITER o Same as requi
(Current Effects) assumed. I (Current Effects)
Mission Phase
(2)	 (1).and
or Oper.	 I, Mission Ph_,e	 (1), I o Provide F 2 space suits for ground
personnel at	 and secondaryprimary Same as for Operation I, Missionp III, o Design the Fhazard	 (2).
landing	 sites. Phase (1) , secondary hazard 	 (2). II	 possible to withstand(slightly without leaks
o Provide F2 detection system at primary more likely
and secondary landing sites during than for o One design ob
the time an F2 payload is
	
clown. normal	 flight? eliminate the
(Delayed Effects) o Provide extensive tra'ning for ground (Delayed Effects) II,
explosives in
could be ace
teat damage in first mission personnel	 in handling of F2 systems. Possible extensive corrosion I	 (possible that there is
e orbtier probably will not and problems under accident conditions.p damage to the engine space and
because of the in a million
o later-mission ;hase. possibly fire and possibly cause cost of
damage to the
of contaminan 
of explosion in the engine space to cause an e
because of fuel vapor and oxi-
p
main engine
space.) o Provide F2 gadizer vapors res-ilting from dump- personnel at
ing TST and other propellants landing sites
upon reentry.	 The above will flown.
occur only if leaks in the dump
system result from the internal o Also provide
f Explosion. suits	 to grow
ORBITER PERSONNEL I ORBITER PERSONNEL
suits for orb
primary and s
ent and Delayed Effects) (Current Effects) o Provide exten
loss of crew due to No immediate effects on personnel. i': ground person
to perform RTLS.
(Delayed Effects) III,
systems and p
Possible crash landing resulting II	 possible
conditions.
o Provide means 
from damage to main engine space purge the ear
but not likely.	 If as a result of nitrogen befo
damage to the dump system, F2 gas
 yor liquid still	 remains
	
in the
system a significant toxic gas or
liquid fire and corrosive hazard
will	 be presented to ground and
orbiter personnel and the orbiter
once the orbiter has landed. i
i
;OF POOR QUA.UrY
k'ULDO	 ...
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SHUTTLE/MARINER oREFERREJ SYSTEM
ON	 RISK
ER	 CATEGO
(10)
SAFETY
CONTROLS & ASSUMPTIONS
(11)
REMARKS(12)
III,
II possible
(slightly
more likely
than fer
normal fiight)
1I,
I (possible
because of the
Zost of
damage to the
main engine
space.)
Only the dump off-load mode can be achieved during this
operation.
NOTE 1: The "g" forces will be large in relation to the normal
"g" forces and will be applied to the payload along
different force vectors than normal.
NOTE 2: It is assumed that the oxidizer payload will be dumped
during main engine burn once it is known that RTLS is
required. The oxidizer will be dumped after SRM
separation. It is also assumed that F 2 will be
dumped before other hypergols.
IV
III,
II possible
o Same as required for Operation I,
Mission Phase (1), secondary hazard
(2) and (1).
o Design the F2 dump system to be able
to withstand low order explosions
without leaks in the system.
o One design objective would be to
eliminate the possibility of low order
explosives in the dump system. This
could be accomplished by assuring
that there is less than one chance
in a million that a suffi,'ent amount
of contaminants would be in the system
to cause an explosion.
o Provide F2
 gas detectors to ground
personnel at primary and secondary
landing sites when an F2
 system is
flown.
o Also provide F2 compatible space
suits to ground personnel and provide
suits for orbiter personnel at the
primary and secondary landing sites.
o Provide extensive training, for
ground personnel in handling of F2
systems and problems under accident
conditions.
o Provide means at the landing sites to
pur;i the cargo bay with clear dry
nitrigen before entering the cargo
bay
LDp
A-6Q
